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Abstract
Available literature showed that the Egyptian diaspora (e.g., emigrants who share a
common situations and work for the same cause) has been developing and engaging
politically in the United States during the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The diasporas’ role
was of interest to researchers and policymakers; however, the literature concerning
diasporas has underexamined the Egyptian diaspora regarding its proliferation and active
political engagement. Using the conflict and climate theories of Truman, and Cigler and
Loomis in conjunction with the political engagement factors theory of Jang as the
theoretical foundation of the study, the purpose was to explore how members of the
diaspora explain and perceive their political engagement in Washington, DC. In this
qualitative study, the key characteristics of diaspora and political and social factors of
home and host countries that enable and inhibit that engagement regarding particular
issues were addressed through 16 in-depth, face-to-face interviews with EgyptianAmericans. Maxwell and Miller’s doubled-strategy and Yin’s case study steps approach
were used for analysis. The findings indicated that the engagement of the diaspora except
Coptic and some Islamic groups are passive most of the time because of the political
home culture; despite that fact, the diaspora became active for a short time because of the
Egyptian revolution. Future research should exam those aspects to better understand the
mechanism of building an Egyptian lobby to work continuously and effectively on
Egyptian interests in the United States. The diaspora and policymakers may use the study
results to help improve the role of this diaspora to impose positive social changes in
Egypt and the future political engagement of Egyptian younger generations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The topic of the study was the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora in
the United States in the context of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the events that
followed, including the 2013 revolution. The focus of the study was on the politically
active Egyptian population in the Washington, DC metropolitan area employing the
Alliance of Egyptian Americans (AEA) group as a representative case for that
population. The 2011 revolution began as demonstrations on January 25, 2011, Egyptian
National Police Day, with an announced goal of social and political reforms (Heggy,
2011) The Egyptian diaspora abroad supported the protesters (Müller-Funk, 2016, pp.
357-358). February 11, 2011 marked the end of the 30 years of the Mubarak regime
(Heggy, 2011).
The protesters assumed this triumph marked the complete end of that era, and a
new goal emerged: a civic regime in Egypt; however, according to Heggy (2011), later in
2011, it became clear that although Mubarak had gone, the regime itself was only
weakened, not toppled. People kept demonstrating widely, demanding “social justice,
freedom, and welfare” (Heggy, 2011). The 2011 revolutionary triumph was followed by
consequences: A military rule was instituted preventing democratic transition (Habatamu,
2017, p. 44). The Muslim Brotherhood ruled the country for one year; however, the
second revolution on June 30, 2013, against them followed this event.
Researchers disagree over whether June 30 was a revolution or rather a coup.
There is also significant disagreement on whether 2011 was a revolution or a foreign
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conspiracy that was based on hidden cooperation between the Western states and
domestic Islamic powers. Regardless of that disagreement, there is a lack of national as
well as international consensus on whether both events were beneficial or harmful to the
country. The study-collected data will provide evidence to support these substantive
statements later in Chapters 4 and 5.
The 2011 revolution also caused tremendous changes in the role and influence of
the domestic Egyptian political powers and civil society as well as the role and influence
of Egyptians living abroad (El-Saeed, 2012). The main assumption of my study was that
the 2011 and 2013 revolutions have had significant effects on the Egyptian group living
abroad—their interests as well as their political engagement. I tested this assumption
based on my study participants’ answers to the interview questions. The 2011 revolution
and several changes in the Egyptian ruling administrations have imposed profound and
broad changes in Egyptians’ political attitudes and engagement inside Egypt and abroad
(Severo & Zuolo, 2012, p. 8). Severo and Zuolo (2012) cited Médam’s summary of the
changing status of this diaspora as “still fluid, shifting, [and] floating” (p. 7).
Having said that, I found that comparing the Egyptian case to other diasporas such
as the Korean and Jewish diasporas can be beneficial. Jang’s (2012, 2014) work
contributed to the base of my theoretical foundation. About the Korean case, Jang (2014)
wrote, “Scholars as well as the Korean community leaders posit that Koreans are
becoming more politically conscious and have been since the 1992 Los Angeles riot” (p.
634). Similarly, the Egyptian diaspora had a historic event that affected its style of
political engagement and social changes.
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There are many essential differences between the Korean and Egyptian cases;
however, a similar situation—lack of interest in political engagement and a remarkable
event or historic turning point—happened in both cases. Regarding the relatively small
size of both diasporas, the Korean American population in the United States is much
bigger than the Egyptian one but is still smaller than Mexican and Cuban diasporas. As I
will explain in detail, great changes affecting the typical passive attitude of both
populations have occurred. However, one of the differences between the two cases is that
the event was local in the Korean case (i.e., the 1992 Los Angeles riots against Korean
businesses) and involved non-Koreans, while in the Egyptian case; the event (i.e., the
2011 Cairo massive demonstrations against the national regime) occurred on Egyptian
land and involved only Egyptians. In the next chapter, I will discuss a number of factors
that might explain differences in political behavior between the Korean and Egyptian
diasporas.
This study was necessary because of its potential social and political implications.
The study findings could enable the diaspora members to maximize benefits to their
country’s economic welfare and political interests in Washington, DC by lobbying the
U.S. government in a consistent, organized, and professional manner. As suggested by
Filipovic, Devjak, and Ferfila (2012), one of the primary interests of the policy makers of
countries became the cooperation between them and their local diasporas dealing with
diaspora and development-related issues such as promoting of networks and strategic
alliances (pp. 7-8). The results of the study can be used to call for improving better
cooperation between the Egyptian diaspora and the diasporas of other countries, the home
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and host lands, and the Egyptian diaspora members themselves. Active diaspora should
support the social progress inside the homeland regarding several concerns, such as
human rights in Egypt. In this study, I will also offer suggestions for future research so
that ethnic minorities could contribute to building a stronger democracy in increasingly
diversifying societies.
In this chapter, I introduce the current situation of the Egyptian diaspora and its
political appearance and engagement. The chapter includes the background of the
diaspora studies related to the scope of this study to better understand the Egyptian
diaspora problem. The nature of the study, its significance, limitations, and definition of
terms are also provided in the chapter.
Background of the Study
Jang’s (2014) Korean diaspora study provided the substructure for my study of
the Egyptian diaspora case. As I mentioned before, both cases have several similarities
that I will detail. Jang studied the Korean diaspora showing its characteristics as well as
its typical passive engagement and the new positive changes in that engagement. Jang’s
exploratory study on Korean political engagement in Washington, DC is the modified
brief of the author’s 2012 dissertation. According to Jang (2014), building upon
framework of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008), the study applied qualitative
grounded theory approach to examine how members of the Korean diaspora Washington,
D.C., provided meaning to their political engagement on their own words. The theory of
Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad addressed the aforementioned general, known factors of
place, type of group, and organizational type.
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For that purpose, Jang (2012, 2014) addressed several known factors that could be
related to diasporas in general, then generated new factors that are related to the Korean
diaspora in particular. Those factors all influence that desired engagement in different
ways or levels. Jang built the theory or model inductively (i.e., it was empirically based
on the reciprocal relationships among the data collected from interviewing study
participants).
In this study, I used a combination of the theory of Jang (2012, 2014) on the
political engagement of the Korean diaspora in particular and Ramakrishnan and
Bloemraad’s (2008) theory for the general political engagement factors. This
combination constituted the major components of my own theoretical framework for
building my study and its findings inductively about the Egyptian diaspora, assuming a
valid comparison between the Korean and Egyptian cases. Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad
suggested other factors that have been found to encourage and discourage political
engagement of ethnic Koreans in Washington, DC, including underestimation of the
self’s political engagement, lack of strong ownership toward the host lands, and negative
perception toward politics (Jang, 2014). Jang (2012, 2014) addressed these new factors
inductively based on the personal perceptions of the participants while giving much
attention to several elements such as religion. I will explain these factors and others in
detail in Chapter 2.
Another justification for drawing comparisons between the Korean-American
diaspora and the Egyptian diaspora is a special quality of the framework for Jang’s
examination of political engagement of ethnic Koreans: It focused on a significant
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weakness, which was the negative relationship between the church institution and
politics. This central finding of Jang’s study might be in contrast with my assumption in
this study about the Egyptian diaspora or might support it. As I will detail in Chapter 2,
the emphasis on places of worship is essential for 21st-century diaspora political
mobilization in the United States and, therefore, was one of the focuses of my research
hypotheses.
Jang’s (2014) research is also related to the scope of my study at several other
points. Jang explored new factors and characteristics that were not mentioned in the
literature, and in my study, I tested their appropriateness to the Egyptian case. According
to Sheffer’s (2006) data, the Korean and Egyptian groups are incipient diasporas and not
old or historical in the United States. In different words, the Korean and Egyptian groups
are different from other, older groups, such as the Jewish or Cubans, and the Korean and
Egyptian groups might have similar time and push factors for immigration. Considering
both diasporas as incipient should not mean that they are similar in total. They are still
different for a variety of reasons including the difference between their home countries in
many aspects, such as size population size and economy.
The general tone of Jang’s (2014) study is negative regarding the past and current
image of Koreans’ political engagement. The factors Jang listed, tested, or modified
implied a deficiency in engagement level and activities. My personal experience and
readings in the available literature and resources gave me the same impression about the
Egyptian diaspora; however, I tested the correctness of this essential impression and will
provide more details on the results in Chapters 2, 4, and 5. Jang gave some
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recommendations for a better future but did not provide promising indicators that the
Korean diaspora future would be different. Hence, it would be more rational and practical
to employ that model (i.e., negative failure factors, or at least, unstable engagement) than
to use a model of positive factors or successful diaspora such as the Armenian or Jewish.
On the other hand, both the Egyptian and Korean cases have a specific turning
point--the racial discrimination and Los Angeles riot in 1992 in the Korean case, and the
revolutions against Mubarak’s rule in January 2011 as well as the Muslim Brotherhood
group in June and July 2013 in the Egyptian case. I found that these events are indeed
critical in the formation of the Egyptian American diaspora as well as its polarization and
weakness and, therefore, was significant. The respective turning points imposed notable
changes on the political and social engagement of both diasporas; however, the changes
from the first Egyptian revolutionary event were different from those of the latter as I
explained in the Chapter 2.
Jang (2014) found that this external factor, the 1992 riot in Los Angeles, changed
the typical Korean passive attitude (p. 634). Ban and Adams (1997) urged Korean
communities and leaders to stop being isolated socially and financially from the other
racial minorities. The authors recommended those communities to “make effort to live in
harmony with their neighbors of other color…participate actively in various events
occurring in their neighboring minority communities …and to announce…actively,
their…positive aspects of their lives as American citizens” (pp. 75–76).
I expected Jang’s (2012, 2014) findings to support my idea that external factors
(i.e., the revolution event) can change the traditional, passive characteristics of diaspora
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and make for more engagement. However, regarding the nature of the turning points, I
had to account for the differences in these cases. Korean Americans were attacked in the
United States, whereas Egypt is far away from the United States. Therefore, I intended to
focus exclusively on the abstract idea of the effect of the external factors in general (i.e.,
the sudden event or turning point) and its impact on a diaspora’s negative or positive
change. In addition, Jang’s grounded theory design showed that not all factors apply
equally to all diaspora groups and members. For example, the influence of a language
barrier on Latinos, Koreans, and Mexicans was different. Jang clarified the different
relationship between the religion factor and political engagement of ethnic Koreans in
DC. With a practical study, Jang sought ways of improving the typical, limited
engagement.
However, generalization of Jang’s (2012, 2014) findings is still possible. Jang’s
findings contribute to the development of theory building for studies on the political
engagement of ethnically diverse groups because the author offered propositions that
other researchers can test and apply to the theory-building process in the political science
discipline. In particular, Jang’s (2014) findings suggest areas for future research on
whether non-church-affiliated Koreans also do not contribute politically (p. 649). In the
Egyptian case, many non-church-or non-mosque-affiliated Egyptians are also not
politically active. Of course, in the Egyptian case, the reason is not always or only the
politically passive stand of the religious institution or the separation between politics and
religion. Before my study provided evidence to support this statement, it would not be
accurate to conclude anything about whether Washington, DC-area mosques, and Muslim
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religious organizations facilitate Egyptian Americans’ mobilization or not. Egyptian
Americans generally might not be active because of other several factors related to the
diaspora in general.
Jang (2012, 2014) did not detail the differences in the religious impact on Korean
political involvement based on the differences among the three types of Korean church,
the Catholics, Protestants, and Buddhists, and sectarian conflicts. Jang just used a general
term, the Korean Church. In a similar way, I addressed the impact of religion without
regard to the type of the church and mosque, their different stances, and any level of
sectarian conflict among them that might include the distrust and dislike seen between
many Egyptian Christians and Muslims in this study. However, the particular question of
the likelihood of political contribution by non-church-or non-mosque-affiliated Egyptians
needed to be addressed by the interview questions as an essential part of my scope.
Although Jang (2014) found that the relationship between religious affiliation and
political engagement was negative or lost in the Korean case because the church was
strong enough to prevent mixing politics with faith, I did not assume the same could be
applied to the Egyptian case, particularly for the mosques. According to Jang (2014), the
high level of involvement in religious institutions has a strong positive influence on
political involvement for Muslims and Arabs. In contrast, the Korean diaspora does not
show this level of relationship (Jang, 2014).
In calling for social change in the diaspora population, Jang (2014) recommended
increasing the impact of the religion factor toward more political involvement to make
that social change. Because the majority of Koreans are affiliated with their churches,
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church and community leaders should be open to collaborating to find ways of enabling
their Christian community and especially encouraging the younger generation to engage
politically without harming their beliefs (Jang, 2014, p. 649). I challenged Jang’s call in
application to the Egyptian diaspora due to the differences in the respective roles of
Korean and Egyptian religious institutions. The problematic nature of the role of mosques
comes from their refusing the separation between the state and religion. According to
Pratt (2005), this separation does not exist in the Islamic Arabic culture, and in fact,
Islamic cultural concepts include the invention of political Islam (p. 74).
My claim was contrary to the social change that Jang (2014) looks for. The social
and political role (i.e., other than worship) of the mosques is stronger than the Korean
church role because some mosques are involved in politics intensively (Jang, 2014).
Many governments do not welcome this role and consider it harmful; therefore, the
desired social change for the diaspora reality and mosques might need to be directed
toward decreasing that extra role. In other words, the role that mosques can fill to help the
home country as well host communities is to act as the Korean church does. They might
need to be limited to the basic traditional role, which is the pure worship, as many
governments such as the Egyptian government wish.
This raises the question of why mosque involvement could be detrimental in some
cases and times. I investigated the outreach activities and political role of some mosques
as well as the American government and local societal attitudes toward those activities in
the literature review in Chapter 2 and data collection report in Chapter 4. Contemporary
religious movements and groups are a form of politicized religion, and this means that
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they pragmatically manipulate the religion as a political medium and combine it with an
efficacious tactic of violence, seeking to educate and change the face and values of
jahiliyyah (i.e., “conscious ignorance”) of societies to obtain political power (Friedland,
2011, pp. 66-67, 75). The minimum outcome that the radical Islamists fight for can be
seen as achieving the governance and religionization of the society and nation-states
(Friedland, 2011, p. 66). According to Benard (2008), “Mosque-state separation and
religious freedom appear to have stalled in Muslim-majority countries, leading scholars,
theologians, and policymakers to conclude that a theocratic model of governance [such as
Iran after 1979] is inevitable for the Islamic world” (p. 65). Maybe some Muslim and
non-Muslim countries have realized these facts, but others still try to ignore or resist
them.
Hypothetically, the desirable features in the Korean American case regarding
activating the involvement of religious or worship institutes in the political realm to
lobby for South Korea could be not the same for the Egyptian case. In the results and
conclusions chapter, I dealt with whether such a hypothesis can be ultimately proved or
disproved. The religion factor will be addressed by the interview instrument questions.
Mehrez and Hamdy (2010, p. 250) composed one of the few studies on the
Egyptian diaspora; it concerned one type, the skilled diaspora, focusing on the
professional members residing in different regions. The scope of the study was limited to
the diaspora-homeland relationships only. That particular sector, the well-educated and
skilled members of the diaspora, is capable of supporting the country in many areas:
investment, human resources, technology transfer, medical facilities, and charity (Mehrez
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& Hamdy, 2010). The authors examined whether and how the skilled diaspora
contributes to the development of Egypt and what are the potential sorts of the desired
contributions.
Mehrez and Hamdy (2010) gave several indications about the diaspora
characteristics and its social engagement abroad; however, the authors also inquired
about to what degree and in which areas the skilled diasporas could engage in efforts in
their host communities to benefit their parent country, Egypt. Similarly, the scope of my
study was limited to certain types of the diaspora members based on their location,
education level, political interest, and other affiliations. This implies that I was focused
on the members who have attributes that can make them a leader or political activist, such
as native-level equivalent influence in English, high education, high income, and so on.
Having said that, the results of this study might also support the assumption of Ceschi,
Coslovi, Mora, and Stocchiero (2005), who stated that the Egyptian diaspora could be
able to canalize new migrants for working purposes; however, formalization of its social
role can be also an effective action insinuating excellent political relevance (p. 53).
Chapter 4 showed whether the Egyptian diaspora members support the new immigrants
or not as an aspect of the engagement and loyalty to the homeland.
Based on the previously summarized research literature related to the scope of the
study topic, there is a gap in this existing literature needed to be covered. Jang (2014)
commented on this gap, stating, “ [the] body of literature on the political engagement of
ethnically diverse publics is growing, however, research on this population remain less
compared to native-born, as many immigrants are not yet U.S. citizens” (p. 630). One of
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the underresearched ethnic groups is the Egyptian. The major need was to know how the
Egyptian diaspora behaves regarding its proliferation and fall, in particular its political
performance. What makes this group or some of its members develop and engage or
disengage in the U.S. political sphere and why that engagement concurs at intervals
needed to be explored. As Sheffer (2006) said, “such studies are necessary to facilitate
assessment of the potential for diaspora’s further development” (p. 250).
One of the major factors behind that style of engagement is the salient external
factor, the 2011 and 2013 revolutions in Egypt. There is a need to explore what was
known as typical about the Egyptian diaspora before that turning point has, for several
reasons, been changed during and after the revolutions. What has been changed in
Egyptians’ political life abroad and whether that change has continued or waned after the
revolution also needed to be explored. Some of the literature, such as Severo and Zuolo
(2012), has addressed the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its impact on the country as well
as the region; however, the current literature has not mentioned the impact on Egyptians
abroad and their political development. Severo and Zuolo asserted that the revolution has
changed the diaspora positively (pp. 3-4). They also thoroughly explored the revolution’s
impact on the Egyptian e-diaspora (i.e., websites of the Egyptian emigrant community)
all over the world, but did not focus on an actual (i.e., not online) diaspora in a specific
geographic area such as the United States—their scope was wide and global.
As the diaspora is subject to the influence of several factors and parties on one
hand; on the other hand, it can be an effective factor influencing the political bodies,
environment, and foreign politics of the homeland and host land. According to Sheffer
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(2006), new world disorder can in part be attributed to diasporas themselves and their
good or bad agendas and conflicts so that dispersed groups deserve additional
investigation. The historically active Jewish diasporas, the incipient Iraqi diasporas
before 2003, and Russians after 1990 are all examples of that role and importance for the
world at different times (Sheffer, 2006, p. 248).
This significant status of diasporas is not limited to the Egyptian diaspora.
Diasporaism is an extreme case in general because of the globalization implementations
and critical complex social and political circumstances of diasporas (Sheffer, 2006, p.
249). This extreme status should impose the present and future need to study issues such
as the nature of the diaspora identities and loyalty patterns. These last two issues connect
to another issue: the confrontation and challenges that diasporas can cause to both types
of governments, the host and home. Sheffer (2006) urged future researchers to answer the
question of “whether or not we currently have strategies adequate to reduce the tensions
and conflicts associated with such groups” (p. 249).
Problem Statement
The problem was that the Egyptian diaspora is not continually active with
unpredictable political and social behavior because of unknown factors that need to be
addressed with research. As Severo and Zuolo (2012) have said, “Few studies have been
carried out on Egyptians abroad, and the majority concerns the link between remittances
and development. In particular, very few of the studies are recent and focus on [diaspora]
political or lobbying role” (p. 7). There is a scarcity of empirical, updated information on
the Egyptian diaspora’s characteristics and the connection between those inherent,
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influential characteristics and the external engagement factors (Müller-Funk, 2016, pp.
353). Therefore, the purpose of this study was to close the gap of a clear understanding of
a comprehensive model for the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora as well as
political engagement factors in Washington, DC in particular.
In general, researchers have noted the importance of diasporas’ influence on the
formulation of foreign policy in the diaspora’s home and host countries (Ambrosio,
2002). Diasporas are an influential player in many host states, especially in democratic
states such as the United States, and they will play a growing role; however, not all
diasporas and lobbies are equal concerning this influential role (Ambrosio, 2002).
Existing research has delineated multiple factors that increase or decrease the diasporas’
role and ability to exercise their power. However, I noticed that the existing literature’s
stance toward some incipient (i.e., groups at initial stage) and new ethnic diaspora groups
is different, and toward the Egyptian diaspora is very different, if not insufficient. Some
studies offered a panoramic image, and others focused on some key diasporas only, such
as the Jewish and Cubans.
Available research that considers the Egyptian diaspora is limited to two major
types. Most of the research, such as Dickinson (2008) on the Egyptian diaspora, focused
on the Coptic sector as a unique group in the United States. The other type focused on the
relationship between the diaspora and home countries, which consists mostly of financial
contribution (Severo & Zuolo, 2012, p. 7). Most studies on political engagement were
conducted on White or Anglo ethnic (i.e., native-born), ignoring or not focusing enough
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on other groups such as the incipient Korean diasporas (Jang, 2012) and Pakistani
diasporas or the relatively new and growing groups such as Egyptian.
For known and unknown reasons, the Egyptian diaspora used to be a passive
group but became very active in Egypt and abroad during and right after the recent
Egyptian revolution based on its action and reaction to the removal of Mubarak (Severo,
& Zuolo, 2012, p. 9). Despite the growing number of some diasporas and their
tremendous immigration waves, the Egyptian diaspora is not very active; therefore, it is
being ignored by governments and researchers. I will explain different factors behind this
situation.
The relatively small size—approximately less than quarter a million in the United
States as of 2013 (Migration Policy Institute [MPI], 2015)—and weak influence of the
Egyptian diaspora might be another reason for being ignored by the researchers.
However, the population of Egyptian immigrants has grown recently because of several
reasons, including the 9/11/2001 event and its offspring. Therefore, it becomes
increasingly important to understand how those newcomers experience the acculturation
process in their new host land (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 3). The increase in diaspora
populations in U.S. society has influenced the engagement of some diasporas positively
compared to some other large-population diasporas (Jang, 2014). Therefore, there is a
growing academic interest in the diasporas and interest groups (Filipovic et al., 2012, p.
49).
However, an initial review of the literature revealed the growing number of new
citizens, good opportunities for political practicing in the U.S. welcoming sphere, and
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other positive factors. Despite this observation, little is known about the political
engagement influence of specific groups, such as the new or small ethnic groups on the
formulation of American foreign policy (Jang 2014; Ramakrishna & Espenshade, 2001;
Sheffer, 2006). This finding shows that my research problem itself focuses on some
meaningful gaps in the research-based literature that my work helped to fill. Such
literature has led to more interest in and recognition of the need to study the factors of
political engagement of some particular incipient or new diasporas and migrant groups,
especially in Washington, DC (Jang, 2012, 2014), including the Egyptian diaspora.
Therefore, there was awe need to explore and understand whether that Egyptian diaspora
could have potential engagement, influence, and success.
Purpose of the Study
The qualitative case study approach is designed to obtain an in-depth
understanding of a specific phenomenon (Creswell, 2013). The general rationale for this
research paradigm is the need to understand how some factors regarding that
phenomenon happen and work in one way or another. Based on that chosen general
methodological frame and the study problem, in this study, I responded to the need for
clearer understanding of whether and how, based on its characteristics and related
external factors, the Egyptian diaspora engages in and contributes to the political process.
That political process, in particular, concerns some contemporary Egyptian political
issues and the U.S. foreign policy toward those issues, which was addressed by the
research questions.
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Hypothetically, the Egyptian diaspora reacts to the Egyptian national events and
not acts or has initiatives. Therefore, the engagement of the diaspora is temporary and
takes a model of waves that need to be understood. Understanding this pattern should
explain whether that diaspora could have potential engagement, influence, and success;
therefore, the study aims to understand that general model of the characteristics of the
Egyptian diaspora; its political engagement factors and style in Washington, DC, in
particular; and the interactive relation between the characteristics and factors. Hence, the
research and interview questions were developed to explore the political engagement
interests and issues of the Egyptian diaspora addressing topics, such as Egyptian
immigration to America, good governance and democracy, mixing religion and politics
and terrorism, and the Egypt–U.S. relationship.
In this study, I explored those issues that were of interest for the diaspora
members (i.e., the study participants) and could indicate their political engagement within
their time context. That time context and boundary was the 2011 revolution against
Mubarak’s regime and 2013 events against the short rule of the Muslim Brotherhoodimposed changes regarding these issues and how the Egyptian diaspora interacts with
them. Therefore, I interviewed different types of people, such as those who have founded
organizations and those who attend mosques or churches infrequently, regularly, or very
frequently. The interview questions addressed this religious affiliation as an independent
variable and how it might affect the dependent variable, which were the issues of political
engagement.
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In sum, the purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore,
describe, and share information regarding the political engagement of the Egyptian
diaspora and its different members and subgroups in Washington, DC before and after the
revolutions. Another goal was to determine the key joined internal and external factors
that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement regarding particular issues or forms.
The 2011 revolution was the major factor that I explored in this study regarding its
impact on diaspora engagement behavior. The pivotal focus on this factor was inspired by
Jang’s (2014) study but aligning closer with Jang’s focus on the existential threat Korean
Americans felt following the Los Angeles riots was not the only basis of this focus. There
was also a need to explore and test my hypothesis about the shift in the Egyptian diaspora
attitude. To do that, I employed a known factor—the revolution—that was of crucial
importance in relation to the development of and change in the diaspora’s engagement.
Other factors were also explored and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.
Research Questions
Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the
joint effect of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution
organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S.
environment elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host country)
of political engagement and the internal factors (i.e., small size, negative
perception of politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the
institutionalization, development, and political engagement of that diaspora in
Washington, DC society?
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Research Question 2: How did the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act
and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns, such
as the Egyptian revolution and the following presidential elections?
Theoretical Foundation
My theoretical foundation was based on a combination of those theories
concerning three connected wings: the diaspora proliferation, characteristics, and factors
of their engagement as I mentioned in the purpose section. The essential theoretical
framework of my study was Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory on the Korean diaspora. Jang’s
model was the basis for generating my pattern of meanings and themes of the Egyptian
diaspora case. Nevertheless, I explored additional proliferation and engagement factors
derived from different cases other than Jang’s model, such as the Ethiopian case.
Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) highlighted the place, group type, and
organization type as three factors that could affect the civic and political engagement of
ethnic groups (Jang, 2012, p. 42). Jang’s (2014) new model examined some of these
factors. Building upon the theoretical framework of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, Jang
also developed new factors pertinent to the Korean diaspora’s political engagement, such
as the lack of organization and religious institutions (p. 637). According to Jang’s theory,
the Korean diaspora has not had a sense of how they might be active in meaningful ways,
and they have lacked opportunities to engage in political conversations. Jang’s model
includes factors that were mainly relevant to why the diaspora was not very engaging or
influential. Not all elements are found to have direct or similar influence on the level of
political involvement for diasporas (Jang, 2014, p. 633).
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Jang’s (2014) theory is the modified application of Ramakrishnan and
Bloemraad’s model of the general political engagement factors (p. 629). Jang extended
and refined that original theory of diaspora political engagement in order to generate a
theory on the Korean diaspora inductively at the end of a qualitative study. That theory
examined factors that might encourage or inhibit ethnic Koreans’ political engagement as
well as ways in which they make meaning of political engagement.
It should be noted that the debate in the literature debate on the diaspora
definitions and identification relates to diaspora proliferation and development. I found
that the theories of identification and proliferation included and were related to the
factors and employed strategies of the political engagement of diasporas. In particular,
Cigler and Loomis (2007) briefly showed some theories of the proliferation of ethnic
interest groups, including the seminal theory of Truman. Those studies on diaspora
proliferation and ethnic political engagement have identified diaspora characteristics and
factors to explain the existence of opportunities for some ethnic and dispersed groups to
be politically influential in the U.S. environment (Cigler & Loomis, 2007).
As I will detail in Chapter 2, when leaders and members act, the diaspora emerges
somewhere and vice versa, leaders emerge, and members act when diaspora comes to the
real world. In different words, “Diasporas have to be invented and mobilized in order to
come into existence” (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 315). The diaspora leadership and
members should be active supporting a specific national cause consistently based on its
feeling of attachment to the home if they want to be considered as an active influential
group in the host land political scene (McCormick, 2012; Oswiecimski, 2013).
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The Korean and Egyptian diasporas might be similar and different in their
political engagement and the outcomes of the engagement factors. The potential
similarities and differences were one of my justifications for choosing the theoretical
framework of Jang (2012, 2014). I chose the Korean model as a key base for comparison
with the targeted Egyptian case; however, I did not ignore other classical diaspora cases,
such as the Jewish in New York and Washington, DC or Ethiopian and Cuban groups.
These groups and the Egyptian diaspora share some political, historical, cultural, and
possibly physiological roots. My use of any component of a diaspora case depended on
the similarity and connectivity with the Egyptian case and appropriateness to the chapter
content. For example, no other study mentioned the underestimation of self’s political
engagement, lack of substantial ownership, and negative perception of politics as a factor
of civic and political influence of diasporas. These factors and others in the Jang model
have much to do with the Egyptian case and do not exist or relate to other diaspora cases,
as I will show in the literature review.
Concerning the theories of proliferation of diaspora and other interest groups,
Jang’s (2014) theory of Korean diaspora engagement did not address them. Cigler and
Loomis (2007) proposed that the surrounding national, tolerant climate should lead to and
interpret the expected proliferation of groups and organizations within the U.S.
sociopolitical environment. As I will illustrate in the next chapter, this theory can be
insufficient to explain some cases of diaspora proliferation and political engagement,
such as the Korean and Egyptian cases. Therefore, Cigler and Loomis introduced
Truman’s theory of groups’ proliferation through the conflict of the groups’ interests.
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The function of theory is to explore and address research questions (Creswell,
2009, p. 49). The research questions should relate to and build upon existing theory or
theories, and I will explain that alignment in detail in Chapter 2. For example, one of my
questions concerned the political engagement style of the Egyptian diaspora in
Washington, DC and why it takes a zigzag course. According to the conflict theory of
Truman (as cited in Cigler & Loomis, 2007), “group formation ‘tends to occur in waves’
and is greater in some periods than in others” (p. 8). As the research questions and study
approach show, my central interest in the current study was how the participants made
sense of the phenomenon of diaspora political engagement and how their points of view
informed the study, rather than determining what actually happened and what they really
thought was true. Jang (2014) adopted this methodological base to generate a theory
inductively, and I will apply the same method to my Egyptian case.
My approach aligns with the theory of Truman for proliferation and of Jang for
engagement because all of these models consider the interest groups’ conflict approach.
The social disturbance that Koreans faced in 1992 was an external factor; it was a calling
for organizational unity and mobilization (Jang, 2014). Group conflict, however, was not
the major element of Jang’s theory. The relation between the existing theories and my
study approach and questions was one of my rationales for choosing these theories of
proliferation and engagement.
There is a body of work called social identity theory that might be useful in
explaining diaspora behavior, and it is more recent than Truman’s interest group
approach. Sheffer’s (2014) new model of convergence and divergence in diaspora-host
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government relationships and the diaspora-home country relationships also revealed the
migration causes and proliferation factors that would be essential for understanding those
questions. Therefore, I used the second prong of my theoretical foundation, the political
engagement factors theories of Jang and of Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, to explain the
proliferation of diasporas. This conclusion might lead to some validity concerning my
study approach. The uniqueness of the diaspora characteristics could explain why it can
be studied as an extreme case. I describe the case as extreme because it includes weak
proliferation, unhelpful characteristics, and unique inconsistent political engagement
behavior, which all lead to notable failure or at least unstable mobilization and success.
The extreme case is one of the rationales for selecting a single case rather than a multiplecase design (Yin, 2014).
Regarding the Egyptian diaspora, extant studies, such as Mehrez and Hamdy
(2010) and Mowafi and Farag (n.d.), were limited to the diasporas’ connections to the
homeland (in particular, economic and financial contributions to the home development).
The scope of research by Dickinson (2008) and Zohry and Debnath (2010) was the
Egyptian diaspora-host land relationship. There was no single, peer-reviewed study
addressing both sides at the same time or addressing the proliferation and political
engagement jointly. Oliver and Montgomery (as cited in Nkongolo-Bakenda &
Chrysostome, 2013) asserted that, to play an effective role, the diaspora should consider
“the conditions in the home country and those in the host country [or the external
factors], as well as the profile of the diasporas involved [or the group characteristics]” (p.
34). That said, exploring why and when individuals establish or leave a diaspora should
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be connected to the understanding of the individuals’ inclinations and the characteristics
of that diaspora and the external factors that affect the diaspora characteristics and
political engagement.
Nature of the Study
The central phenomenon of this study was not the ethnic Egyptian population
itself as an intrinsic case. I selected the Egyptian diaspora as an instrumental case to best
understand the aspects and unique phenomenon of Egyptian diaspora political activities
and engagement in specific Egyptian issues and forms, such as human rights matters in
Egypt, Egyptian governance, and Egypt–U.S. relationships. The issue of Egyptian
governance affects other current issues in Egypt and between Egypt and the United
States. Determining which issue should be the focus was important because the research
questions reflected and connected those issues. If the focus included other forms of the
political participation activity of the Egyptian American diaspora in the U.S. political
system, then it would also be good to indicate what they could be. For example, political
participation can be focused on shaping U.S. policymakers’ views about Egypt’s internal
politics or economy or something specific like Egypt’s position regarding the dispute
with Ethiopia over the Nile River. This latter example might be something that highly
educated Egyptian Americans might be attentive to. Other issues and related questions
could have been how the interviewees viewed the President El-Sisi government or the
2011 and 2013 revolutions or coups, which are controversial.
The overarching focus of this study was how Egyptian Americans attempt to
influence the U.S. government. In previous sections of this chapter, I mentioned the
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issues of Egyptian Americans’ political participation and engagement as well as others,
such as facilitating emigration to America. Facilitating emigration is important issue
because it can include and affect many other forms of political participation. My study
would achieve the goal of investigating the political engagement by addressing the
Egyptian diaspora characteristics as well as several external factors, such as the current
revolution, that could all relate to and affect the weak political role and engagement of
this diaspora.
I conducted a qualitative single case study using in-depth interviewing as the main
method to collect data. The qualitative method guided my research approach in several
ways. According to Jang (2014), The interest of the researcher in the daily, social
interactions as expressed and attributed by the study participants themselves is one reason
for choosing the qualitative method. There was compatibility between the qualitative
tradition and my research activities, personal goals, and designed research questions. This
compatibility justified my personal motives and values for doing a qualitative study,
which aligned well with my abilities and subjective interest in the tradition of qualitative
fieldwork (see Maxwell, 2013, p. 26).
The qualitative design of this study was a case study. In general, the case study is
an approach involving an in-depth exploration of a specific bounded system or case(s),
such as a program, organization, event, and individual or individuals (Creswell, 2013).
Case studies can be an intrinsic single, instrumental single (within site), or collective
(multisite) (Creswell, 2013). I adopted the approach of single case study, including a
small number of embedded subunits (not cases) because of the analytical and practical
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considerations of the study. Therefore, the purpose of choosing a particular Egyptian
organization and some individuals was so they could function as analysis units for this
single case study. I used only those units to help the case illustrate, explore, and present
an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon or concern of my study. Qualitative
tradition and case study design require collecting data from several sources considering
validity issues, and the analysis units should help further this goal and develop the indepth understanding of the case and topic (Creswell, 2013).
Operational Definitions
Some of the key concepts and terms in this study will likely be found in the
literature or everyday conversation and will often have a wide array of meanings
therefore, I provided concise definitions of them. Some terms such as revolution and
coup d’état are controversial; therefore, I did not waste time defining them. The concept
of revolution has long been a focus of study in political science because controversy over
its definition and implementation exists on the media, academic, and especially the
political levels. Terms such as uprising or overthrow might be used instead; however, I
used the term revolution because the relevant literature uses it.
Diaspora: Jang (2012) asserted that dispersion, homeland orientation, and
boundary maintenance criteria could be applied for defining the diaspora term and
distinguishing a diasporic group from nondiasporic groups that could seem similar to
diasporas (p. 7). Bruneau (2010) adopted the physical approach of defining the term,
considering the diaspora materiality in terms of space, place, and territory. On the other
hand, Bruneau said, “In everyday language, the term is now applied to all forms of
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migration and dispersion of a people, even where no migration is involved” (p. 35). This
means that the diaspora term might refer to any population beyond the home national
borders (Bauböck & Faist, 2010, p. 147). On the other hand and similar to Bruneau,
Waterbury (2010) mentioned that a diaspora is composed of “a population beyond the
border” (p. 147). Kenny (2013) has mentioned that the term diaspora is a synonym for the
nature of migration or all displacement types.
These wide definitions could resolve the specific debate on whether the Egyptian
diaspora is a diaspora or not as it will be detailed in chapter 2. I considered and defined
diaspora based on its behavior and identity, not physical shape and geographical
boundaries. In practical terms, a group can be a diaspora if it mobilizes for such a cause
(Bauböck, & Faist, 2010, p. 315), such as resisting the host country’s immigration
policies or supporting the economy or fighting for democratic values in the diaspora
homeland. In Chapter 2, I will continue this essential illustration, assuming that the
Egyptian diaspora is a diaspora. I will explore whether the Egyptian diaspora’s political
engagement exists or not and determine whether the diaspora itself exists or not. The
assumption here is that the Egyptian diaspora exists because it acts and engages actively.
The definition of political engagement will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 2.
Ethnicity: This term refers to the quality that gives the close personal identity that
members of some ethnic groups need and feel toward a policy issue, and that should
produce “the strong identity politics” of that group’s members (McCormick, 2012, p.
339). This identity, as well as the ethnicity power and quality, can be facilitated when
“the strong emotional bonds of large numbers of Americans to their cultural or ancestral
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homes,” have been characterized as the “secret weapon” of [some] ethnic groups”
(Mathias as cited in McCormick, 2012, p. 339).
Ethno-national: Sheffer (2006) imposed this term to identify the diaspora limiting
the diaspora term to specific categories. According to Sheffer, the term ethno-national
defines diasporas as a group of people for whom their common collective identity is
based on their feeling of being attached to the same ethnic nation and believing in shared
values, cultural mores, shared history, and biological traits. The second condition that an
ethnic group needs to meet to be regarded as a diaspora is the actual moving. According
to Sheffer (2014), the group should also emigrate from an actual state or imagined
country (i.e. Palestinians, Kurds, and Romani state-less cases) to live as a minority in the
host country or countries permanently.
Incipient diaspora: This term refers to “groups of migrants who are in the initial
stages of forming organized diasporas” (Sheffer, 2006, p. 75). This term does not mean
modern or new diaspora. This category refers to diasporas Incipient diasporas such as
Koreans in the Arab-Persian Gulf area or Russians in Baltic Sea area are newly
developing organizations and composed of new migrants. They have established
adequate, active organizations in the host land and yet are not known as historical
diasporas (Sheffer, 2006, 2014).
Political engagement factors: I used this term to refer to the external factors that
surround the diaspora in host and home countries affecting the diaspora existence,
influence, and success. This term is detailed in the following chapter.
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Characteristics of a diaspora: I employed this general term to refer to the internal
factors of a diaspora that could affect its organizational development and political
performance. They are another set of variables that could affect the diaspora by
determining its reaction to the external factors differently from other diasporas reactions.
Assumptions
In-depth interviews with the Egyptian diaspora members were able to produce
insight into the participants’ subjective perceptions, but not objective facts of the diaspora
political engagement situation itself. The model of the Egyptian diaspora assumes that
this diaspora behaves according to a pattern of waves that the study findings should
confirm or disconfirm. What is desirable in the Korean-American case regarding
activating the religious or worship institutes involvement in the political realm to lobby
for South Korea could be not the same for the Egyptian case. What can be a positive or
desirable factor for such a diaspora, is not necessary to be the same way for another
diaspora. The assimilation into American societies for many Egyptians contradicts the
diaspora proliferation itself, diaspora-home state relationship, and the potentiality of the
political engagement in the Egyptian concerns in general. Every diaspora needs a waking
up event making the diaspora act and engage. That event cannot be the same in each
diaspora case.
The more the size of the group is significant, the less the group is united and
organized. A big size does not lead an influence and success for diasporas in all cases.
The good example here is the Jewish diaspora. If this assumption of the size and
organizational unity characteristic could be applied to the small-size Jewish or Cuban
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diaspora, it might be not applicable to the smaller-size Egyptian diaspora. There are
factors other than the size factor that can affect that diaspora existence as well as success.
The Egyptian diaspora is an incipient group. This assumption was necessary in
the study context because clarifying it should help clear up several related issues such as
diaspora formation and potential development and success of such a diaspora. The
incipient type of diaspora has not been researched yet (Sheffer, 2006, p. 250).
Exploring the Egyptian diaspora proliferation and role should help positive social
change in its reality, and the political atmosphere of the home and hose countries. The
main assumption of my study was that the 2011 and 2013 revolutions have had
significant effects on the Egyptian groups living abroad—its interests and political
engagement. Therefore, external factors (i.e., the revolution event) can change the
traditional passive characteristics of diaspora and make for more engagement.
Scope and Delimitation
The scope of the study was on the approach of the identified active diaspora
members in Washington, DC only. I collected the data from the target diaspora members,
in their private setting or via online way. Hence, the data were obtained with collective
views from all the study suitable participants. The collection data process and the study
findings scope have been limited by the revolution times and Egyptian populations in
Washington, DC in particular. Therefore, I was able identify major emerging themes
when analyzing the Egyptian diaspora political engagement issues. The sudden positive
and sharp negative shifts of the political powers in the local Egyptian sphere from 2011
to 2013 were deviant enough to catch the attention of the researchers in different fields.
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While this fluctuating mood of the national Egyptian powers and parties also reflected on
the Egyptian diasporas in abroad, it did not catch any attention of the researchers yet.
That was the major aspect of the research problem to be in the study scope.
Other Egyptian diaspora members, such as the diaspora of New Jersey and New
York City were not included in this study. Living and involving in the diaspora activities
in Washington, DC during the revolution time gave me a unique opportunity to approach
the group. Many Egyptian organizations and activists participated politically taking
advantage of being close to the political atmosphere of the political capital city of
America such as the Congress, think tanks, and the Department of State. That fact gave
the members easy access and fast communications with the U.S. official decision makers.
All of these elements do not exist in other U.S. cities.
However, not everyone in the Washington, DC diaspora will be considered. I do
not intend to interview someone who is politically inattentive and uninterested in the
political activities of his or her diaspora in Washington, DC I am focusing on questioning
members who were relatively inactive but became active in the civil society and Egyptian
diaspora organization(s) during and after the revolution, and because of that event. The
immigration status and political orientation were not included in the criteria for excluding
some population members. I chose and used specific units of the population (individuals
and one group) within the single case for the interviews and observations based on the
values only those samples can bring to the study. My study’s scope would be limited to
some types of the diaspora members based on their education level, political interest, and
other affiliations. That implies that I am going to be focusing on people that have
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attributes that make them such a leader, such as native-level equivalent influence in
English, high education, high income, a reasonable level of communications and
interests, and so on. Based on these boundaries, my major unit of analysis is the AEA
group and its members.
Limitations
The small size of the Egyptian diaspora means exploring less than a quarter of a
million Egyptians in the United States (MPI, 2015, p. 1). A small part of that number may
exist in Washington, DC and that should impose challenges regarding the availability of
the data, resources, and studies on this small diaspora. Although the sample size in a case
study approach should be small, I still need to find a sufficient number of participants
who can provide precious information for my study. Mehrez and Hamdy (2010) found
that “most respondents did not belong to any diaspora network…this noticeable lack of
enthusiasm toward diaspora networking and advising indicates a missed opportunity for
the country” (p. 48). However, my research data would tell whether this negative image
existed before the Egyptian revolution, and whether it incurred some tremendous change
because of that event or not. But as I mentioned earlier, based on my first-hand
experience in the Egyptian diaspora field in Washington, DC the diaspora members
became passive or had different goals or motivations that keep them again from being
organized and active. Therefore, I expect the same unhelpful attitude among my study
participants. The survey and interviews that I have designed to collect my data should
prove or disprove my expectation practically. To address this limitation and others, I
therefore decided to apply several methods of sampling, to be discussed in Chapter 3.
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One of my other rationales for applying the qualitative tradition is my set of
personal goals, abilities, and motives. Personal goals can be a sufficient base for
conducting a qualitative study if the questions are appropriate for that approach
(Maxwell, 2013, p. 26). Because personal goals and abilities cannot be excluded from the
research design, they can also have consequences for the findings credibility. I would
therefore take into account how my goals shape and affect my topic and research, design
of the questions, choice of particular participants, and data collection and analysis
methods (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 24, 26-27). I need to be aware of how to deal with any
possible barriers and negative effects of my goals and personal motives. These personal
and practical goals are my patriotic and personal desire to conduct this particular type of
research for the purpose of illustrating and improving the Egyptian diaspora situation and
its relations with Egypt and the United States.
This study topic affects and involves several aspects such as organizational unity,
nationalism, religious perspectives, identity, integration and assimilation, host and home
states relationships with the diaspora, and loyalty. All of these aspects could be
controversial and personal if not emotional for the participants. This expected style of
participants’ emotional and subjective reaction should affect the efforts of seeking the
absolute and actual reality. The nature of the emotional behavior of participants as well as
the study topic, Egyptian diaspora, imposed difficulty in collecting data from that type of
participants and addressing all of the case dimensions and realities objectively. That is
also because many known and unknown control variables and factors involved in the case
and because of my potential personal bias. Hence, using a qualitative case study approach
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and its relative flexibility gave me that desired deep understanding for diasporas within a
bounded system by specific time and space.
Significance of the Study
Based on the justifications I have shown, I will try to drive the attention of the
research toward (a) the proliferation, development, and political role of the incipient
diasporas; (b) the Washington DC area as a critical environment for that type of diaspora
and any diaspora; (c) and the choice of Egypt and the justification for choosing the
incipient Egyptian diaspora in particular.
Egyptian case choice is significant for several justifications. As Jones (2012)
asserted, “The fate of reforms and changes in Egypt will be particularly important in
setting the tone for the rest of the region. Egypt has a disproportionate influence on the
politics and culture of the Arab world” (pp. 459-460). This proposition might support my
general belief that this study could help launch and support future research regarding the
Egyptian diaspora and other similar relatively new diaspora such as the Arab and African.
Also, I have mentioned several times in this proposal that the Egyptian diasporas have
been addressed as a part of the Arab diaspora, ignoring the clear or subtle differences
between the big and small groups. Hence, according to Coles and Timothy (2004), there
is a need for Western researchers to read the diaspora matter from a different and wider
frame of mind and to avoid the current tendency of generalization.
My interest in this basic and applied study and its potential findings and lessons is
personal, academic, and practical. As an intellectual goal and based on the study problem,
this study is significant because it addresses a topic that has not yet been explored in
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detail (Maxwell, 2013, p. 28) has not been accessible. Hence, this study would offer an
original contribution to this area of research and fill in that recent gap in the literature.
Hopefully, this will lead to future research on this topic.
There is still a need to explore the Egyptian diaspora’s political position and
engagement through explaining the intertwined relationship between religion and
political participation in that diaspora as well the relationship of the diaspora with the
most powerful political player, Washington, DC. In short, the rationale of the study
problem is the heightening of awareness for the Egyptian diaspora political experience
that is being forgotten or ignored by researchers and politicians, unintentionally or
purposely, despite plenty of studies on the Egyptian revolution and its influence on the
citizens and the region.
Exploring these controversial relationships should be critical to understanding the
Egyptian diaspora on a general theoretical basis. The grounded theory is not my study
design or at least is not the primary one, and the deductive process approach (specifically,
testing variables relation) is not my primary way of leading to an entirely new
generalized model or theory. Although earlier in the study I referred that Jang (2014) had
used a grounded study qualitative approach, my primary design was the single case study.
Despite this clarification of my design orientation, the findings of the study could also
contribute to advance knowledge in the discipline. Hence, using the inductive-deductive
logic process would be applied to enable my use of complex reasoning skills (Creswell,
2013, p. 45).
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There is always a need for the development of theory building for studies on the
potential for further progress and political engagement of diasporas by offering
propositions that can be applied to the theory-building process and as a comparison
foundation (Sheffer, 2006, pp. 250–251). In short, this exploratory study has the potential
to offer valuable insights that push forward theoretical development in political
engagement of ethnic Egyptians, which could lead to social changes in the reality and
future of this group. Justification of the study significance could also come from practical
goals (Maxwell, 2013, p. 29). This type of goal could include changing the current
political situation and ongoing conflicts or polarization of Egyptian diaspora and
improving the governmental policies toward this group. Also, this applied study will offer
suggestions for future research so that other diasporas and ethnic minorities could
contribute to building stronger democracies in increasingly diversifying societies (Jang,
2014, p. 21).
Hopefully, I was able, based on the study’s results, to have the attention to the
Egyptian government’s ambivalent outlook on its diaspora in the United States, and
spotlight the need for making some positive change in the recent U.S. policy toward
Egypt and the diaspora. The occasional divergence in interests and the relationship of the
United States to Egypt and the Egyptian diaspora are issues that needed to be addressed
by both governments in the interest of a better relationship between the two countries.
The literature review provided illuminating details on this matter. According to
Muslemany (2013), at present, the Egyptian government puts effort into contacting its
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diasporas all over the globe, but unfortunately, those efforts are insufficient, and the
government needs to put forth more consistent, less selective efforts.
After the end of 2011 revolution and its consequences, the diaspora polarized and,
therefore, became weaker than before. The Egyptian polarization seems much more
intense inside Egypt but maybe it is not so intense among Egyptians in the United States.
Illustrating the need for a strong, active Egyptian diaspora that includes community
organization hypothetically can result in raised consciousness and a positive culture. This
desired change could produce a sense of teamwork and unified partnerships and
leadership among the diaspora.
This research aims to support professional practices and allow for transparent and
practical applications for the current political incorporation of the Egyptian diaspora. It is
essential to create an organizational awareness and positive culture that encourages the
members to work together in a professional manner, accepting of the other members’
participation and insights. If these goals are not achieved, the present division within the
Egyptian community, the traditional aversion from politics (a typical weakness), and the
dominant negative organizational culture and experience will not allow for the legitimate
positive influence of the diaspora and positive policy of the governments. Furthermore,
this level of awareness and performance will not be possible without helping the diaspora
realize the core of its problem: lack of effective organization.
There were good reasons for conducting this study. Its scope was broad enough
that it has potential implications for positive social change. Such change might include
improvement of human or social conditions of this diaspora and others by promoting the
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worth and development of individuals, communities, organizations, culture, and societies.
For example, the diaspora’s economic contribution to Egypt’s development should
intertwine with the political engagement in the host country for the home benefit as well
as the diaspora influence.
The advancement of diaspora and the national strategies concerning this
development are essential. The implementation of the desired development can show how
and why the home and host state agencies, policymakers, and citizens should cooperate.
According to (Filipovic et al., 2012), they should think beyond national borders, security,
and immigration concerns; and make efforts to build or support the existing nonterritorial
nonprofit or official organizations and activities.
The weak or unclear relation between the Egyptian governments and diasporas
can be attributed to “the prevalence of a culture of mistrust between the Egyptians and
their government in general” (Zohry & Debnath, 2010, pp. 6–7). According to Sheffer
(2006), the homelands usually are responsible for lack of cooperation and friction in the
relationships with their diaspora; however, the actual situation should be reexamined (pp.
255–256). However, the problem exists not only in the relation between the home
country and diaspora. To enable a diaspora to play the expected roles, it would be useful
for the diaspora to realize what could disable the proliferation of its organizations, and
then its political role. Hence, it was important to address the other external factors
(challenges) that prevent diasporas and their organizations from playing their critical
roles.

40
Summary and Transition Statement
Egyptian diaspora issues were being addressed and proposed for this study
precisely because little research has been conducted and focused on them. My
dissertation topic and purpose was clearly connected to this study problem. These issues
shaped my research questions, data collection method, and analysis process, as was
described in the next chapters of my dissertation. As the research questions showed, my
real interest was in how the participants think about the phenomenon of the Egyptian
diaspora political engagement, and how their personal, social, cultural, and historical
points of view and information can inform the study. The other desired result of the study
was the potential social change implications on different levels and for all parties.
This study usesd a new theoretical foundation that was composed of more than
one previously developed model. Jang’s (2012, 2014) theoretical framework was the
essential framework of my study, and it was based on the factors of place, type of group,
and organizational type. Beyond these frameworks, this study suggested identifying other
factors that might encourage and inhibit proliferation and the political engagement of
ethnic Egyptians.
Building upon this new framework, this study employed qualitative methods
using a single case study approach of the purpose of exploring how members of the
Egyptian community in the Washington, DC describe and practice political engagement
on their own terms. For the purposes of this early work, my goal was not to conduct a
comprehensive initial search, but rather to explore the landscape in a preliminary fashion
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to learn about the main themes, modes, and factors of political engagement that the
Egyptian diasporas have met and employed over time in their host country.
The next chapter will include the literature review as it relates to critical variables
and concepts of the study and the research questions. I elaborated on the background and
Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory of political engagement factors. The purpose of the chapter is
showing the apparent gap in the literature on the proliferation and political engagement of
the Egyptian diaspora in particular.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
After careful review of the available literature on diaspora, it appears that there is
a continuing interest and need for studying the diaspora and many related issues, such as
the factors of political engagement in incipient or new diasporas and migrant groups
(Jang, 2014; Severo & Zuolo, 2012). Therefore, the problem under study was that while
the potential general importance of diasporas is known and while previous research has
identified a number of possible factors influencing engagement, how those factors and
others affect some specific incipient diasporas, such as the Egyptian, or how they affect
its political role are not known. No current researchers have looked at the importance and
uniqueness of those growing groups and their political role in Washington, DC in
particular. A few studies have been conducted on this particular type of diaspora,
including Egyptian, Arab, and others (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2; Severo & Zuolo,
2012, p. 7). Very few of the studies, however, are recent, and they did not focus on the
political or lobbying role of the Egyptian diaspora. Most also focused on the financial
contribution of the diaspora to its homeland instead (Severo & Zuolo, p. 7). Therefore,
this study aimed to remedy the lack of a clear understanding of a comprehensive model
for the characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora and political engagement factors in
Washington, DC in particular.
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to explore, explain, and
describe the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora and its different ethnic
Egyptian members in Washington, DC at the time of the 2011 Egyptian revolution as
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well as the key factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement. Therefore, my
focus in this study was on describing these factors and the characteristics of the diaspora
that have not been addressed in the literature. Ultimately, I aimed to contribute to
knowledge and theory as well as drive attention to a social concern (see Patton, 2002, p.
213).
This chapter includes an explanation of the theoretical foundation as connected to
an exhaustive literature review. It also includes information regarding the key concepts
and phenomena of the study. The purpose of synthesizing the current literature studies
was to produce a description of what is known, what is controversial, and what remains
to be studied. Achieving this purpose assisted me in filling the apparent gap in the
literature on the proliferation and political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora in
particular.
Literature Search Strategy
In this section, I describe the strategy I used to search for the literature. It includes
a list of the databases, journals, and search engines I used to gather the literature. A list of
the keywords I used in my searches is also included.
Literature Source
I searched for relevant literature for review using several sources gathered via
Google Scholar, American University in Cairo, and Walden University’s library website.
I conduced a majority of my research using the Thoreau Multi-Database Search and the
ProQuest Central with full text database. I also collected ethnic data and associated
information from the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale and Foreign Policy magazine
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websites. These sources provided information about diasporas in general and the
Egyptian diaspora in particular, including diasporic Egyptian’s cooperation with the
homeland, the Coptic diaspora, and characteristics and political engagement of the
Egyptian diaspora.
Literature Key Search Terms Used
The principal search terms I used were diaspora, Korean diaspora, groups’
conflict, revolution, political engagement, lobbying, ethnic groups, ethnic identity,
political relationship, assimilation, and Muslim Brotherhood. To narrow the search
process and to focus the results, I subsequently searched for Egyptian Diaspora, ediaspora, ethnic conflict, mother country and homeland, power struggle, power
decentralization/centralization, incipient diaspora and group, diaspora size, traumatic
memory, ethnic clashes, and convergence and divergence. Some of these terms such as
the term Egyptian Diaspora came up with a few relevant results.
The Iterative Search Process
When conducting my searches, I logged into Walden’s University Library
website, clicked search and obtained articles through Thoreau Multi-Database Search,
Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, and ProQuest Central with full text. I tried to limit my
searches to materials published in the past 5 years, but I subsequently expanded the
range. I reviewed materials published in English and Arabic. In the initial search of
Thoreau, I entered Egypt and diaspora on the second bar. The search results displayed
over a thousand articles with “Peer Reviewed” checked, but many of these were not
specific to the Egyptian Diaspora. Using the terms Egypt and diaspora produced results
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about Somali and Jewish diasporas in Egypt and not the Egyptian diaspora elsewhere.
Therefore, I narrowed the search process. When I entered Egypt and diaspora/Egyptian
diaspora on the first bar, political engagement on the second bar, and political
engagement and America on the third bar, the search resulted in about 500 articles from
which I selected and reviewed the newest scholarly papers and journal articles. I applied
the same search format to the multiple databases listed above; however, the results were
not the same each time or try. In addition, I used Google Scholar through my account in
the Walden University Library and came up with much more accurate results.
Theoretical Foundation
A Brief Map of the Theoretical Framework
The purpose of the theoretical framework for this study was to provide an
explanatory, narrative text that can illuminate the major items and concepts to be studied
in the following literature review section, which include the key factors and constructs
and the presumed relationships among them. In general, the topic includes two major
prongs: diaspora engagement and diaspora proliferation. The existing political models
and theories are not suitable or inclusive enough in exploring and examining the political
engagement of diasporas (Jang, 2014). This insufficiency is especially visible in the
Egyptian diaspora literature; hence, I adopted a new theoretical framework developed by
Jang (2012, 2014) in this study that explored several known factors and new factors
influencing how members of the Korean community in the Washington, DC area make
meaning of political engagement on their own terms. Regarding the theories of
proliferation, Cigler and Loomis (2007, 2014) mentioned several theories, such as
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Truman’s theory, that might explain the expected proliferation of ethnic interest groups
and organizations within the U.S. sociopolitical environment.
In order to explore the components of theoretical framework of the study, I
explain the origin or source of the theory and describe major theoretical propositions and
major hypotheses, including a delineation of any assumptions appropriate to the
application of the theory. Next, I provide a literature- and research-based analysis of how
the theory has been applied previously in ways similar to the current study. Finally, I
describe how and why the theory of Jang relates to the present study, and how my
research questions relate to, challenge, and/or build upon existing theory.
Origin or source of the theory: Major theoretical propositions and major
hypotheses, including its delineation. To inductively generate a new theory on the
political engagement of the Korean diaspora in Washington, DC, Jang (2012, 2014)
extended and refined a framework that had been developed by Ramakrishnan and
Bloemraad (2008). The latter one, the theory of the political engagement factors, looked
at the place, type of group, and organizational type to understand political engagement of
ethnic groups in United States. On the other hand, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad’s theory
found its roots in Ramakrishnan and Espenshade’s (2001) comprehensive study entitled,
“Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States” that examined
factors of engagement of many diasporas, without focusing on a specific place.
In line with Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad’s (2008) framework of the three
factors, Jang (2014) also suggested that factors, such as underestimation of self’s political
engagement, language barrier, religious faith, type of group and organizational type, and
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gender, enable and disable political involvement of the Korean diaspora (p. 637). Jang
applied a mix of original factors and factors from Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad’s model
to examine the Korean diaspora. These factors can hinder and encourage political
engagement of Korean as well as other diasporas.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, according to the researcher, Jang’s (2012, 2014) study
has limitations in terms of applying the factors that exclusively focus on one area: the
Washington, DC metropolitan area. Because of those limitations and other similar ones
that apply to the Egyptian case and have appeared in its available literature, I needed to
support the framework of Jang with other theories. The differences between the Egyptian
and Korean cases also suggested that caution be used when drawing parallels between
them.
Several scholars, such as Ambrosio (2002), Cigler and Loomis (2007, 2014),
Kenny (2008), and Zuolo and Severo (2012), have identified a number of political
engagement factors and strategies. Those factors and strategies are related to the
diaspora’s identity and loyalty, environment, organization, group size, convergence and
divergence in interests between diasporas and host and home governments, and
nationalism that were all of interest in the current study. Besides the factors model of the
Korean case, these factors listed above and others explain the influence, success, and
failure of several other ethnic groups and diasporas, including the political performance
of the Egyptian diaspora in the United States. Those theories and models were the
theoretical foundation for my study of the Egyptian diaspora case.
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Assumption of the connection between proliferation and engagement
concepts. Besides the factors of political engagement theories, I address diaspora and
ethnic group proliferation in this chapter. Through my review of the existing literature, I
found that the debates and theories on the proliferation or existence of diasporas and
political engagement factors were not separated because the concepts and mechanism of
engagement and proliferation are also not separated from each other in the real world, as I
will show in the remainder of this chapter. Therefore, I claim that, theoretically, when a
diaspora emerges somewhere, it acts and engages actively and the proliferating and
existing diaspora will have a chance to play its role. Practically, it is a diaspora if it acts
like one. As Cigler and Loomis (2007) stated, there has to be a motivating issue all the
time encouraging people to gather or join the diaspora. In this study, I inferred that
proliferation and engagement are two sides of one coin.
Diaspora proliferation and development theories are connected to a broad debate
in the current literature on diaspora’s definitions and identification. My collective
theoretical foundation considered the diaspora identity and identification and was based
on a mix of theories concerning two connected wings that are the proliferation side
(Cigler and Loomis’s (2007) theories) and factors of the engagement side (Jang (2014)
and Smith [2014] and their other colleagues). The engagement factors also included two
parts: the internal factors (i.e., characteristics) and external factors. These elements are
connected to each other to compose the image of the diaspora performance. Hence, I
chose a mix of those theories for the theoretical foundation and to describe the ways
researchers in the discipline approached the problem as well as the strengths and
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weakness in their approaches.
The Korean and Egyptian diasporas might be similar and different regarding their
political engagement and the influence of the factors on their formation and engagement.
However, I chose the Korean model for comparing with the targeted Egyptian case. I also
considered some other classical diaspora cases that have similar roots in the Middle East
and Africa and are close to Egypt, such as the Jewish, Ethiopian, and Lebanese.
In addition, the literature review revealed that many factors of political
engagement are alike in both diasporas. For instance, both types of citizens, as well as
diasporas members, have inherited negative perceptions about politics and politicians.
Also, I have found that the religion factor is a great ascendant influence on both sides. As
Jang (2012, 2014) did, my study will explore engagement factors inductively, and that
will be my study’s original contribution: discovering how the Egyptian diaspora evolves,
operates, prospers, or fails, something to which the literature has not paid particular
attention. Likewise, Jang complained that the existing literature has not paid enough
attention to addressing the Korean case.
Jang (2012) provided a comprehensive list of research and interview questions
that I have used, with several modifications, as a suitable model for my proposed research
and interview questions. Finally, adopting the theoretical framework as well as the
Korean diaspora case of Jang (2012, 2014) should give a new model for comparison. It is
obvious that the Korean diaspora is different from another conventional model of cases
such as Arab Egyptian diasporas that are similar in many issues and features. I consider
the difference as a point of strength, not weakness. The similarities between Egyptian and
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Arab or some African cases perhaps will not reveal many new details about the target
case. However, there are not enough studies on Egyptian diaspora to be compared to the
similar diasporas.
Theories on Interest Groups and Ethnic Interest Groups (Diaspora) Proliferation
According to Sheffer (2006, p. 250), the need for definitional boundaries of the
phenomenon and its components generates difficulty and ambiguity that should be
resolved first. This step should help clear several related issues, such as diaspora
formation and potential development of diasporas, e.g., the understudied incipient type of
diaspora. In short, studying diaspora formation and proliferation should be combined
with resolving the ambiguity of the diaspora definitions; that issue will be addressed in
the literature review.
Concerning the theories of the proliferation of diaspora, Jang’s theory of Korean
diaspora engagement focused on the social, civic, and political engagement, but there was
a lack of in-depth or exclusive examination concerning the ways and factors in which
Koreans have been formed into and acted as a diaspora. Jang mentioned that Koreans in
the Washington, DC area, a new host for the newcomers, have not experienced the same
strong ethnic or racial tension as Koreans in the 1992 Los Angeles and New York riots
(Jang, 2012, p. 629). Jang (2012) said, “After the 1992 riot, there were significant
changes in Korean communities. Most important, the uprising brought the community
together. Political associations sprung up noticeably after the 1992 incident” (p. 47).
What can explain the positive reactions and positions of Koreans groups? What made
Korean Americans realize that they needed to be politically empowered to defend
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themselves by joining a group? (Jang, 2014, p. 633) In short, what was their reason for
that change: external force or personal or organizational benefit? The answer can be an
application of Truman’s conflict theory or other pluralist theories. However, as I will
explain shortly, a conflict can explain the behavior of Los Angles Korean Americans, but
it cannot be applicable to the quiet Washington, DC Korean Americans.
Truman’s theory of group proliferation: Group interest conflicts. This theory
concerns all interest groups and is not particularly focused on ethnic interest communities
(Lowery & Gray, 2007, p. 135). The conflict or disturbance theory could explain two
different dimensions that are related to the present study: first, the push factor of
immigrating, and second, the pull factor of joining a diaspora after the immigrating
process has completed. According to this theory, interest groups and their communities
arise spontaneously as a reaction to an action, force, or need (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p.
7). When like-minded people gather to address a common problem, the interest groups
emerge and are mobilized as a natural response (Lowery & Gray, 2007, p. 135). Those
“groups organize politically when the existing order is disturbed, and certain interests are,
in turn, helped or hurt” (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8). But the proliferation,
development, and mobilization of the responsive groups do not happen immediately or
suddenly. Instead, the political interest groups come to the real world in successive waves
as a response to the disturbance in the existing socioeconomic or political order and
interests.
According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), the imbalance of interests could lead to
conflict. Changes in socioeconomic development of complex communities and
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improvement of technology and communication could impose a subsequent
disequilibrium among the social powers and create new problems, needs, and interests for
them; thus, groups proliferate and develop reacting to an event or events (p. 7). Similarly,
Rowe (2001) argued, “conflict of interests between diasporas and their domestic
compatriots is part of a significant search for survival strategies, identity, and meaning”
(p. 84).
The interest conflict in the Ethiopian diaspora case as well as the Egyptian case
has some violence, to a different degree and nature, all the time. Of course, the conflicts
have different causes because different parties are involved claiming different agendas.
The Addis Ababa government used to claim that some Ethiopian diaspora groups in
America were actually terroristic in that they carried on the national conflicts by
supporting the “violent” local Ethiopian groups and influencing the international
community (DeWind & Sigura, 2014, p. 178). Probably, the Egyptian governments also
have the same attitude against the Islamic groups abroad. According to DeWind and
Sigura (2014), ethno-national-religious diasporic entities and organizations such as
fundamentalist Muslim groups of North Africa can use violence to promote their interests
in either host lands or homelands (p. 47).
As a reaction to the disturbance and conflict, citizens create, develop, or join
interest groups, and thus the interest communities, or any interest groups, exist (Lowery
& Gray, 2014, p. 135) to expand and invest in existing opportunities in response to the
rise of other counterparts or interests (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 7, 8). Rowe (2001)
noted that their behaviors could also be attributed to “the spread of a domestic struggle

53
for legitimacy and power to a transnational setting” (p. 84). The size and age of those
groups and their organizations depend on the number, frequency, and density of
disturbing events (Lowery & Gray, 2014, p. 135).
The disturbance of the existing orders of life can take multiple shapes, such as
organizational, social, economic, military, or political and sometimes violent disruption
(i.e., the action). In turn, these actions can lead to new needs or interests that could be
protected sooner or later (the reaction) by new or emerging social factors such as
business, labor, or ethnic interest groups. Cigler and Loomis (2007, pp. 7, 8) observed
that the emerging groups’ needs and responses are not always good and can be bad in
some events, such as terrorism.
This selected theory of conflict or disturbance might relate to the present study,
and the research questions might relate to and build upon that existing theory. For
example, the emergence of new interests and the conflict of many new and old Egyptian
political and religious groups and organizations came to reality because of the 2011
revolution. According to Lowery and Gray (2014), “The interest community is generated
merely through the accumulation of these mobilization events” (p. 135). This remarkable
event was a response to accumulated social and political disturbance in the ordinary
system of the country and legislative challenges facing the groups’ and powers’ existence
before and after that event.
Patterson and Singer (2007) observed, “Although Truman’s theory may explain
the origin of groups and their emergence, it does not explain how groups evolve over
time, prosper, or fail altogether” (p. 39). What happened in the Egyptian situation was
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that the old powers, interest groups, and counterparts that commonly were titled as a
counterrevolution power or deep state have partly and gradually retrieved the normal
system of life again. Many new revolutionary powers became disappointed and thus
passive and disorganized again. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, it later became clearer that
the regime itself was only weakened, not toppled (Heggy, 2001). The army and Muslim
Brotherhood appeared again explicitly and heavily in the political scene, leaving only
slight room for political engagement of the other revolutionary powers and reformists,
and much economic hardship for people.
This observation, based on the theory of interest conflict, might explain this cyclic
attitude of not only the Egyptian diaspora’s unstable engagement but also the domestic
political groups and their activities. According to Truman’s theory, group formation
“tends to occur in waves” and is greater in some periods than in others” (as quoted in
Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8). This assumption might also be correct for the other
diasporas, such as the Arab and Korean. This relation between the existing theories and
my study and research questions is one of my rationales for the choice of these theories of
diaspora proliferation and engagement.
Arab Americans have traditionally not been very active in foreign policies or do
not have enough numbers of unified political organizations (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p.
307; Oswiecimski, 2014, p. 66; Uslaner, 2007, p. 307). Nevertheless, they reacted
collectively and individually on different levels to the 9/11 attacks, and its legal, societal,
and political consequences were, presumably, targeting Arab and Muslim communities.
Those groups responded positively to the irreconcilable atmosphere of inequity and
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imbalance of interests or positions. Their reaction was not just to change the biased
foreign policy of the United States, but also to resist some new national policies (i.e., the
Patriot Act), public discriminations, and some public violence toward Arabs and
Muslims. They also reacted to maintain the balance with other groups who took
advantage of the American government, and the new laws.
According to Kalmbach and Moghissi (2009), “the potential for diasporas united
by an identity other than shared origin and the importance of the threat of violence in
maintaining group cohesiveness have added significance for Muslim diasporas after
9/11” (p. 352). Although this sudden extreme disturbance was appalling, it created a
unique opportunity for a new wave of mobilization and countermobilization in the Arab
and Muslim civil society in New York and Washington, DC (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp.
8, 307). Referring back to Jang’s case, the disturbance theory of Truman might answer
many questions I have asked and explain why the riot against Koreans in Los Angeles in
1992 led to political awareness and mobilization for coalition building among the
diaspora members. However, that theory could not explain why this diaspora in a later
time, as well as the Egyptian one after the revolution, has become retrograde.
Conflict theory could explain why and how some ethnic and interest groups
emerge. It could also explain their engagement and role. Conflicts seem to have a
negative meaning or tone; however, this is not always true for all parties or times. I found
that the revolution was a temporary positive factor that forced different Egyptian
diasporas all over the world to react to the indigenous movements and changes in the
country. This event or internal conflict produced organized mobilization and the
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emergence of the virtual e-diaspora as well as actual diaspora. According to Ambrosio
(2002, pp. 169, 184), the homeland’s conflict can be over the national identity, and this
type of conflict becomes a threat to the diaspora survival that turns into an ingredient in
diaspora identity. As a potential result, this menace will be a motivation to the diasporic
communities to mobilize. The homeland conflicts and violence enable the diaspora to
justify its political act and fight for its homeland and its interests and to maintain and
nourish its ethnic identity.
Ironically, Ambrosio (2002, pp. 184, 188) argued that resolving the homeland’s
conflicts and having stability and peace could threaten the diaspora’s identity and change
the public and official attitude toward that group. As a result, the motivation for
mobilization would disappear, and that ethnic community would need to be reshaped to
keep the diaspora’s life and its accepted role in the host and home states. Moreover, the
diaspora groups and leaders might try to keep the conflict going or even create other
conflicts to keep both the home and host governments in need of the diaspora role.
In short, a diaspora needs the homeland’s conflicts to survive, and its identity and
role emerge and continue as a result. The same technique that American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the American Jewish Committee use to maintain their
organizational bureaucratic interests and financial support in U.S. foreign policies
(Ambrosio, 2002, pp. 188–189). Islamic radical groups recently realized how to
manipulate this strategy too. The conclusion is that conflict theories could explain the
proliferation and the engagement of the diaspora in some cases and times. It would not
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explain why the diaspora or other interest groups fail to keep their active status and
existence and how they could develop.
Other theories of ethnic interest groups. Other theories might be able to explain
the proliferation as well as the failure and success of diasporas. Climate theory is another
approach to the proliferation and political engagement of diasporas. According to Cigler
and Loomis (2007, p. 6), a national, tolerant climate should shape the expected
proliferation of interest groups and organizations. American history and sociopolitical
environment have provided this favorable climate. This relatively open atmosphere is
rooted in several constitutional democratic principles, such as separation of parties and
powers, decentralization, and equity and justice. Moreover, we must consider the
vastness and the great variety of the country’s regions, different traditions and
opportunities, open immigration policies that allowed for cultural diversity and
heterogeneity of populace, and U.S. cultural values that appreciate the individual
initiative—all of these factors created a favorable climate for transnational groups in the
United States. These contextual or external features are opportunities that encourage
individuals to join groups and use different kinds of access points to the political
decision-makers at all levels, at least theoretically.
Similarly, this positive climate, jointly with various factors such as
decentralization and division of the federal political system and vagueness of the strategic
priorities of foreign policy, has caused a vacuum and hesitation within the political
process and system of Washington, DC. For example, the reactive policy of Obama’s
administration toward the new rule of Egypt after the fall of the Islamic Brotherhoods
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was hesitant, confused, and confusing (Bamyeh, 2014, p. 91). That administrative policy
allowed several Islamic groups in DC to try to fill up the gap and manipulate that
hesitation and vacancy in an attempt to influence the current American administration
regarding Egyptian and other concerns (Sorko-Ram, 2015).
This assumption is not new and has several precedents in recent history. This
vacuity and uncertainty about the U.S. strategic policies provided an opportunity for
some interest groups, including some ethnic interest groups such as the Jewish diaspora
after and during the Cold War. This diaspora always works to fill up the decentralized
political power structure and power vacuum in the decision-making process. I refer to this
status as political system gaps. The interest groups or political organizations such as
diaspora take advantage of this status to influence political decisions and to comment on
foreign policies based on the benefits of the favorable environment for the development
of such decisions and comments (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, pp. 6-7; Huntington as cited in
Ambrosio, 2002, p. 135). The Jewish lobby did not just fill up the gap; it also achieved
obvious influence on U.S. foreign policy (Bamyeh, as cited in DeWind and Segura, 2014,
p. 15; McCormick, 2012, p. 320).
The external factor of the absence of defined national interests and meaningful
national policies of the United States after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union permitted some ethnic groups to wield influence more than other groups in
shaping that indeterminate U.S. policy. I have found this to be a striking fact: the
vagueness of the strategic priorities of the foreign policy became a common notion that
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could be cited in many resources of the political and ethnicity literature and scholars such
as Fukuyama (2014) and Ambrosio (2002).
Besides the vacuity, weakness of the general structure, knowledge, and sphere of
the U.S. foreign policies might also allow the interest groups to be influential. According
to Perez (2014, p. 147), a vacuum also implies insufficient stake or little stimulus to
change a particular American foreign policy that should allow an organization to work in
Washington, DC. This situation allows the well-organized communities and groups to
shape the foreign policy of the United States (Smith, 2014, p. 256). For example,
according to Pérez (2014), the well-organized Cuban diaspora worked sufficiently well
under an efficient lobbyist leadership and operated in a political vacuum in Washington,
DC in the 1980s and 1990s because the organization did not encounter strong organized
political opposition. The result was an open sphere and opened doors for that smart
organization and leadership.
This theory and its implementations could be interpreted by Baubock and Fiast’s
(2010) model of diaspora as resource. According to that model of comparison, the state
policies toward diasporas will shape the diasporas’ ability to be organized and mobilized
as a valuable resource for the state. Favorable climate and policies of the state should
consider diasporas as a definite source for national benefits rather than a symbol of
weakness for their original countries or threat against their host states (Baubock, & Fiast,
2010, pp. 146-147).
In conclusion, the positive climate for ethnic interest groups refers not just to
positive public attitude and cultural tolerance. As an extended meaning of the theory, it
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could also refer to decentralization, separation of powers, and weakness and vagueness of
the host state foreign policies and strategic priorities. The theory implications also
include the difficulty of defining the public interest, and other circumstances of the host
environment that might allow diasporas to work.
How the existing theories have been applied similarly to the current study? I
would provide a brief literature and research-based analysis of how the existing theories I
mentioned have been applied previously in ways similar to the current study. For
example, the incipient Ethiopian diaspora is an ideal example of the conflict of interests
as a factor of the proliferation as well as political mobilization. This case is different from
the Egyptian diaspora case concerning the interests, levels, and times of the conflict, but
the Ethiopian diaspora is relatively much different from the Korean case. According to
Sheffer (2006), most, but not all, incipient diasporas or subgroups emigrate mainly due to
economic reasons, including deprivation as well as career opportunities, so they would
not be forced. Thus, they have grown voluntarily (pp. 113-114). However, the fleeing
persecution, oppression, and marginalization, even genocidal attack is another set of
motivations for emigration. It would seem that migrants such as Rohingya refugees from
Myanmar today fleeing persecution are more likely to continue to self-identify with their
lost home in their origin country and therefore act like a diaspora in the new, host
country.
However, what makes the Ethiopian diaspora case attractive concerning the
comparison with the Egyptian diaspora case is that both groups share the same African
origin and region. Also, both countries have historic relationships that range from
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friendly to very strained. Of course, the Nile is the most critical issue regarding this
changeable relation, but this matter is out of the study scope because the studied conflict
is not between states but between groups and their state or governments. The possible
comparison might expose and point to the similarity between the peoples as well as
between the characteristics of both diasporas. Both cases include political adversaries
who work actively to defeat the incumbent regime by building lobbies, and relationships
with the host government of the United States. Besides, there are other reasons and
factors for choosing this group for the comparison purpose and that all should be
illustrated in the next two paragraphs and two sections.
Ethiopian groups as an application of the conflict theory. It seems that Lyons
(2014) adopted the conflict approach to explaining that interest groups’ proliferation.
This approach might explain how and why Ethiopian diaspora emerged and settled. This
approach denotes the disturbance of regular social order and imbalance between different
interests in the local sphere. Lyons (2014) believed that Ethiopian ethnic groups were a
conflict-generated diaspora, and this is the reason behind its origination in the political
atmosphere of Washington, DC (p. 164).
According to Cigler and Loomis (2007), events of disturbance such as a war can
“place extreme burdens on society, and protracted conflict lead to a growth of groups,
whether based on support of [the war] or opposition to the conflict” (p. 8). In the
Ethiopian case the disturbance of the normal life system occurred because of the internal,
natural ethnic conflict, communist military coup, and the prolonged one-party rule.
Because of the ethnic nature of the Ethiopian society, the local confrontation also took
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ethnic trait, and that caused the conflict to be multisided, lengthy, cultural, and armed. I
would investigate whether the Egyptian case had any disturbance causing the diaspora
members to escape.
The conflict became an identity crisis in a period of uncertainty and confusion in
which the society parties’ sense of identity became insecure, typically due to a change in
their expected aims or role in that society. Therefore, that multi ethnic domestic conflict
led to waves of Ethiopian migrants moving to Italy, European Union, and the United
States. According to Lyons (2014), some of those immigrants framed their country
conflicts in “categorical, hardline terms, thereby strengthening confrontational leaders
and organizations and undermining others seeking compromise” (p. 164). In the Egyptian
case, some groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and some Coptic organizations do not
escape from local conflict only but also escalate that conflict remotely while they settle in
host states. Interviewing some members of those groups should approve or disapprove
this assumption.
The validity of applying the conflict theory and Ethiopian groups model to the
Egyptian Diaspora case. Sheffer (2014) listed three main reasons for national conflicts
that could motivate the individual diasporans to involve themselves while they are
abroad. Those reasons are the expulsion, struggles for separation and independence, and
discrimination and deprivation (p. 43). Those reasons of homelands’ conflicts could also
discourage the United States to be involving itself in the same conflicts. Sheffer (2014)
categorized diasporas and groups based on the prevalent causes of conflict. Sheffer
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(2014) put Ethiopian diasporic groups in the category of the “cultural, political, social,
and economic discrimination and deprivation of their kin in their homeland” (pp. 43-44).
Some Egyptian groups such as some Copts and Islamists including the Muslim
Brotherhood could claim discrimination and denial. All of those groups would seek
strategies to fight for what they claim and assume. According to Sheffer (2014), the most
important factor in those conflicts is the United States interest in involving itself. It is
important because the diasporas always need to keep convergence in the core goals and
interests with the United States because that consequently can lead to the United States
involvement in some international cases based on the severity degree of those cases of
conflict and other U.S. determinations (pp. 42-44).
The different groups of the Ethiopian diaspora employed several transnational
strategies and activities to heat up the existing internal disturbance; therefore, the conflict
over interests resources and legitimacy became a transnational conflict. Several Ethiopian
conflicting groups involved in the conflicts by sustaining and using hard feelings and
traumatic memories. They also provided different supplying resources such as
remittances from the kin and back-and-forth visitations of internal opposition leaders to
their dispirited followers and pre-existing networks in America. They used the Internet
means and oriented radio for their mobilization efforts and transnational communication
with the preexisting networks in the host country. As I mentioned before, improvement of
technology and communication means could impose a subsequent disequilibrium among
the social powers and create new problems for all interest groups. Moreover, those
groups engage in the ongoing conflict and transnational politics through employing
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strategies of lobbying a number of the U.S. congressmen, raising funds, and using the
social media applications (Lyons, 2014, pp. 164-165).
It is possible to infer that some groups of the Egyptian diaspora have the same
situation at the current time, given evidence of the past Ethiopian case. The Ethiopian
specimen is similar to some contemporary Egyptian groups in the United States after the
2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions. As these two events were a decisive factor for the
organizational unity of the diaspora, they became a factor for the fraction and ongoing
conflict among the Egyptian political parties in the homeland and distant lands.
Similarly to Ethiopian groups, the Egyptian opposition groups’ agenda and
strategies can be challenging to the Egyptian regime when those groups try to convince
the United States to block any U.S. official aid and supportive public opinion. Hence, I
have noticed the proliferation of a new group that is the Egyptian Islamists group based
on their portrayed conflict and active strategies. The diaspora’s type and proliferation
shape should be different based on the differences of the motives, conflicts, and time. The
cause of Ethiopian, Irish, Tamil, and Egyptian groups in the 1960s and 1970s were
different historical racial, religious, and political events that produced their respective
homelands' different conflicts.
What happened is that some counterparts disturbed the existing order, and certain
interests of some powers were, in turn, helped or hurt. This internal situation in the
homeland gave those groups a ground to flow from domestic homeland disturbances or
injustice, as they perceive, and then organize themselves financially and politically using
transnational political relations and strategies (Cigler & Loomis, 2007, p. 8; Dickinson,
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2008, p. 38; Lyons, 2014, pp. 164-165). This observation could be applicable also to
small diasporas such as Egyptians in the United States, and the newest diasporas such as
Syrian, and Egyptian Islamic groups in Turkey and Qatar after and during the severe
political events of 2013, 2014, and 2015. It may be partly a class issue. The Egyptian
diaspora in Washington, DC disproportionately consists of well-educated professionals
who are fluent in English. They may have the time, resources, and self-confidence to
participate in diaspora formation and lobbying of the U.S. government. The Syrian
diaspora today consists of desperate, poor or poverty-stricken refugees fleeing, often in
fear for their lives. They want to stay and survive, not engage in diaspora formation.
However, diaspora formation and lobbying may be an issue for their children in a later
time.
The members of these groups brought their conflicts to their new environments
and continued the same path. However, the catalyst conflicts, of course, occur at different
times, degrees, and nature in each case, therefore, the emergence nature and time, goals,
and characteristics of each diaspora were different too. Other factors can affect those
diasporas’ appearance and political role in the host lands, and that would be the subject of
the other sections of this chapter. I would say in conclusion that the major comparison
point between Ethiopian and Egyptian cases is the behavior of both diasporas against
their incumbent governments and their lobbying strategies that they apply to conduct
their homelands conflicts.

66
Literature Review
An Exhaustive Review of Current Literature
In this section, I provided my rationale for selection of the study concepts based
on the relation between the available literature, the phenomenon, and my study scope.
Having said that, I continued to explore other points related to the diaspora proliferation
theories and diaspora development theories that I have just presented in the theoretical
foundation section. I analyzed the connection between the climate and conflict theories
and other concepts to assess their validity for exploring the proliferation and mobilization
of the Egyptian diaspora. When considering the proliferation, development, and
engagement of diasporas, a review of Jang (2012, 2014) and other researchers’ studies of
factors and characteristics that might encourage or discourage political engagement in
diasporas is warranted.
In short, I turned to the literature to justify my selection of the phenomena and
concepts under investigation to produce a description of what is known about them, what
is controversial, and what remains to be studied. As part of this process, I reviewed and
synthesized studies related to the concepts of identification, characteristics, and political
engagement in the Egyptian diaspora problem. Therefore, I started by exploring how the
literature consider the Egyptian diaspora
Is the Egyptian Diaspora a diaspora? In the first chapter of the study, I
mentioned Sheffer’s (2006) limited term ethno-national when defining the term diaspora.
A different approach to the definition takes into account the communications and culture
that diaspora produces while abroad (Kenny, 2013, p. 12). Dufoix (as cited in Müller-
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Funk, 2016), argued that no diasporas as such exist physically, but diaspora means the
ways of managing its the relationships with the homeland. Diasporas develop by
themselves when the members share common situations, and believe and work for the
same cause (p. 354). Given that some scholars have broadly defined diaspora as not
limited to a distinct social or physical entity, all Egyptian migrants might simply be
considered members of a diaspora. Moreover, Kenny (2013) argued that diaspora is just
an “idea that helps explain the word migration [or] the migrant experience abroad” (pp. 1,
11). In other words, diaspora connotes a broad emigrational and cultural frame
explaining all migrant experience (Kenny, 2013, p. 6).
Given the limit Sheffer’s (2006) ethnonational definition of diaspora, I adopted a
wider definition of diaspora to include ethnic Egyptian groups and to avoid the
sophisticated theoretical debate on ethnicity. Like Zohry and Debnath’s (2010) definition
of diaspora, Sheffer (p. 9) asserted that the broad definition frames a group as a diaspora
when it has been established outside of its homeland because of voluntary or forced
migrations. Hence, Sheffer excluded several types of diaspora from his limited ethnonational definition. According to his limited application of the term, pan-diasporas such
as the Muslim and Arab American diasporas are not ethnonational diasporas, but
according to the broad definition, they are. These groups are also considered diasporas
because the majority of Muslims and Arabs speak the same language and share the same
dominant religion of the majority, Islam (pp. 10-11).
It was relatively difficult to locate materials on the political influence of Arab and
Muslim diasporas during and after the Cold War. If this is the case, then it will also be
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harder to assess the appearance and influence of the Egyptian diaspora because the scope
of early studies was on Arab immigrants in general, and not on the diasporas of different
subgroups such as Egyptians. Moreover, I noticed that researchers such as, Sheffer (2006,
2014) and Bamyeh (2014) often study Arab diasporic groups in comparison with the
Jewish Diaspora and conflict with Israel, and rarely study these groups outside of this
approach. That is one of my justifications for studying the Egyptian diaspora separately
from these typical approaches and limits.
Does Egyptian identity, for all Egyptians, really reflect and belong to Arab
nationalism? What can describe the Egyptian national identity prior to the Arab
nationalism wave? Nasser’s Arabism propaganda in the 1960s deepened this problematic
phenomenon and question. Witteborn (2007) asserted that Egypt was Arabized and
Islamized by social and political powers. That means that the country had come to the
reality from thousands of years ago as not Arab or Muslim before those two fixed
interrelated identities, the Arab and Muslim.
The modern Egyptian national identity was reproduced by regnant powers under
new circumstances and for specific reasons. Concerning a particular agenda and interest,
Pratt (2005) said, “The reproduction of [Egyptian] national culture and identity acts as a
means of reproducing the dominant configuration of relations of power in society, or
hegemony” (p. 90). The imposed national identity did not just change and reproduce the
Egyptian people’s culture and identity, but it also impacted the practice of democracy
(Pratt, 2005, pp. 1, 74). In this study, I considered the Egyptian case as one entity, but I
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also mentioned the uniqueness and influence of both Copts and the Muslim Brotherhood
whenever doing so could serve my study purpose.
The concept of political engagement and participation. The term political
engagement is varied and unclear (Jang, 2014). It could be defined as that which grants
citizens in a well-functioning democracy an opportunity to influence the political choices
of government officials to communicate specific information to those officials about
citizens’ concerns and to put pressure on them to respond positively. This political
participation involves a wide range of informal activities and is not limited to the typical
formal participation that exists (Boarini & Diaz, 2015).
Political engagement might take several forms and range from passive or inactive
to proactive and traditional activities. These forms could include a minimal level such as
watching the news or reading newspapers, meeting a group of friends to discuss political
issues, paying taxes, boycotting products and recommending others to do the same, and
serving on a jury. A higher level of engagement could include visible activities such as
electoral voting, participating in politicians' campaigns, participating and organizing
demonstrations, or signing petitions for a cause via social media or other traditional ways.
According to Jang (2012), generally, people engage by communicating with the decision
makers directly or indirectly by influencing the electoral outcomes of those politicians
and other officials (p. 639). In the Korean ideal, Jang asserted that second generation of
diasporic populations might tend to adopt the traditional activities that are at the higher
level of engagement such as direct involvement in political campaigns and voting (pp.
637-638).

70
Of course, the choice of engagement activities and levels depends on several
factors that are part of the study topic. However, Jang (2014) asserted that the low
engagement and influence emerges because people underestimate their own political
commitments because they believe that being active should mean being proactive and
visible. They have a misunderstanding and no confidence in their ability to make any
change; hence, they avert from doing any activity, however minimal.
Finally, ethnic groups are, in general, different regarding their political
engagement based on the engagement factors combined with the groups’ characteristics
(Jang, 2012, p. 41). Political engagement is an outcome of a long process of interaction
between many related elements. I designed my approach to studying the external and
inter factors of political engagement in the Egyptian diaspora based on the premise that
engagement is the result of such a process. Jang’s statement assures my notion that no
separation should be made between all types of factors at the theory and practice level in
order to address what is political engagement and how it could look like for the diaspora
The concept of the diaspora identity and how it affects the diaspora
formation and proliferation. Goodman (as cited in Kalmbach & Moghissi, 2009)
argued that diasporic individuals forge their new identity in host lands through both
passive and active processes and interaction with the environing population and
environment (p. 352). As Aswad (2001) noted that identities vary and change and people
can have multiple identities at the same time and situation (p. 2). That is because ethnic,
national, religious, and other forms of identification depend on situational factors such as
political context and geographic location (Witteborn, 2007).
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Also, changing identity is a common behavior and is not limited to the diaspora
members. As I have explained previously, the authorities of the country of origin, i.e. the
regime of the Egyptian military coup of 1952, also tended to change and reproduce the
people’s identity as Pratt (2005) explained. That happened because of other
circumstances such as the regime need of having its stable legitimacy instead of the
revolutionary legitimacy.
Changing, hiding, or showing a distinct identity of diaspora members is a general
notion; however, Watanabe (2002) referred to the situational political mobilization to
indicate one of two dimensions of addressing the Asian Americans’ identity. Sheffer
(2006, p. 18) pointed to the same approach as one of the several approaches addressing
the ethno-diaspora identities concept. Some diasporas such as Asian-Americans or
Coptic-Americans could choose one of the several identities, or they could gather several
identities. For example, the identity can be global versus the local or limited national or
religious identity. According to Dickinson (2008), the Copt community in Michigan
chose to show their religious identity and hiding their Arab identity because of the hassles
that occurred after the situation of 9/11.
This orientation was not limited to the Copts or Michigan. “Today, as Muslim
Arabs receive so much attention many Christians Arabs in the Detroit, [Michigan] area
[were] distancing themselves by wearing large crosses” (Aswad, 2001, p. 2) and that
orientation was not limited to that city. In the United States as a whole, “much of the 2/3
of the American Arab community that is Christian [tended to] distance itself from the 1/3
that is Moslem” based on the effect of the same situation of 9/11 (Wilson Center, 2001).
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But although some “Arabs in abroad dropped the label of “Arab” after September 11 to
avoid discrimination, others started to self-identify as “Arab American”” (Witteborn,
2007, p. 556)
On the other hand, this event and its public consequences and legal problems also
made many Arab Americans start feeling their original identity for the first time (Hajjar,
2001). Therefore, because of this public hassle and suspicion, Arab and Muslim
Americans found that event as a strong reason to shift to the protection of civil liberties
and identity and to be more active and organized (Uslaner, 2007). This positive,
pragmatic notion can also be applied to other diaspora cases. With peace in the Middle
East based on the Oslo Agreement of peace between Palestinians and Israelis in 1993, the
homeland “would no longer remain Jewish-America’s “secular religion,” and the
[Jewish] diaspora would have to reshape its identity” (Ambrosio, 2002, p. 184) Each
diaspora and subgroups have a different reason or motive to come to the United States.
The paradoxical situations of those diasporas denote that their unique Islamic and
Arabic identities become explicitly salient in the host environment more or easier than in
the home country. According to Kalmbach and Moghissi (2009), group identity is
“constructed” through experience in the host country and these experiences can lead to
more explicitly Islamic identities (p. 351). High unemployment and exclusion from
certain social circles in the host societies are another example of those negative
experiences of Muslim diasporas. Those experiences increase not only the feeling of the
Muslim identity but also extend the radical identity, Islamism identity (Mossallanejad as
cited in Kalmbach & Moghissi, 2009, p. 352).
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Watanabe (2002) referred to the flexibility of choosing one identity, which is
option one or assuming multiple identities instead, which is option two, for the AsianAmericans groups. The flexibility of the situational model allows more than one
mobilization reaction and other political behaviors (Hing, as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p.
139). The second option that is the multiple identities is also based on the political and
social situations and changes. In different words, politics can be the base of assuming
multiple identities (Wang as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 139).
As a result, the identity was not solid all the time because of some political
situations. According to Jang (2012), several studies found “identity changes and evolves
over time as immigrants assimilate into the host culture” (p. 9). That also means that the
identity formation is a natural process and outcome as it could also be an arbitrary choice
of individuals in a specific time and for a reason. Is it perhaps rather that they have a
range of more or less intense identities, among which some become more salient
depending on the external circumstances. Egyptians are very unlikely to assume a
Muslim, Buddhist, or Jewish identity, for example, even if they would get material and
security benefits. Some might, i.e. those who marry outside the ethnic group and convert
their religion, but that situation is not often occurring. In the section of loyalty
characteristic, I showed how that identity and assimilation could be a factor in deciding
on loyalty type of diaspora.
In sum, identity has a role in defining the diaspora political choices on the one
hand (Watanabe as cited in Ambrosio, 2002, p. 139), and choosing or forming any
identity is a product of interactions between several social, political factors such as the
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context, immigration policies, foreign policy, political status of the home country, and
time, on the other hand. This cyclic process and relation also indicate that having a
particular identity can be not only the group choice only but also the outsiders’ perception
and treatment towards the group (Watanabe as cited in Ambrosio, pp. 138, 139).
Egyptians have long conducted an intense national debate about what Egypt is,
what it stands for, and its place in the world (Cook, 2011). Hatina (2007) stated, “The
struggle over Egypt’s cultural identity was reflected in a large corpus of ideological
writing, quintessentially represented in the works of neo-liberals and their Islamist
writing” (p. 8). Neo-liberal Egyptian theorists use Islamist concepts regarding several
issues such as, the challenge of modernization and Western culture, and the true Islam
(pp. 8-9) While Egyptians are African in nature origin, the Arab, and Western mindsets
commonly identify them as Muslim-Arab or Middle Eastern. This public perception and
reception consider the contemporary political, religious, and linguistic dimensions that
Arabs share with Egyptians, and does not reflect many aspects of the physical differences
and social, history, and geography facts. Islamic culture and values were the most
influential factor in shaping the Middle East and North Africa image and making the
assimilation of Egyptians into the Arab Muslim culture (Bishai, 2010, pp. 18-19).
The problem is that many Egyptians and Egyptian diasporas mostly changed that
path and believed in the Arabic identification and nationalism for mostly political
agendas and crisis events (e.g. wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973). This change caused
a new formation of the Egyptian nation as well as diasporas and, thereby determined their
policy choices and actions especially after 1956 during Abdel Nasser’s rule. “In other
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words, [Egyptians’] cultures and identities are socially constructed, yet, for political
reasons [and particular interests], they are represented as natural and unchanging” (Pratt,
2005, p. 91). Several national identities should lead to different or situational political
behaviors and activities within both the host and home countries. While I could address
these situational behaviors of Egyptians in the Gulf area, I explored their behaviors in the
American environment, which still has not been handled in the available literature.
A long time of observation could show and approve the situational model of
identity for the different Egyptian diasporas. Many of the their members of the 1960s and
1970s immigration waves had chosen a radical Islamic identity when they lived for long
terms in Saudi Arabia and Persian/Arabian Gulf states. After the 1967 defeat, Nasserist
nationalists and pan-Arabism declined, which opened the national sphere to the Islamic
discourse and powers to come back and became salient in the 1970s and 1980s (Hatina,
2007, pp. 8-10, 100). Thus, “the Islamist movement in Egypt is active in attempting to
shape cultural practices” (Pratt, 2005, p. 78).
There was a need to explore what other political situations or factors could make
ethnic groups have a specific identity and form their diaspora based on that. Teitelbaum
(as cited in Watanabe, 2002) argued that migration policies and process are the most
important element that affects the U.S. foreign policy through regulating the ethnic
composition (p. 132). Ambrosio (2002) had the opposite view of this triple relation.
Ambrosio believed that the foundations of Asian-American groups connect to the foreign
events more than the U.S. local immigration regulations (p. 133). Does that mean
anything regarding the Egyptian case due to their identifications and mobilization as a
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diaspora? I would merge both views that Ambrosio showed to explain the ethnic groups
formation and connect it to the identity choice.
I adopted a simple idea of Glazer and Moynihan that implied that there could be a
loop of interactions between the formation of ethnic groups, and the formation of foreign
policies. Hence, the ethnic group foundations, including the identity, are located and
affected by the context that implies several internal and external actors, counterparts,
opposing or coinciding interests, and foreign policy. In turn, ethnic groups participate in
shaping the foreign policy; however, they are not the only factor in this process. The
foreign policy and other elements such as national immigration policies and global forces
and concerns also shape the size, identification, and diversity of the groups such as Asian
Americans (Watanabe, 2002, pp. 132-133). In different words, all of these factors are
functioning as a cause and result of each other in a cyclic style, not a linear way.
Egyptians are not different from some other Arab ethnic groups regarding to their
identity aspects. According to Connor and Smith (as cited in Sheffer, 2006) the identity
of groups ethno-national groups such as Gypsies are based on primordial, instrumental,
and mythical/psychological elements (p. 11). The controversial identity, loyalty, and
relationship between Arab and Egyptians are one of the elements making the Egyptian
identity that is still undetermined. According to Witteborn (2007), some Egyptian
diaspora members emphasize an Egyptian instead of an Arab identity in their daily, social
communications. They believe that Egypt was Arabized and Islamized by the state
authority (p. 566). Confusion about the identity choices and the situational characteristics
are an important determinate of the division among the Arab diaspora and Egyptian
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diaspora members and their deficient political engagement in America. However, let us
also continue considering all Egyptians abroad as diaspora and one diaspora only, and
exploring its internal characteristics as a diaspora as well as the external engagement
factors in the coming sections.
Approaching the Diasporas’ Characteristics and External Factors
Oswiecimski (2013) detailed the characteristics and factors of political influence
and engagement of some powerful and traditional diasporas in history, which are the
Jewish, Cuban, and Armenian Americans (p. 70). Oswiecimski built a list of factors on
the perception of the influence and power using a comparative approach. Similarly,
DeWind and Segura (2014) used a distinctive interactive approach to explore and analyze
the different degrees of diasporas-governments relations to examine the influence of
several diasporas such as Jewish and Iraqi (p. 15).
According to Oswiecimski (2013), “To discuss the role of ethnic lobbies in
foreign policy making one should rather look at examples of groups that are the most
active and are perceived as having the most influence” (p. 53). My study also used the
same approach that is the compared powers; however, my comparison will not be
inclusively using successful models such as Jews and their powerful organization,
AIPAC, only. Instead, I would compare the Egyptian ethnic group to influential diasporas
such as Cuban and Jewish besides less powerful diaspora, which is the Arab, Ethiopian,
and Korean ethnic groups to explore the characteristics and factors of the Egyptian
diaspora influence.
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I chose new, incipient, or less powerful diasporas because their influence level
assumingly, would not be far or very different from the Arab or Egyptian diasporas.
Jang’s model of included factors were mainly addressing why the Korean-Americans
were not very engaging or influential. Having said that, it would be more rationale to use
that model of adverse factors or failing enterprise of Korean-American lack of
engagement. This approach is more reasonable than using a model of very positive
factors or model of success to explain Egyptian-American weak political diaspora
lobbying engagement. Jang (2014) offered a new model of the political engagement
factors and diaspora characteristics that I would take in my primary account.
Of course, in any comparison, I take into my consideration that the ethnic groups
have different features and would be different regarding their political engagement level
and type depending on several factors. Those factors are such as what kind of priorities
and problems ethnic groups face and faced given their unique circumstances (Jang, 2012,
p. 41). Jang’s (2012) theoretical foundation considered “studies have not separated
behaviors from knowledge and attitude, along with resources, recruitment, and
psychological orientation, when examining groups under investigation” (p. 40). Hence,
exploring the political engagement factors would not be separated from the nature and
characteristics of the diaspora. That is because these two categories of factors were not
studied separately in the literature and because they could not be separated from each
other as well as the strategies the diasporas employed to be influential in the real world.
The effectiveness of an ethnic group is primarily due to some relevant group and
organizational characteristics such as the size, particular electoral distribution, and
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motivation and commitment to a specific policy and country (McCormick, 2012, p. 338).
McCormick built an approach to the success of all interest groups including ethnic
lobbies on Smith’s general factors: the pluralist nature of the American political system
that implies several divisions among the official political branches and powers of
Washington, DC and the characteristics of ethnic groups themselves (p. 321). Both
scholars considered the external factors such as the nature of the U.S. political system, as
well as the internal organizational and characteristics as essential independent,
intervening, or confounding variables to determine the diaspora potential influence and
success. Among the external factors are the democratic principles such as Madison’s
version of democracy that exist in the host country sphere.
Diaspora Characteristics
Political apathy has dominated the behavior of most Egyptian expats, and indeed
most other Arab expatriates, with the exception of some Palestinians. Concerning the
typical style of that diaspora’s engagement, Ashour (2010) believed that “Most Egyptian
expats have been more concerned about building economic fortunes and retaining the
ability to go back home without fear of government reprisals” (para. 2) This section,
covering the characteristics, explored and tested if that statement of Ashour (2010) has
reflected the reality of the Egyptian diaspora.
The Korean case and Jang’s study are significant for my study basically, because
of its theoretical framework and new factors of diaspora political engagement model.
Jang’s study shows several characteristics of the Korean diaspora and other diasporas,
and external factors of their political engagement. No other study mentioned the
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underestimation of self's political engagement, lack of substantial ownership, and
negative perception on politics as all factors of civic and political influence of diasporas,
and that was the uniqueness of Jang’s new model.
These internal characteristics and external factors and other variables of Jang
model do not exist or relate to many other diaspora cases but they still have many things
to do with the Egyptian case as well as the Korean. In general, the diaspora
characteristics exist and form the diaspora profile and engagement at different levels
because of different reasons and factors. According to Watanabe (2002), the foreign
policy and other elements such as national immigration policies and global forces and
concerns also shape the characteristics size, identification, and diversity of the groups
such as Asian Americans (pp. 132-133). Severo and Zuolo (2012) summarized the
characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora as the following:
[It is] known phenomena: the fact that the Egyptian diaspora is limited; the weak
link with the country of origin; the variety of the diaspora’s dynamics and how
they differ according to the host country; and, last but not least, the strength of the
Coptic diaspora. Given these facts, we can describe the Egyptian diaspora as one
of those diasporas that Alain Médam defines as “still fluid, shifting, floating.
Even if these data cannot be considered as representative of all Egyptians abroad,
they reveal an interest of part of Egyptian migrants for their homeland, a common
feature of diasporas. (p. 7)
I cannot consider all of these features of Egyptian diaspora as an absolute fact.
The link with the country of origin is not weak at all. According to Talani (2005), the
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patterns of Egyptian migration indicates that Egyptians have a reputation of attachment to
the land and kin, and when they travel, they always return no matter how long they stayed
out that homeland. However, recently, the number of migrants raised and one-third of the
Egyptian migrants all over the world are permanent. Usually, Egyptians who go to work
in the Arab countries and come back while their peers in the West prefer to stay in the
diasporic countries (pp. 18-19). They are also eager to obtain the citizenship as a clear
indicator that they decided to stay and maybe assimilate into those Western countries.
This generalized statement could be challenged by a hypothesis that I intend to
test to determine whether it is true through my questions research. Egyptians emigrants’
self-identity is not that weak; hence, that unique characteristic might explain why their
connection with the homeland and kin is still salient, however, that is not the only reason.
Egyptians emigrants are not just this diasporic sector of the Arab diaspora that has not
been assimilated into the American environment. That is if I generally speak by
considering the Egyptian diaspora as a part of the Arab Americans (or Arab-Americans),
therefore I could agree with Suleiman (2001) who asserted that Arab Americans still have
a serious difficulty of being accepted, assimilated and integrated into that environment,
especially into the political realm (pp. 9-10).
Nevertheless, generalization is not the right way to address the Egyptian group’s
status. The strength and salience of the different activities of the Coptic sector of the
Egyptian diaspora is a fact according to many researchers such as Severo and Zuolo
(2012), Dickinson (2008), and Rowe (2001). However, the dispersed Islamists after the
January 2011 Revolution should also be considered in the same active group category. I
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would address and test this statement by exploring the following characteristics. The
Egyptian diaspora also has other attributes that need to be explored in terms of
highlighting their effect on the political engagement of that ethnic group.
First characteristic: Negative perceptions of politics and politicians. Jang
(2014) found that negative perceptions of politics and politicians were attributed to direct
and indirect negative political experience of the Korean diaspora members in the home
and host countries. This stand made them refrain from politically engage and decide not
to establish or join active diaspora. The first generation has this stand that is more
intensive than the stand of the latter generations. That is because they had direct
experience in Korea and America and negative impression about the Korean politicians
and organizational leaders in the United States (pp. 637, 642). That can also be true in the
Egyptian case. The negative impression of Egyptians is not on Egyptian organizational
leaders in the United States only.
There are many reasons for assuming the existence of negative perceptions
characteristic in both the Korean and Egyptian cases. Egyptians have typical negative
perceptions of their politicians, political system, and all powers in Egypt. For example,
Islamists were already framed negatively before they reached power, and when their
political roles changed, framing became more negative (El-Haddad, 2013, pp. 41-44). It
is not just negative perceptions but also mistrust between citizens and the government
that affect the citizens as well diaspora members (Zohry & Debnath, 2010, p. 7). In line
with those statements, Jang (2014) found that distrust toward Korean associations and
their leadership is a common negative perception among Koreans in Washington, D.C.
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For example, it is a common thought that those leaders and politicians only work for
themselves, family businesses, and personal prestige (p. 642).
Moreover, since 1952 and Nasser’s regime, Egyptians have reasonable causes to
fear the state and its long unchecked arms, and the fall of democracy and the Egyptian
liberal era. That era had extended from the Constitution of 1923 under King Fouad the
First and impaired partly by the British and then diametrically by the coup d'état of 1952.
According to Pratt (2005), “The importance of dominating the cultural sphere in order to
exercise political power may be signaled by the vast amount of resources dedicated to
promoting the leadership cult of [a number of Pan-Arabism leaders such as]” (p. 77)
Nasser. Having said that, in Egypt, the typical Egyptian culture, and identity, based on
liberal values that were common before the Free-Officers coup had vanished (Hatina,
2007). The new authoritarian rule has reshaped this national culture and thus identity.
The regime’s rationale for going this way was the regime's rhetorical panArabism, the claim of security, protecting the “our newborn revolution” from the forces
of reaction and feudality powers, and fighting “what is called Israel.” The result on the
national level was a new fixed identity but also new resistances against that imposed
orientation of the state and the society. The resistance came from Islamists as well as the
civil society but of course, for different socio-political goals and confronting agendas
(Hatina, 2007, p. 31, 100; Pratt, 2005, pp. 74, 77). When Egyptians moved to other states
regardless any positive climate of those new host lands, they kept and transferred the
conflicts between all of these factors and the reproduced culture. In addition, there were
always other reasons for the adverse perception of politics and politicians such as the
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high rate of corruption that has been composed due to the illegal marriage between the
wealth and authority. Due to these reasons and others, many Egyptians believe that there
is a difference between the welfare of the country and the interests of the ruling regime.
(Ashour, 2010)
Second characteristic: Organizational unity. This internal factor is an umbrella
of several factors facilitating political influence for diasporas and their lobbies. The
diaspora’s strength is rooted in the organizational unity. The unity means the collective
and dominant national dream, a single clear agenda backed up by salient goals and
organizational purpose, positive human communication, and mutual understanding of the
differences of the nation’ parties. Adopting one national motive can be the backbone of
organizational unity (Smith, 2000, pp. 110-111). Jang (2014) mentioned that the diaspora
members realized their need for being united only when they faced a disturbing, robust,
and external factor (e.g., the domestic racial riot against the diaspora and its interest).
As an independent variable, when divisions occur and grow within the diaspora, it
will lose its one-voice characteristic, and it will be harder to gain or keep support outside
one’s own group for the diaspora cause (Uslaner, 2007, p. 302). Losing this support
should lead to a lack of the diaspora motion and influence that is the dependent variable
of this relationship. As per Smith (2000) and McCormick (2012), interest groups
including diasporas permanently should adopt and press for achieving a primary purpose
for its institutional structure under a single leader, for example, a historical founder as in
the Cuban diaspora. (p. 110, pp. 319-320, 338) or collective institutional leadership that
members have to appreciate. The institutional backbone is the harmony of the
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organization among the leaders and between its leadership and the diaspora community
(Smith, p. 116).
Before the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian diasporas had “face [d] real challenges
in terms of overcoming their differences in order to form strong organizations” (Ashour,
2010). Supporting the country’s economy by the diaspora and national agenda had kept
the organizational harmony for a very short time during the last few years that followed
the Revolution. The state, organizations, and individuals might need an external enemy
(i.e., Israel before Camp David Treaty in 1979, Ethiopia Dam project, or Shi'ite rhetoric
of Iran) or internal challenges (i.e., Muslim Brotherhoods and ISIS and terrorism in north
of Sinai) to keep the national entities’ friendship, solo national identity, unity, and maybe
all parties’ life. The new revolution was the key to the national unity because people,
organizations, and civil society were all fighting one enemy or challenge that was
Mubarak’s tenure.
Although this collective mindset of national popular struggle was the key to the
resurgence for citizens as well as Egyptian diasporas and political groups, Egyptians tend
typically to disagree on one leadership or agenda and a collaboration culture or tradition
does not exist in many situations. According to Ashour (2010), the reason could be the
diaspora is divided along political, ideological, religious, and social class lines (para. 4).
On the other hand, according to Abdel Aziz and Marcos (2013), Egyptian organizational
culture is known as having a high level of power distance and hierarchy (p. 1). Hence, the
unity might not be available if was not imposed by the polity from top to down.
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For example, the revolt or coup d'état of 1952 that was the symbol of the struggle
for national independence had succeeded in imposing and maintaining the national unity
and consequently, the Islamic slogan and activities had disappeared for some years till the
1970s. Ironically, one of the factors that existed behind the return of the Islamic powers
and discourse was the Egyptian state itself (Hatia, 2007, pp. 3, 100). That template was
not different or separated from the situation of the Egyptian diaspora and was expanded
to all Arab diaspora especially, Arab and African students’ unions abroad during the
collective revolutionary waves in the 1960s.
For Egyptian Americans diaspora and its advocacy organizations, there is severe
polarization, social class lines, and political, ideological, religious divisions amongst
them and between them and the Egyptian state, and an apparent lack of organizational
experience and lobbying history (Ashour, 2010, para. 4, 9). In a later section of this
paper, I explored the connection between this characteristic, the organizational unity, and
an external factor that is the relationships between a state and diaspora. In sum, these
characteristics and others set back the political influence on the home and host countries’
politics. The identity profile of Egyptian diaspora including Copts is a complicated,
critical matter because of common issues such as faith as well as past and emergence
political circumstances. The current research on diaspora did not approach the influence
of the current Egyptian identity debate and struggle on the likelihood prominence of
united diaspora leadership and organized political mobilization. In the following section,
I continue exploring more characteristics as well as factors that all are independent
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variables that intertwine determining the potential political engagement and Influence of
diaspora with more focus on the Egyptian ethnic group.
Factors of Diaspora’s Political Engagement, Influence, Strategies, and Nature
Egyptians in the diaspora face many different obstacles to playing such a political
role (Ashour, 2010). Of course, those obstacles change due to the change in time frame
and the internal and external circumstances. As I mentioned, several writers found that
ethnic interest groups, communities, and diasporas are not solid or static entities, but they
are changeable and dynamic objects whereas they react to different types of factors and
changes as well as they influence other parties along history and the current time. In other
words, no diaspora is always paramount or passive (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 71) because a
diaspora is not an isolated group or organization.
Diaspora consists of human beings who influence as well as being influenced by
others and surrounding historical and new events and factors every day. For example, “In
1987, the pro-Israel groups began to lose some of their clout because the rising success
on the Palestinians side and the conflict in the region which led to fractionalization within
the Jewish organizational unity” (Uslaner, 2007, p. 308). Similarly, the strong, active
Cuban diaspora lost its unity, the one-voice trait; because of the change in its solo,
leadership coupled with the United States government policy shifting towards new
collaboration the Castro brothers’ Cuban dictatorship regime (Uslaner, 2007, p. 303).
In sum, diaspora is a subject of changes based on its amebic nature and
changeable characteristics that expose the diaspora to different factors. The following
sections will demonstrate factors and more characteristics of different diasporas to be
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applied and compared to the Egyptian case. The analysis of the available literature would
conclude that the emergence of the ethnic groups and the existence of their influence per
se are also linked to each other and those factors and others. In a similar vein, Jang
(2014), Smith (2005), Sheffer (2006), McCormick (2012), and Ambrosio (2002)
summarized several factors or characteristics that ethnic groups should have to be seen as
a successful and influential actor in the foreign politics realm.
The organizational type and strength. This major factor was widely explored
by several studies. Jang (2012, 2014) and Ambrosio (2002) found that this factor could
include several elements; however, not all studies classified or identified it in the same
way. The organizational factor includes the role of the religious institution, unity among
leadership and members, using advanced technology, and relatively easy access to the
Congress members. The last element should reduce the cost and obstacles of lobbying the
decision-makers.
When Jang (2014, pp. 633-634, 640) referred to this factor, she did not mean the
diaspora as a substantial entity and its organizational issues. She focused on one
dimension that is the religious institution as a primary organization in the Korean
diaspora’s life. Korean churches play a fundamental role within Korean social enclaves at
all levels of social and civic assets (Jang, 2012, pp. 29-31). However, its notable role and
attitudes constituted a negative influence on the Korean community regarding the
participation in political activities (Jang, 2014, p. 634). The church leaders firmly believe
that this contrasting stand of abstaining from politics should keep the church and diaspora
strong and united regardless of the political engagement.
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Jang (2014, p. 632) paid more attention to the religious organizational element
that influences political engagement of ethnically diverse publics; however, she found
this relation between mobilization and religious organization factor was clear and
confident in other diasporas such as Arabs, except for the Korean diaspora members. On
the other hand, the religious institution is not the only dimension or element of the
organizational type factor. Jang found that diaspora was not organized politically before
the 1992 riot that imposed profound shifts in the community by bringing it together. As a
result, the diaspora realized the need of being politically empowered and organized to be
able to defend its benefits and assets when confronting other minority groups (Ban and
Adams as cited in Jang, 2014, p. 634).
This factor also implies long, successful organizational experience that has
furnished a roadmap for the newcomers to the political process. Arab diasporas do not
have this level of experience unlike Jews, and that organizational feature affected their
potential access to the decision-makers’ layers. According to Smith (2000), some
professional organizations of diasporas such as Jews, Albanians, and Cubans are able to
push for enacting particular legislations and policies, monitor the decision-making
process, and building cooperation with other diasporas, maintain ethnic unity, and all of
these elements lead to strong organizational type and experience. Being close and closer
to the decision makers is fundamental to achieving greater change and influence on the
foreign politics (pp. 94, 123).
Electoral mobilization implication. This factor includes several elements of
membership unity, concentrations in states rich in congressional districts and electoral
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college votes; political and financial contribution of ethnic groups; and access to
contacting the district constituency that might lead to voters participation impact, voting
bloc pressure, and financial ethnic support (Ambrosio, 2002, p.p. 11-12; McCormick,
2012, pp. 319-324). According to the annual report of the Arab American Institution
(AAI), (2016), although Arab Americans live in all 50 states, two-thirds reside in 10
states only such as New York, Washington, DC, and New Jersey. As I mentioned
previously, Egyptian immigrant communities are growing up. They composed one of the
three largest Arab communities: Egyptian (12% which was 9% in 1990), Syrian (12%),
and Lebanese according to Census 2000. Then, the Egyptian group became the largest
Arab group as Egyptians (34%) who concentrate in California and New Jersey
respectively according to U.S. Census 2010 (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2). One limitation
that statics have is that “there was no statistical difference between the size of the
Egyptian populations in New Jersey and New York” according to Census 2000 (Census,
2003, p. 8). The meaning is that they are both the same proportion of the population in
those cities.
Available literature and resources did not explain the reason behind this type of
concentration of Arabs and Egyptians. However, the Egyptian diaspora concentration in
New Jersey might be explained by saying that since New Jersey has the largest
population of Coptic Christians in the United States, therefore the reason for Egyptian
and Egyptian-Christian concentration in this state might be religious, personal, or
cultural. In other words, the political power of the diasporas concentration pattern is not
the reason for moving and mobilizing, but it is just a consequent result. The concentrated
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voting power could explain the contrast between the small size and significant influence
in many cases such as Jews, Greeks, and Albanians (Smith, 2005, p. 95) with taking into
account that the Greeks and Jews must be significantly larger U.S. diasporas than the
Albanians. This idea should explain the finding of Oswiecimski (2013) that is about why
the small size is not always effective in a negative way. This issue will be a subject of
more explanation through other factors that are connected functionally to electoral
mobilization.
The effective size and expected influence. This factor has particular significance
because it connects and affects the diaspora’ proliferation, engagement, and potential
influence. According to Jang (2014), given the exponential growth in the size of the
population of ethnic minorities increased the academic interest on them; therefore, more
research was needed to understand their political engagement (p. 649). The effective size
factor includes population concentration, effective generation, and leadership style.
Ashour (2010) addressed this point and found “the potential advantage of the expats lies
in their numbers, and thus have made permitting Egyptians abroad to vote in Egyptian
elections via consulates.” However, this claim cannot be generalized or believed all the
time.
As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, “It would seem that the size of the
group should affect its lobbying effectiveness. This is only partly true, though”
(Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 64). Theoretically, Irish and some other European diasporas
should have stronger lobbies than the Jewish lobby based on the vast difference in size,
but this is not the fact on the ground. The enormous size of some diasporas such as the
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Egyptian, Mexicans, and Chinese caused by their countries large population also did not
necessarily lead to greater political effectiveness all the time or in all cases.
According to Mowafi and Farag (n.d), “Creating a sense of community is not
dependent on size of country” (p. 6). To explain this contrast, we should differentiate
between two sorts of population sizes, the general and core size. Mearsheimer and Walt
(2006), and Oswiecimski (2013) asserted that the most substantial Jewish populations
concentrate in key electoral districts such as New York, California, and Washington, DC.
The most important is not the general population size (pp. 54, 63, 65; pp. 41, 43). The
Jewish-Americans small portion (3 percent) of the general American population
guaranteed a place for Jewish agenda on the table of foreign policy deliberation in
Washington, DC (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, p. 43; Smith, 2006, p. 99).
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that this concentration of population
is an important factor of ethnic groups’ political power and influence in general, and
voting turnout in particular, besides other organizational benefits (p. 878). However, this
finding of Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, and Oswiecimski (2013) were not the common
belief in the literature on some groups such as Latinos. Due to some characteristics and
contextual social factors such language barriers and insufficiency of financial resources
and immigration status, higher ethno concentration might be not a useful factor for
electoral mobilization, voting participation, and political manipulation (Cho; de la Graza;
Espenshade & Fu; DeSipio, as cited in Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001, p. 878).
Those two contrasting ideas cannot be generalized to all ethnic groups or across
all generations. Ethnic concentration can be sufficiently positive for diasporas to organize
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themselves as effective organizations and voting bloc. Concerning the small size of the
diaspora in the United States, the MPI report (2015) indicated that the “Egyptian diaspora
organizations are relatively abundant” (p. 2). I inferred that the entire small size of the
population did not affect the proliferation and engagement of the Egyptian diaspora's
organizations all the time negatively.
However, I should assert that being effective does not always mean being
successful and achievable. Also, the success is a relative perception, i.e., the Palestinian
diaspora is relatively unsuccessful if we considered it in proportion to AIPAC. There are
always other factors as well as characteristics intertwining with the consideration of the
size enabling or disabling the social assimilation, in general, political integration in
particular, and organizations’ proliferation. De La Raza (as cited in Oswiecimski, 2013)
expected that Mexican-Americans and African Americans might have a future chance of
being a potential influential ethnic community mainly because of their large and growing
population size (p. 63). It is easy to generalize by saying that as big it is it should be
strong. However, Oswiecimski (2013) challenges this hypothesis by saying that despite
the large size of some ethnic groups including Mexicans, these groups do not formulate
an influential lobbying power in America (p. 64).
The Egyptian diaspora essentially does not have significant absolute size (less
than quarter of a million in 2013 in America) or concentrated population (one type of the
effective size) in any politically important electoral district (MPI, 2015, p. 6). While
Egyptians comprise about 12% of the 1.7 million Arab people as 2010 U.S. Census
record indicated (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2), they compose only 9% of the total Arab
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population, that is less than 4000 in Washington, DC according to the same year of U.S.
Census record (Suleiman, 2001). That is, could this tiny group come to be concentrated
and thus mobilized and active? This claim about Egyptian and Arab Americans might
support my idea; there is a difference between the size of the ethnic group population and
concentrated population size that interest organizations can mobilize for lobbying. And
because of this debate, yet, there is no direct connection between the group size and
effectiveness. According to Smith (2000), regarding the Irish Americans, “one should not
confuse their numbers with their strength” (p. 117).
The effective size is not only resulting from the concentration of the ethnic
population in the key electoral districts. The other type of the effective size is the core
size of the group, which I will speak about in the section of the diaspora’s proliferation,
and effective size. According to Oswiecimski (2013), some diasporas such as Cubans had
an effective center that should represent and push the whole diaspora to be effective
regardless of its actual size. This substantial size refers to wealthier, better-educated, and
politically active members (the exile generation in the Cuban case) who care about the
interests of their country of origin (pp. 65-57, 70). Those two specific components-the
concentrated population in the key electoral districts and effective core-of the population
is the launcher of the diaspora lobby and its influence. Egyptian diaspora might need to
gather those two elements to be an influential group, however, the entire population is
tremendously small, and that might make this hypothesis such dreaming.
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Finally, neither the mother country population nor diaspora total population size could
always lead to automatic political effectiveness of its diasporas. According to Mowafi
and Farag (n.d),
“Israel is less than 1/10th the size of Egypt and India is more than 10 times the
size of Egypt; yet both have managed to foster a strong self-identity and linkages
to their diasporas that have benefited both the home country as well as their
respective communities worldwide” (p. 16)
The small size of a country could make it feel the need for its diasporas support
more than other bigger countries could do. However, the strong, big Indian diaspora in
the Silicon Valley, CA could challenge this assumption meaning that a significant
national population can also lead to the vast and influential diaspora in some cases.
Regardless of this hypothesis, the population of Egyptian immigrants to the United States
is growing (Millar & Ahmed, 2013, p. 2), and Egypt population exceeded the 80 million
in 2013. But this growing rate of immigrants and the enormous number of the national
population is out of proportion to the minuscule size of the diaspora population and this
diaspora is not influential compared to the large Indian one. The total estimated Egyptian
diasporas size was about 2.7 million only in 2005 in the whole world including Saudi
Arabia and America (Talani, 2005, pp. 18-19). In different words, they compose about
only 1.5 % of 175 million that is the total of migrants all over the world.
This percent has changed due to the large refugee movements in the last two
years. While Egyptian diaspora size in the United States is small, much smaller countries
such as Albania and Czech Republic have much bigger diasporas size which does not

96
consist with their tiny countries population and area. That Albanian diaspora became
much stronger and bigger (Sheffer, 2006, pp. 106-107). Although there are many
Egyptians, especially the well-educated young generations and middle class eager to
escape to the United States, their existing number is modest. For the Egyptian situation in
particular, there are specific factors could be behind that contrast between the country
size and its diaspora size. American foreign policy and national immigration policies (e.g.
visa and Green Card), and global forces and concerns should affect the formation of
diaspora by shaping its absolute size. The interview questions would try to find out an
explanation of that contrast.
The Connection Between the External Factors, Internal Characteristics, and
Strategies
The last section included several references to the diaspora characteristics and
their relations to other factors and strategies of political engagement and influence. In the
current section, I make a closer focus on this relation in more details. The factors listed in
both sections are separated or different. I simply try to see the external factors through
their links to characteristics and how the literature has linked them.
Uslaner (2007) and McCormick (2012) listed some essential conditions and
strategies for ethnic interest groups to employ if those groups seek to be influential and
successful. The two authors asserted the need for organizational unity that supports a
specific national cause of the home state they present, a supportive public opinion of the
host country, campaign contributions, and diaspora members’ concentration in key
political states and cities. The pro-Israel lobby was able to integrate and manipulate these
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particular elements. However, the lobby was not able to maintain these strategies and
features all the time (McCormick, 2012, pp. 321-325; Uslaner, 2007, pp. 307-308).
Also, it could infer from these strategies that they are not different from factors
and characteristics. What can be characteristics of one diaspora can be applicable
strategies or external factors of one another. The classification and differentiation depend
on authors’ views and his study purpose. All factors connect to different parties and
political contexts that diasporas work through and with them. This second type of factors
is the external factors that do not directly or solely determine the engagement or compose
the diaspora characteristics (internal factors), but they mingle with them to determine the
collective image, engagement, and strategies of any diaspora (Jang, 2012, p. 40).
The effect of the external type of factors connects and depends on the internal
factors or characteristics of each diaspora, and all should jointly enable or disable
diasporas to bring pressure to bear on the political process and influence. This point is
essential to this study, and I am testing and explaining it in detail in the following section
shortly and through the entire study. The external factors are such as, how the public and
government perceive the group, the changes in the governmental attitude and political
process, the ongoing national and international historical conditions and changes such as
the post-Cold War and 9/11, and the political system mechanism, nature, and gaps
(Ambrosio, 2002, p. 12; Smith, 2000, pp. 94-129). To differentiate the external factors
from the internal characteristics, we could consider the element of the local political
system as an external factor (independent variable). The way that the diaspora could use
to show its professional understanding and take advantage of the political system element
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(intermediate variable) should consider the internal organizational characteristics
(dependent variable).
By exploring the factors and their elements, the objective of this research has been
reached. Although not all of those items were found to have direct or any influence on the
level of political engagement for ethnic minorities (Jang, 2014, p. 633) some factors are
more important than others depending on the groups' characteristics. For example, the
religion as an element of the organization type factor was not always positive. It is
positive in the Arab Muslims and Black Americans cases and negative in the Korean case
(see Jang, 2012, pp. 3-4).
According to Oswiecimski (2013), the size of the ethnic population might
translate into the size of a motivated lobbying ethnic community but it is not the only
factor. Many encouraging and discouraging circumstances and characters can always
control the implementation of the diaspora size (p. 65). A large size of diaspora does not
necessarily provide more resources or has more perceived political influence and
presence (Jang, 2014, p. 633). Ashour’s (2010) findings indicated that “The Egyptian
diaspora, estimated at between 3 and 8 million worldwide, has until now not been a factor
in Egyptian domestic politics, in contrast to the active roles played by Armenian, Irish,
and Cuban expatriates” (para. 2)
Historical and historic factors. Smith (2000) mentioned that some historic wellestablished diasporas such as Jewish and African Americans continued with their
influence on different domestic and international American policies (pp. 64, 68). In other
words, some tremendous shifting events in the world did not impose significant change
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on the unique position of some diasporas. More recently after historical events such as
World War II and the period of the new Arab military regimes, Arab Nationalism’s
(Nasserism and Al-Baath) rise, sectarian strife in some countries such as Lebanon, and
the disastrous outcome of the 1967 war for Arab states, Arab-Muslims also has been
immigrating to America and established their new groups.
Besides these internal factors of migration, Arabs faced other factors in America
such as the positive change in the immigration quota system that ended favoring
European immigrants in 1965, and the consequences of the 1967 war and the biased
support for Israel (McCormick, 2012, p. 323). Therefore, they launched their first
organization or lobby, the National Association of Arab Americans in 1972 (McCormick,
p. 323). They have significant disadvantages compared to the historic Zionist lobby, and
the community still lacks a coherent lobbying arm in Washington, DC and thus has not
served as effective counterweights (Wilson Center, 2001).
Every Arab group including Muslim and Christian had its historical motivation or
incentives to flee to a different era forcibly or voluntarily. It might be correct to say that
any ethnic group needs a wake-up call to immigrate and then to be active in the foreign
settler societies. That wake-up call could be national or local events. The 1992 Los
Angeles riot against Korean business offered this call and rang the bill for making
significant changes in the passive Korean communities. Most importantly, the riot
brought the community together raising the unity characteristic and the need for being
active and empowered (Jang, 2014, p. 634).
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Similarly, Egyptian ethnic groups were partly contradictory and passive until the
revolution in 2011. This historic event was national and not a U.S. local event in contrast
with the Los Angeles riot. Although the revolution was the direct motivation for
displaying the unity characteristic of Egyptian diaspora, the domestic following events in
Egypt had an obvious negative effect on that temporary organizational unity. This
tendency contrasts with the advantage of the immense unity of Jewish diaspora that rarely
desire to bring any dissonance to the public sphere or the congress (Mearsheimer & Walt,
2006, p. 46; Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 56). Although the Coptic lobby in the United States
and Canada is very active and more organized in the Internet sphere compared to the
Muslim groups, the Coptic groups have no one voice, which conforms with the general
characteristic of the Muslim Arab and Egyptian peers (Rowe, 2001, pp. 89, 90).
The relationships between the host state and its diasporas. DeWind and
Segura (2014) focused on this factor in their new edited book Diaspora Lobbies and the
US Government Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy. The major case
study of their book is the convergence of interests between the U.S. government and
Israel and the Jewish ethnic group that seek to influence the U.S. foreign policies
especially towards the Middle East all the time (DeWind & Segura, 2014, p. 7). It is not
just that a good relationship between both states reflects positively on the diaspora
political positions, but also the stability of that relationship does.
The relation between diasporas and host land is not limited to them but extends to
involve the homelands too. According to DeWind and Segura (2014), the host landdiaspora relation should help resolve the conflicts in the motherland (p. 5). However, this
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association is not always positive in its nature and it can affect the diaspora’s homeland.
It can be negative because of the negative role or bad agenda of the diaspora per se. For
example, the Egyptian media, press, and official discourse claim that the role of the
Muslim Brotherhoods and, sometimes the Coptic groups and their relations with their
host lands should have negative consequences on the Egyptian state and its relations with
the diasporas’ host lands such as Canada, Britain, and America. According to Sheffer
(2006), this role, and nature of some diasporas can be negative on the political level
causing conflicts and terrorism not just in the homeland but also in host lands (p. 31).
Other Factors Related to Diasporas’ Proliferation or Mobilization and Devaluation
To have a deeper exemplary understanding of the diasporas’ proliferation and
devaluation, I need to explore the effect of the connection between immigration motive
factor and effective size factor on diasporas’ proliferation or mobilization in particular.
The decision of migrants and community members on immigrating contributes to joining
a new or incipient diaspora. Therefore, their decision affects the establishment or
materialization as well as the disintegration of that diaspora itself. These events are all
affected by more factors such as the original culture and immigrants’ experiences,
prevailed attitude of host and home countries, globalization, migration orders, and
backgrounds or motivations for emigrating. According to Sheffer (2006), The migration
pushing-factors and patterns with the pulling-causes for taking part in a diaspora can
together establish a specific diaspora in a particular region and time; however, the cause
for migration decision and reasons for being members of a diaspora are different (p. 115).
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According to Ceschi et al., (2005), the immigration pattern, namely, the kin
network is a cumulative process. This process implies a structured pre-existing diaspora
that attracts a particular population of, for example, an Egyptian countryside region to
come to specific Italian cities. For example, the majority of Egyptian diaspora members
of Milan city came from individual villages of Banha city seeking work and only work.
The newcomers would receive generous help in all areas, and the total group became in
touch with the homeland through a representative organization in Egypt (p. 3). According
to Jang (2012), in this type of immigrants group, the laborers typically preserve their
emotional and social connections with their kin and homeland (p. 6). As a result, the
concentration of the new and old migrants in a specific place in the host land as well as
being committed and attached to the ancestral homeland give the feelings and shape of
the diaspora.
However, concerning the diaspora emergence, establishment and, development,
Sheffer (2006), argued that the traditional hypothesis of making a connection between the
migrating reasons and the diaspora nature and creation is not conclusive because there
should be other related factors affecting the diaspora presence (pp. 115, 128).
Alternatively, Sheffer proposed four factors or interpretations explaining the individuals’
decision of establishing and joining or abandoning a diaspora. Those factors are based on
the related immigrants’ status and various circumstances, and they concern the naturally
expected delay of the settlement decision based on home and host land’s conditions. No
settlement decision would be made before a certain time of living and assessing the
conditions prevailing in the host land (pp. 128-131).
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Having said that, the delay in making the final determination of settling in the
host country is a result of many issues such as the attachments to the homelands and kin,
fear of the immigration authority’s regulations, and common visa obstacles. Sheffer
(2006) used only the example of Egyptian guest workers in Iraq (p. 130) as an example of
the fear of the immigration authorities. However, I assume that Sheffer’s example is
ideally applicable to Egyptian illegal migrants in America too. The restrictiveness on the
new immigration mantle decreased the growth of the Egyptian population after 9/11 in
the host land (MPI, 2015, p. 3). In addition, many diasporas - such as Egyptian -do not
decide clearly, for different reasons and times, to stay when they come to America, thus,
they do not have interest in joining or staying in a diaspora and being active (Sheffer,
2006, p. 129; Zohry & Debnath, 2010, p. 16).
However, the data of MPI (2015) study has reported that the “population’s
relatively high naturalization rate suggests that many Egyptian immigrants applied for
citizenship shortly after they became eligible” (p. 4). Moreover, many doctoral students
(67 %) decided to change their immigration visa to stay longer in the States (MPI, 2015,
p. 5). On the other hand, Egyptians who have migrated to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and
Libya after the 1973 War and oil prosperity moved to those host lands “on a temporary
basis, since [they were] unlikely to gain citizenship in these countries” (MPI, 2015, p. 3).
The differences between host countries (i.e., Iraq in the 1970s and the United States)
regarding their social and political circumstances and legal conditions and restrictions
affect the migrants’ decision of settling and the time of making that final decision that all
affect the chance for diasporas emergence and development or devaluation. In sum, the
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host lands and homelands’ policies, time, and place, and different personal and legal
factors and concerns effect the settling decision of immigrants.
I would describe how and why the selected climate theory relates to the present
study. The previous finding should remind us the climate theory approach to the interest
groups’ proliferation. As it was mentioned, the religious and political freedom in the
United States encouraged different particular ethnic groups such as Copts as well as
radical Islamists to flee and settle in the States. Moreover, the educational and practical
opportunities are unique in the United States and should attract scholars such as Ph.D.
students to change their basic plan of coming and staying for a short time.
However, these different phases of the American tolerance climate, the religious
freedom, the secure political practice, and educational and financial opportunities might
not clarify the decision of coming and settling by other sectors of the diaspora. What
about people who decided to stay based on new random changes or chances that they
found a mate and married? They did not plan for that decision in advance, as they may
not have any particular reason to come to the host country (Ceschi et al., 2005, p. 25).
This may be more common among lower socio-economic classes such as Egyptian
immigrants who fled from poverty in their home to live and maybe settle in the United
States or the Arabian Gulf.
Generally speaking, the lower socio-economic classes or guest workers in a
diaspora would maintain their self-identity and dual national identity differently from
other peers (Sheffer, 2006, p. pp. 129-130) such as Ph.D. holders and scientists who can
speak different languages and could find a job anywhere in the world. It seems that they
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prefer to keep strong relationships with their kin in the homeland, and they might prefer
and able to return back home when they accomplish a satisfactory economic or social
level or for different personal reasons (Ceschi et al., 2005, pp. 38-39) without considering
any academic or political or religious fear or concern.
There could be a significant difference in political, organizational behavior
between Egyptian graduate students in the United States and poorer and less educated
migrants working in a menial job in Italy. The climate and conflict approaches would not
interpret other cases of the migrants who decided to settle in the United States for pure
personal reasons, e.g. making money, with a legal or illegal status. Once again, the
motivation approaches of the Pluralists and Olson as well as Sheffer’s new model of the
establishment and demise of diasporas could remain proper to explain the migration
cause and the existence or establishment of one sector of the Egyptian diaspora, the
economic immigrants.
According to Sheffer (2006), the ambiguity or hesitation of the settling decision in
the host country reflects on another ambiguity of establishing and developing the
diaspora itself. Moreover, it is very common that many of those migrants deciding to stay
permanently would not return home if they could (p. 129). The status of the Egyptian
case supports this assumption of Sheffer but not all the time. After Mubarak’s fall, many
Egyptians (long-distance nationalists), who left the country because of utter political
suppression, decided to go back and contribute in the political compass regardless of their
past final decision of settling in the host lands forever.
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I would ask if this decision of come-backs could support the diaspora strength and
influence in the host countries! The interview questions of this study would illustrate the
answer from the participants’ point of views. As I mentioned previously, the Egyptian
Diaspora has never been a stable or solid entity because of many external circumstances
and organizational factors. It changes over time based on the mentioned factors.
According to Halpin and Nownes (2012), it is hard to imagine a group will remain as we
found it at its outset; therefore, it is essential to the researchers “…to know what it used
to be and what it is now” (p. 57).
The diaspora’s proliferation and effective size and leadership (core adequate
size). The previous different point of views regarding the diaspora’s proliferation should
explain and match to the idea of ‘the core adequate size’ that Oswiecimski (2013)
mentioned in his study. According to Oswiecimski, not all Cuban diaspora members are
considered as active political and organizational members. The exiles were the dominant
hub of the Cuban community; therefore, they are the, not the entire group, effective
organizational size (p. 56). When compared to the exile generation, the second and third
generation does not fully involve in the diaspora political concerns that focus on the
homeland because the personal political motivation does not exist (p. 57). Besides the
economic and educational motivations, the assimilation into the U.S. societies in New
York and Florida is higher amongst the latter generations in all diasporas and Cubans are
not different. In other words, their motivation became mainly economic and personal;
hence, their assimilation into the American society and culture enjoying the democracy
and welfare is higher than the exiles generation’s political motivation.
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As a result, the politically oriented generation-the first generation- that fled after
Castro’s movement- appeared to exercise control over the entire lobby for a long time.
The difference between the levels of the political concerns of the generations is that the
leading edge generation (the exile) possesses a hatred for Castro’s regime and that feeling
is not strong among the following economic immigrants to be mobilized politically
(Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 57). That might explain the contrast between the small size and
considerable political and organizational effectiveness. Many second and third generation
Cubans are politically concerned about Cuba, but generally much less than the original
exiles. Having said that, the Egyptian diaspora members, in general, had insufficient
selective benefits or personal motivation to be politically active most of the time, thus, no
stable, effective size can become apparent through their group.
The adequate size is not enough by itself, and it relates and includes many
elements that the leadership style is one of the most important of them. Bauböck and
Faist (2010) put a very clear conditional statement stating, “Diasporas have to be
invented and mobilized in order to come into existence” (p. 315). The two authors
connected this conditional existence of ethnic identity groups to specific positive
conditions that provide motivations for, particularly, the elite of the diaspora members.
This elite and their followers should be active working to support a specific national
project or cause consistently concerning a specific homeland and interests (McCormick,
2012, pp. 320, 326, 338; Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 56). In short, it will be a diaspora if it
acts, and it will act if it has an active style of leadership or in other words, an adequate or
core leading size.
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The effective size and leadership in the Egyptian case. The same factor of
leadership effect has appeared in the Egyptian diaspora but for different short times.
Before and during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, Professor Mohamed Elbaradei, the
former Vice President, was the most important motivation icon. According to Ashour
(2010), “it is clear that for now [2010] diaspora Egyptians are responding in a way they
never have before to Elbaradei’s [socialism democracy] message to them.” In the Korean
case, the church seems to be the active leadership; however, it is active in a contrary
nature and direction. That religious leadership traditionally keeps the diaspora away from
political engagement (Jang, 2014, pp. 640-641) and maybe this policy was one of the
reasons of draining the possible active size of this diaspora. The situation is the same in
the Egyptian Church in Egypt; however, the restriction of the Egyptian Church on the
political engagement did not prevent the Coptic People from being politically very active
in America compared to other passive Egyptians (Dickinson, 2008, pp. 40-41).
In the same vein of Dickinson’s observation, Rowe (2001) praised the very active
lobby of Copts that assumed an important role in the politics realm of the West (pp. 8690). What about non-militant Muslim Egyptians? Most U.S. Muslim clergy members are
not militant Islamists. What role do they play in assisting Egyptian Americans to organize
and mobilize, if any role at all? Is the typical Egyptian-American imam politically
passive, apolitical, or uninterested? Do home countries and the attitude of the American
government and environment welcome the outreach political activates of the mosques
and their imams? In general, “from being a foreign body in America, [the majority of
imams of the mosques tend] to be totally integrated into America” (Haddad, 2001, pp. 9-
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10). Haddad conducted this finding came based on a survey during the U.S. office
election of 2000 before Sept.11, 2001. In the current time, 2017, the question is how can
imams and mosques’ eagerness of integrating with the American sphere relate and help
their diasporas political role regarding the home countries?
Egyptian Coptic people are typically afraid of being active explicitly, politically
within the local Egyptian climate (Dickinson, 2008, p. 44). The reason can be that the
Church leadership, military regime of July ’1952, the partial repression of the Muslim
majority or radical groups, the general common attitude of the Egyptian society towards
any minority, or all of these counterparts were against the political participation of Copts.
Depending on those factors, Copts in general, are inactive or not successful politically in
the home state in contrast to their overpassing economic and business status in Egypt as
well as their active attitude and political and religious role in the U.S. sphere. The climate
is supportive and cooperative on all levels in the host countries compared to the home.
The Muslim Egyptian case is in an opposite direction. This climate might be not applied
to the Muslim majority who is active in Egypt but relatively inactive in the United States.
Once again, the climate theory of proliferation that Cigler and Loomis (2007) mentioned
might be a valid interpretation of this paradoxical situation.
Compared the small size of Copt inside and outside Egypt, the big population size
of the Muslim Egyptians might not be the final word in determining that group political
effectiveness. Here, I can derive another general result from the explanation of the
connection between the proliferation factors and size characteristic. According to
Borkowska (2006), “It does not always follow that the larger the group, the better its
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organization and therefore visibility” (p. 24). These hypotheses should lead us to explore
the debate about the connection between the other characteristics and effectiveness of
diaspora.
The Hypotheses of the Functional, Reciprocal Connection Between the Impact of
Diaspora’s Characteristics and the Influence of Political External Factors
One of the theoretical hypotheses of Jang theory is that the difference of the
factors influence comes from the difference of the influence of groups’ characteristics.
According to Jang (2014), religious institutions are an important element of the
organization type factor, however, not all elements such as this element could have a
direct influence on the political engagement and power of diasporas (p. 633).
The available literature shows that diasporas’ characteristics cannot be sharply
separated from the external factors of the diaspora’s proliferation, organizational
development, political engagement and influence, and success or fall. Both the
characteristics and factors and their sub-elements are integrated with strategies employed
by diasporas to impose the desired change in politics and to deal with other diasporas and
host and homelands. On one hand, diasporas’ characteristics are the result of the factors
and strategies, and the latter are clearly affected by the characteristic on the other hand.
As a technical result of this relation, it would be difficult or not reasonable to distinguish
which ones are independent and which are dependent variables. However, until I found a
different reasonable hypothesis or observation, I would assume that the diaspora
characteristics are the independent ones that enable or limit the outcomes of the factors.
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By investigating the available research, I found that the internal and external
factors are connected to the strategies and basic preconditions for the effective influence
of diasporas. Not all factors and their elements or ideals could have the same effect on all
diasporas. That different effect also varies from time to time, for example, the Cold War
and the post-Cold War. The characteristics and their influences of each diaspora are
different. In short, the differences between diasporas make differences of the influence of
the external factors causing the change in diaspora political engagement level and thus
the diaspora strategies of influencing the countries politics should also vary.
Jang (2012) asserted that understanding the influence of Korean churches and
their communicative role in shaping the social lives of Korean Americans is very
important (p. 52). Jang (2014) found that the conservative characteristic of the Korean
diaspora and honored civic and social role of the churches (mediating variable) enabled a
close, negative influence of religious institutions and faith (independent variable) on the
insufficient political engagement of Korean Americans diasporas (dependent variable).
On the other hand, Jang’s findings referred to a close, positive relationship between
religious institutions and rhetoric (independent variable) and explicit political
engagement of other diasporas (dependent variable) such as Arab, and Latinos in
America. This statement should not lead the reader to assume that this study is going to
focus on Egyptian-American religious institutions as a factor in their political
engagement. Of course, religious institutions factor is not the only one.
While the conservative political characteristic of the Korean diaspora and the
negative political perception made the majority keep their faith separate from politics for
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fear of politics influencing their faith and confusing priorities, mosques have been found
to directly and purposefully influence political engagement and perceptions of Arab
Muslims (Jang, 2014, p. 639). That is because those groups have salient religious
characteristic that intertwines with identity and political orientations. Besides, some of
those institutions and groups have an extreme or harmful agenda against the host or home
country. For another example, Sheffer (2006) considered the diasporas characteristic of
identity and identification as one of the elements that shape the factor of loyalty level of
the diaspora (p. 227).
On one hand, as the characteristics of a diaspora could enable or disable some
external factors of engagement, the factor can generate new characteristics on the
contrary. As I mentioned previously, an ethnic group might need a wake-up call to be
active in the settling foreign societies. This wake-up call could be national events or local
events. The factor of the Los Angeles 1992 racial riot brought the Korean community
together raising the unity characteristic and the need for being active and empowered
(Jang, 2014, p. 634).
A diaspora needs to have organizations or lobbies holding a clear agenda and
reasonable goals in order to be influential in the political process (Mearsheimer & Walt,
2006, p. 41); however, this characteristic of having organization and unity is not always
available in all diasporas such as the Egyptian one. In other words, to convince decisionmakers to support diaspora political agenda is to have this agenda clear before the official
agency and decision-makers (Ambrosio, 2002, p. 70; Smith, 2000, pp. 109, 128). Having
this influential agenda (factor-intervening variable) should be affected by the unity and
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organizational level (characteristic- independent or control variable) among the group
members and leaders, which should lead to some level of political or social influence
(dependent variable).
As there are negative characteristics that are connected typically to some
diasporas, there are several unique characteristics connected to some classical diasporas
exclusively. Arab and Latino diasporas are criticized that they are not organized
sufficiently and have no announced clear organizational purpose and goals (Uslaner,
2007, pp. 307, 310-313). This characteristic could be attributed and related to their
typical divergence and the multiple, unclear, or controversial identities that some of the
Arabs have. This image made it impossible for them to be seen as one voice to the public.
The characteristics and factors jointly made the political groups emergence difficult and
insufficient. The connection between the characteristics and factors are strong to the
degree that both of them can be seen as the same. I discerned in the literature that what
some writers saw as characteristics or strategies, others could see as factors.
A number of diasporas and their lobbies are characterized as naturally influential
and successful. According to Uslaner (2007), “Jews benefit from a high rate of
participation in politics, and Arab Americans are not as great a political force” (p. 307).
As a result, the characteristic of being generous and caring provides a high image of the
diaspora and makes its lobby heard by the decision-makers who receive the diaspora’s
combination of demands and generous donation (McCormick, 2012, pp. 322, 324). The
pro-Israeli lobby and its active and old organizations realized how to keep the United
States on their side most of the time.
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Apart from their influential factors, those diasporas have their several positive
features that led to positive effect of the external factors on the diaspora political role.
According to Smith (2000), the Jewish lobby and other lobbies such as Armenian share
positive features in different degrees and times. Functionally, the Israeli lobby represents
a state that has a strong military power in its region. This powerful ethnic lobby
introduces that strong state as the most stalwart keeper for the U.S. strategic interests in
the Middle East, and that should convince U.S. politicians and government branches to
keep doors open for that lobby agenda and demands (pp. 124, 128). This type of positive
relationships is triangular.
Compared to Arab states, Israel has this favorite position, which reflects
positively on the Israeli lobby position in the U.S. politics. In other words, the Israeli
lobby introduces itself and the state of Israel as a compatible alliance to the United States
with no chance for deep or long public division between both states (Smith, 2000, p.
127). Arab diasporas do not have those features because of historical, political and
religious values or obstacles (Uslaner, 2007, pp. 307-308). It might be a common doublestandards case, but the Arab diaspora might still have the chance to change. The change
that Smith (2000) meant is the change in the diaspora characteristics per se. Smith
recommended that no efforts should be made for changing the political system of the
United States because it would be an unrealistic attempt. Instead, groups just need to
improve themselves and their organizational strategies and show understanding of the
existing political system, no matter whether the system could be broken or even
tyrannous (p. 129).
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Once again, the Israeli lobby enjoys the friendly public opinion and open doors of
DC most of the time, because that lobby has characteristics and strategies that enable it to
manipulate the surrounding external factors. The lobby keeps reciting an accepted
statement and presenting a democratic state that strong and undemocratic enemies
surround according to Jewish or Israeli eloquent speech and literature (Uslaner, 2007, p.
307). In addition, the Israel lobby also portrays the Palestinians, particularly Hamas, as
agents of evil regimes, Damascus, and Teheran. According to the persistent Israeli claim,
Hamas is not a separate group of people, but it is the extension of bad states that want to
destroy Israel. This claim parallels the U.S. claim about Damascus and Teheran, with
North Korea that compose the axis of evil that works to destroy the United States and the
whole liberal world of good states.
These claims may be backed up by the observation of Sheffer (2006) that Muslim
diasporas or groups typically hold hybridized identities and overlapping loyalties, which
impose difficulties on the relationships between those groups and host governments (pp.
70-71). On the other hand, the sympathetic public opinion and attitude factor was
founded upon other factors such as collective ignorance of the public opinion and culture,
and precise communication between the lobby and the U.S. media (Smith, 2000, p. 124).
This conditional statement appeals to the Israeli lobby and state.
Compared to Israel, those all explained features and elements apply partly to the
Egyptian state and diaspora for several reasons that are not our issue in this study.
However, the comparison between the American aids given to both states can offer us an
indicator of the difference in the official and public attitude and opinion towards both
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sides. Although the Egyptian state does not have the favorite prime position, compared to
Israel, it is still in a better place than the Arab countries. The question is whether that
favored treatment towards the Egyptian state reflects on or connects to the diaspora effort
and position by any mean.
The major factor is the strategic interests and relationships between both
governments. According to Smith (as cited in DeWind & Segura, 2014), “the United
States’ place and role in international affairs affect the potential for convergent interests
between the government and individual diasporas” (p. 12). In other words, the
governments have the upper hand in determining the relationship between both states and
the Egyptian diaspora and the influence of that diaspora. However, I would rephrase the
said question; does the real or surface divergence and convergence regarding specific
interests between Egypt and the United Sates reflect on or connect to the diaspora effort
and position by any means?
Early in this section, I have referred to Jang’s (2014) notion that implied that the
difference in the diaspora’s influence factors comes from and connects with the
difference in the respective influence of the groups' characteristics (p. 633). The same
author found that some good characteristics do not necessary lead to any political
influence. According to Jang “Despite upward social mobility through education and
economic achievement, Koreans' civic and political engagements have been low…” (p.
633) Likewise, Egyptians have a high rate and level of education and income compared
not just to other diasporas or immigrants such as Latinos but also white American citizens
(MPI, 2014, pp. 6-9). For example, “38 percent of Egyptian diaspora members age 25
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and older held a bachelor’s degree as their highest academic credential versus 20 percent
of the U.S. national population” (MPI, 2014, p. 7). Despite this fact, these positive
characters of those educated members did not produce correspondent, political
involvement, and influence of the Egyptian diaspora.
Let us emphasize, at least theoretically, that the external factors and diaspora
characteristics are connected variables. Other negative characteristics are strong enough
to stifle the interchangeable relation between good characteristics and expected political
presence and influence of the Korean and Egyptian diasporas in the host societies such as
DC. In other words, correlation between positive traits and external factors is not enough
in some cases because of the existence of other negative characteristics that can harm that
correlation and diaspora’s influence. For example, Mexican Americans are more than 15
million and constitute 60 % of Latinos in America, and Cuban Americans makes 5.5 %
only in 2000. However, the bigger group, the Mexicans, is commonly poorer, less
educated, less interested in their home country causes, and the leaders did not campaign
in the United States on behalf of Mexico, and thus less organized, united, and influential
than the Cuban group is (Oswiecimski, 2013, pp. 64, 67; Smith, 2000, p. 147; Uslaner,
2007, p. 311).
The negative characteristics affect the likely response of the diaspora to the
external factors differently from other diasporas. My assumption is that each diaspora is
unique by itself, and there should be no solid ideal of the relation between positive or
negative characteristics and factors to be applied perfectly to all similar diasporas. I
would recall the definition of diaspora that I mentioned in Chapter 1; a dispersed group
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should be having a unique concern with policy and politics in the homeland, which
shapes its behavior in the host land to be considered as a diaspora.
The examples of the educated, wealthy Korean and Egyptian diasporas can show
that the positive characteristics can be not always productive. On the other hand, we
could also find that negative symptoms are not always negative regarding its connection
and effects on the external factors as the example of the small size characteristic of
Jewish or Cuban diaspora showed. Therefore, the research questions of the study will
address the validity of this hypothesis as an example of the interrelation between
characteristics and factors of the diasporas’ political influence on the American policy
making processes.
Justifying the Relation Between the Available Literature and the Study Concepts
The study of Zohry and Debnath (2010) on the Egyptian diaspora was not based
on updated data, and it did not show any clear theoretical framework to back up its way
of inquiry. However, the authors mentioned that the study would be just a resource for
information for future studies (p. 1). As a matter of the relation between my proposed
study and the past studies, Zohry and Debnath’s (2010) study remains a unique resource
for studying the Egyptian diaspora in the United States since that there is almost no
available updated research on that topic. In addition, some other studies considered Zohry
and Debnath as a primary resource on this topic. That study should provide my proposed
study with much comparative data and information based on the typology base that the
authors applied to their study.
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Second, as nearly all of the studies conducted on Egyptian diasporas, Zohry and
Debnath’s (2010), Mehrez and Hamdy (2010), Severo and Zuolo (2012), and Dickinson
(2008) were limited to the diaspora’s economic linkage and contribution in Egypt
development, or Coptic diaspora traumatic memory and religious freedom in the
homeland. Those studies had no plan for exploring the political roles of Egyptian
diaspora in the host countries or connecting that role to their importance and local
political role in Egypt. The studies of Filipovic et al. (2012), and Ceschi, et al. (2005), are
other instances of this limitation too. In their article, “Diaspora engagement strategies,
and policies,” Filipovic et al. (2012) focused on the diaspora-motherland partnership and
suggested several policies that the administration should adopt to enhance that
partnership and the diaspora contributions concerning the homeland only.
Third, I found that diaspora literature adopted a comparative approach to study
the diasporas’ characteristics, strategies, and factors of formation or mobilization, having
accepted roles, and engaging in the political process. The literature used comparative
models of successful diasporas to study or just mention to others who are relatively small
or unsuccessful. Cigler and Loomis (2007), Oswiecimski (2013), and DeWind and
Segura’ (2014) studies are ideals of this method. Most of the researches employed the
Jewish diaspora model to compare or measure the other groups especially the Arab. They
did not expand their investigation to cover the unsuccessful diasporas per se and why
they are not successful.
Regarding the criteria for being active or successful, diasporas have to include a
degree of influence over particular U.S. foreign policy according to the most of the
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literature and writers such as, DeWind and Segura (2014). The criteria could also refer to
the diaspora-host government convergence in policy making, and the extent that
Egyptian-Americans attend group meetings, and donate money or time, to group activity.
However, all of these criteria should aim and pave the way for the first one that is the
ability of influencing over particular U.S. foreign policy for the homeland’s interests.
Justifying From the Literature the Rationale for Selection of the Study Concepts
As I found in this analysis of the current literature, several gaps and weaknesses
need to be covered, which justify from the literature the rationale for selection of the
studied concepts. I also noticed major trends and themes amongst the researchers. One of
those major themes was the effect of the external factors on the diasporas’ characteristics,
presence and, influence. However, that does not mean that the factors should lead to the
same results in all diaspora cases. The external factors affect the characteristics of each
diaspora and they together affect the diasporas reaction (their engagement strategies)
differently. The employed strategies of diasporas for social and political engagement are
the natural fruit of the connection between the factors and characteristics; however, not
all diasporas were able to see and use this connection. The relations between the factors,
characteristics, and engagement strategies are in a loop or cyclic shape. The following
diagram illustrates these relationships.
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Figure 1. The loop relations between the factors, characteristics, and engagement
strategies.
The purpose of Oswiecimski’s (2013) study was exploring what could make
some ethnic groups effective and what could be their potential influence on the American
foreign policy arena. As major factors, the author found three elements including the
characteristic of groups and their members, and elements of the political context of the
host state (p. 43). The contemporary political environment element implies the political
system, global circumstances such as the changes and events that occurred during or postCold War, terrorism war, 9/11 attacks, regional conflict such as Iraq war in 2003,
globalization, advanced technology applications, and economy (Dickinson, 2008, p. 39).
In fact, not all of these factors had been adequately addressed.
Several pioneering scholars such as DeWind and Segura (2014), Ambrosio
(2002), and Smith (2005) explained and asserted the positive changes in the political
positions and powers of a limited number of diasporas’ after some significant events such
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as the Cold War (DeWind & Segura, 2014, p. 251; Smith, 2005, p. 93). While the end of
the cold war was a decisive factor for ethnic groups in general (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 51)
such as, Armenians and African Blacks (DeWind & Segura, 2014, pp. 252, 254), and
negative for East Europeans and Cubans (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 63), it has neutral impact
on other groups such Cubans specifically right after the war (Oswiecimski, 2013, p. 58)
and Arabs. Having no change can be a kind of success in some cases. The emerged
concept here is that the uniqueness of the diaspora’s characteristics maximize, minimize,
or neutralize the same externally related factors. Hence, there will be a need to explore
the differences between external factors effects on some diasporas, especially the new,
small, or incipient, because of the differences in their characteristics. For example, as I
mentioned before, literature did not indicate how has the post-Cold War affected the
Arab, Egyptian, and Muslim incipient diasporas’ positions compared to Latinos and Jews.
Hence, if the effect of post-Cold War event on Arab and Egyptian diasporas was
not salient in the current literature, so I suggested exploring other events that are strongly
connected to those diasporas and more recent. I would employ the same concept, the
effect of historic events on diasporas in host countries, but the events would be different
in terms of its closeness to the Arab and Egyptian diasporas. Many studies such as “The
Arab Spring” of Jones (2012), explored the new revolutions and its impact on Arabs and
Egyptians in their home countries but not abroad. However, Severo and Zuolo’s (2012)
study focused on Egyptian diaspora after the revolution, but the scope was limited to the
e-Diaspora only and with no focus on a particular groups or city or state.
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The 2011 revolution as a major independent variable induced impacts on
diasporas in discouraging and catalytic ways. The MPI (2014, 2015) reports on Egyptian
diaspora profile agreed with this finding. New Egyptian organizations work on different
issues such as supporting the human rights in Egypt and serving the Coptic community.
A significant portion of those organizations was established during the Arab Spring and
Egyptian revolutions. Unfortunately, many of those organizations, e-diasporas groups,
and unregistered groups had already grown inactive, if not disappeared by 2014 (pp. 8-9).
The post-Cold War period can be called the hinge of history, but it is certainly not the last
or only one. Other historic-not historical- events such as 9/11, Egyptian revolutions, Arab
Spring, and the new information technology revolution might be closer to Arab and
Egyptian diasporas emergence in terms of time closeness and effect of those events.
The disorganization, disengagement, self-identity, confusing and complex
identity, and other characteristics of the Egyptian diaspora led and connected to another
characteristic that is the blatant polarization. This later one is a result and cause of many
other characteristics and factors that all affect this diaspora political and civic
engagement in its host lands; therefore, the polarization status deserves more attention
and needs to be addressed in terms of understanding other factors and engagement status.
If we want to know what has kept the Egyptian-American diaspora unorganized and
disengaged, then we might need to investigate the literature to find out if it is profound
religious differences, e.g., Copt versus Muslim, or ordinary Muslims versus radicals. As
stated by Jang (2012), because the available studies on the intersection of ethnic identity,
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ethnic community, and religion factor, there is a need for future studies for better
understanding of the influence of religious identification on one’s ethnic identity (p. 11).
A major claim of this study is that the Egyptian diaspora’s political behavior took
the wave shape; turning from passive to active and the passive stage again. This behavior
is an echo of the same behavior of the citizens inside the country. The short period of the
active engagement could indicate that the external motivation or force was just an
exception of the common passive behavior of that diaspora. The revolution and its
ongoing consequences and other several elements cause that behavior of engagement;
nevertheless, no studies have been conducted addressing this phenomenon. Thus, the
study questions should address this claim.
Having said that, the Egyptian diaspora can be similar to Korean diaspora
engagement behavior. According to Jang (2014), Koreans received the terrible message
of the racial riot that had led to civic unrest in Los Angeles in 1992 against Korean
Americans’ businesses. The diaspora understood the need for being active, united, and
organized, and became aware for coalition building (p. 629). However, “Although [this
factor] brought attention and awareness to the larger Korean population, despite the need
to voice their opinions and empower themselves to address their concerns, Koreans have
continued to be inactive.” (Jang, 2012, p. 54) Jang did not detail what was precisely the
reason of that unresponsive behavior, and that would be one of the needs for my study of
explaining the similar behavior of Egyptian diasporas. This concluded observation leads
to the need to justify from the literature the rationale for selection of the mentioned
concepts.
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Comments on Studies Related to Their Chosen Methods and Ways of Approaching
the Problem
Here, I summaries several points that I detailed through the chapter. This brief
would be focused on describing studies related to the constructs of interest and chosen
methodology and methods that are consistent with the scope of the study. Second, this
brief would describe ways researchers in the discipline have approached the problem and
the strengths and weakness inherent in their approaches. The focus would be on the
Egyptian diaspora studies because that is the scope of my study. What are the possible
weaknesses of the methods and design of the literature on diaspora in general, and
Egyptian diaspora in particular?
Severo and Zuolo (2012) explored the e-diaspora, not the actual diaspora, as a
new approach to studying the Egyptian diaspora. This method of sampling can be correct
and limited to the associations level. Nevertheless, the representation of selected
associations for the actual groups in the real world can be questionable. Hence, I would
consider the approach of using e-diaspora besides using surveys and interviews with
actual groups and not just the online or virtual groups or one association. Using one
approach can give just a part of the truth, and that would not be ideal for my qualitative
tradition. Using more than one data resource is a triangulation strategy that is essential for
a certain level of validity in qualitative studies. As I mentioned throughout this study,
Egyptian organizations and leaders typically have more than one agenda or have personal
agendas that are not necessary representing all the diasporas members. In other words,
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studying the diaspora based on what the diaspora says online cannot be sufficient,
therefore, meeting with people is necessary to synthesize the actual image.
I choose my sample purposely to be one actual- not virtual-association or group in
one specific city; Washington, DC prominent Egyptian associations and figures typically
concentrate on the important political areas. One of the reasons behind this tendency of
the diaspora organizations is that “One of the changes in modern interest groups politics
is the centralization of group headquarters in Washington, DC rather than New York City
or elsewhere” (Cigler& Loomis, 2007, p. 2). Egyptian organizations and actors are not an
exception from that common tendency. There was no study conducted on Egyptian and
maybe Arab diasporas in this city specifically. Jang’s (2012, 2014) studies of Korean
Americans were my primary theoretical framework; however, it did not focus on Koreans
in any particular area.
Another cause related to Egyptian organization placement concentration is the
Egyptian history and culture that I have to consider in assigning my sample and place.
Egypt is a central-rule state and presidency or monarchy regime through history;
therefore, political, civic, and military powers gather around the center that is Cairo in
Egypt or Washington, DC in the United States. According to Cigler and Loomis (2007),
organizations of DC aim to be influential so that they decided or accepted to settle close
to the hub of the policymakers and political kitchen (p. 10). With the same line,
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) found that ethnic groups concentration in
metropolitan areas is “more likely to have contacts with, or espouse to, ethnic media and
community organizations” (p. 878). Hence, I assume that this choice of the groups could
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give some advantage to them on one hand, and should give me easier access to the
organizations and involved stakeholders, save some time, and provide my study with
updated, direct information on the other hand.
Finally, as I mentioned in the external factors section listed in this chapter, the
2011 and 2013 revolutions have to be considered if we need to explore the effect of
external historic factors, not just the historical factors such as the Cold War. Several
studies I explored such as Zohry and Debnath (2010) in this proposal were conducted
before the revolution that made a great shift in the Egyptian political scene in Egypt and
host countries. This change implies the need to study the same diaspora and that new
factor related to what happened after 2011.
Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I mentioned several characteristics and political influence’s factors
of different diasporas with connection and major concentration on the Egyptian diasporas
based on several functional comparisons with other traditional and incipient ethnic
groups. The chapter did not cover all elements or generalize the findings to all Egyptian
groups in different regions in America or the world. Based on this review of the current
literature, the size, organizational unity, and religious characteristics had had a great
focus in literature; thus, they would have the same focus in this study. According to
Oswiecimski (2013), there are always circumstances (i.e., external factors) and
characteristics (internal factors) that control the implementation of the size (p. 65). This
statement shows just one claim of the relation between the independent, dependent, and
mediating variables that should explain specific outcomes regarding the diaspora political
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engagement and influence. This relation between the size and unity and political
effectiveness is still unclear; is it a reverse or direct link? Future studies are in need to
grasp this particular hypothesis.
It would not be realistic if the ethnic groups’ characteristics and extrinsic factors
if they were studied separately. That is because they jointly affect the groups’ political
proliferation, strategies, position, and power in the host countries. What we can separate
is the influence from success of the diaspora. According to Lyons (2014), Ethiopian
diaspora became influential, but that did not mean achieving successful change in the
American policies towards the Ethiopian government in 2005 (pp. 163, 165, 180). Hence,
each category is not enough by itself, and both categories of factors are contributing
jointly in enabling or hindering the diaspora establishment, organizational and political
strategies employed for active mobilization, engagement, influence, and success.
The Egyptian diaspora has some common as well as unique characteristics that
prevent it from taking advantage on the opportune factors and from keeping the active
status. The limited existing literature had addressed some of those characteristics by
studying other diasporas but other characteristics had not been addressed. I noticed that
the Egyptian diasporas has severe political and personal polarization, ideological division
among them and between them and the Egyptian state, divergence in interests between
some sectors and the Egyptian state, urgent need for a clear organizational purpose and
single agenda, and an apparent lack of organizational experience and lobbying history.
For these reasons and others, compared to the Ethiopian diaspora, the Egyptian diaspora
was not considered influential because it did not employ effective strategies. Thus, it was
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unsuccessful because it did not achieve changes in the U.S. foreign politics towards
Egypt and the region in general. The research questions should test this assumption.
I could rephrase my concluded statement by saying that the characteristics
(independent variables) of each diaspora allowed or did not allow it to manipulate the
external factors (dependent variables). In Chapter 3, I explained, among other things, how
the research and interviews questions are going to generate valid data regarding the
relationship between external, independent factors, i.e. the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian
revolutions/coups, and the internal factors that define the extent to which EgyptianAmericans are a diaspora, according to my framework.
Based on this contrast, ethnic groups have different and various activities or
strategies such as lobbying activities and experiences, which range from two distinct
ways of lobbying. Lobbying is about “taking the form of campaign contributions or
influence-buying through other means, as an activity that is aimed at changing [and not
bending] existing rules or policies [of a government]” (Harstad & Svensson, 2011, p. 46).
The change and influence can come to reality when the lobbies show the government the
likely consequences of its action because lobbies are treasured resources of information
showing those consequences for the governments (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 483).
Not all groups can lobby the executive government directly and thus they tend to
do indirect lobbying activities as we saw clearly in the Ethiopian case (Lyons, 2014, pp.
163-180). Also, the common perception implies that not all countries are able or prefer to
apply the lobbying strategy. This strategy is relatively more common in the rich or
developed countries compared to the developing ones. The culture, experience, and
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mechanism of lobbying might be not common or easy for groups who came from the
developing countries (Harstad & Svensson, 2011, p. 46).
The differences in characteristics of diasporas as well as their home countries
should explain why the external factors have no similar results for all diasporas and why
diasporas could be able or not able to apply similar strategies (Hrebenar & Thomas, 2012,
p. 312). Finally, the Korean, Arab, Ethiopian, and Cuban, diasporas were studied here to
extract lessons for the Egyptian case. In addition, proliferation, characteristics, political
position, and influence of the Egyptian diasporas’ have still to be addressed due to the
new external factors including the 2011 revolution ongoing implications.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The primary purpose of this applied study was (a) to identify, describe, and
understand the problem of the Egyptian diaspora’s current political engagement and
potential influence in Washington, DC and (b) to explore the key characteristics and
related factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement and influence. The
research tradition I employed in this study to explore the study phenomenon was the
qualitative, instrumental, single case study design. However, the grounded theory
approach that was identified in Jang’s study (2012, 2014) was integrated with my primary
approach of the case study. I applied the case study design expecting to interview
participants who have different backgrounds and hold contrasting views about Egypt and
diaspora. The goal was to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and the
specific bounded case. The source of questions for this case study came from concerns
experienced by people (see Patton, 2002, p. 217). Therefore, a thorough understanding of
the phenomenon under study came from the prime data sources: case materials collected
by exploring the case units and the contrasting perspectives of participants as a prime
data source (see America Psychological Association (APA), 2010, p. 11).
To achieve this purpose, I developed the research questions, based on the
intellectual goals of this study, to essentially focus on exploring what are the Egyptian
diaspora and its political engagement shape. The search and interviews questions were
created to provide details about the diaspora’s nature or type, proliferation, components,
as well as members’ backgrounds, immigration status, interrelationships, assimilation,
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self-identity, and other characteristics and factors. In Chapter 3, I explain how the
questions were developed to generate valid data regarding the relationship between
external, independent factors (i.e., the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian revolutions) and the
internal factors that defined the extent to which Egyptian Americans are a diaspora,
according to my framework. In this chapter, I also describe and enumerate the particular
steps that I expected to take to address the research questions. Therefore, the chapter is
separated into two major sections focusing on (a) the research design and rationale and
my role as researcher and (b) issues with participant recruitment, instrumentation, the
procedures for collecting data and analysis, and related issues of trustworthiness.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Questions
Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora explain the
connection of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution,
organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S.
environment elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host) of
political engagement and the internal factors (i.e., the small size, negative
perception on politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the
institutionalization, development, and political engagement of that diaspora in
Washington, DC society?
Research Question 2: How does the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act
and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns such
as the presidential election and revolution?
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The Research Tradition and Rationale for the Chosen Tradition
In this section, I identified the chosen research tradition that would best answer
the research questions, and address the rationale for selecting this tradition. The social
phenomenon in this study is the political engagement and influence of the Egyptian
diaspora living and acting in Washington, DC during and after the Egyptian revolution.
Hence, a qualitative methodology was employed to study the factors of this phenomenon.
The research design derived logically from the problem statement. Based on
thorough review of the existing literature on diaspora, I found that it would be
appropriate to use the qualitative case study tradition approach because there is no
existing theory and very little information about the phenomenon. Hence, the need for
exploring and understanding the phenomenon and case might exist. A case study required
using multiple data sources that would be useful and essential to cover the limited
literature and information about the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013, pp. 104-105).
Therefore, as Creswell wrote, the researcher should rely on participants’ perceptions of
the phenomenon studied in the specific context (2009, p. 8; 2013, pp. 24-25). The study
participants developed subjective varied meanings about their personal experience that
flow from their different historical and cultural backgrounds.
The definition of the case study approach involves studying a case and its boundaries
(Creswell, 2013). The case boundaries include the case nature, place, time, and members
within a real-life, contemporary context or setting that can be described and identified and
are not abstract (Creswell, 2013). The goal is developing an in-depth description and analysis
of that case to understand it and the specific related bounded phenomenon (Creswell, 2013,
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pp. 97, 104; Yin, 2009, p. 32). I chose the case study as a qualitative research methodology
for several reasons. Namely, I met participants in Washington, DC to learn how the things
happened in Egypt from their point of view and what makes the diaspora members behave
and move due to their perceptions, different backgrounds, and worldviews. I listened to
participants about their engagement in what is going on in Washington, DC regarding
Egyptian concerns. I began the study with little knowledge about the topic, and using openended questions and descriptive analysis based on several kinds of data sources, completed it
with more details.
My case study research was qualitative and descriptive, not a cause-effect study
that was of the quantitative tradition. As qualitative research, the study aimed to explore
and gain new information about the unknown phenomenon studied. My qualitative single
case study showed purposefully different perspectives of the participants on the topic by
exploring and using multiple units bounded transparently by one place (i.e., Washington,
DC) for a specific time (i.e., the term of the 2011 Egyptian revolution through 2018).
In contrast to the quantitative research tradition and because there was not enough
realistic information on the topic, I did not conduct the study to develop or test a theory
about the phenomenon (as it is in the grounded theory approach). Moreover, the
grounded theory approach demands primarily using interviews with a significant number
of individuals, which was not very possible due to the study topic and circumstances of
the diaspora, such as its minuscule size in Washington, DC. I did not conduct the study to
tell a story from marginalized figures or groups or to explore the life of an individual as is
demanded in the narrative design. With the narrative approach, the data collection
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method included limited sources that are interviews and documents. In sum, other
possible choices of research traditions would have been less effective.
As shown in the literature review, I had been seeking to understand the cultural
and social settings and experiences of the participants (i.e., the diaspora characteristics).
The resulting meanings and themes emerged inductively based on my close interaction
with the community members and the subjective assumptions and interpretation of the
participants based on their personal view of the world and the situation being studied (see
Creswell, 2009, pp. 8-9). The subjective assumptions and interpretation should be
obtained through the participants’ answers to the interview questions. My goal was
making sense of the participants’ views on the particular topic, the revolution,
transformation period (i.e., 2011–2013), and the effect of those events on the diaspora
political engagement.
Role of the Researcher
I needed to define the personal and professional relationships that I may have had
with participants, steps to gain entry, personal connection to the site of interviews to
collect the data, and my likely biases and sensitiveness to other ethical issues. I also
needed to state my plan for addressing these issues. According to Rudestam and Newton
(2015), in qualitative research, the instruments are the human researcher and other sorts
of traditional instrumentation, such as interviews and observations (p. 127). The
relationships between participants and me and between people involved in these activities
can influence the potential results. Therefore, I was the key data collection instrument in
this single case study by being involved in the case settings as well as conducting the
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interviews, browsing documents, and observing what was being studied. My data
collection instrument was face-to-face interviews, while sending a questionnaire list to
participants was my alternative plan to be used if I could not meet the participants in
person.
As a researcher in the qualitative research tradition, it is typical to be involved in
intensive experiences and ongoing relations with the prospective participants. Since I was
a member in a number of the Egyptian organizations and groups in Washington, DC,
Virginia, and Maryland, I had the necessary access and opportunity to access the
participants and groups' activities and documents. As such, I knew many of the
participants. This position and personal relationship led to building reciprocity and trust
between us. However, I did not have any supervisory or instructor relationships involving
positions of power with the participants. This situation prevented me from abusing the
power I had or coercing the participants into the study, which could have been a serious
validity and ethical issue. To address ethical issues in advance, I developed a consent
form that functioned as an essential contract between my potential participants and me.
My role included some essential elements, including the potential biases and
ethical matters, steps to gain entry, and study values. The ultimate goal was ensuring the
validity and accuracy of the findings and respect for and protection of participants, their
organizations, and their rights (Creswell, 2009, pp. 87, 89, 177). I might have faced
several challenges collecting and analyzing data, such as my presumptions, past
experiences, access difficulty to the organizations’ sites, abusing power over the
participants, interpretation accuracy (see Creswell, 2009, pp. 89-92) and lack of
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anonymity. Those challenges could have imposed limitations on my data collection
strategy and the quality of collected and analyzed data. To address threats to the quality, I
discussed my “past experiences, biases, and orientations that have likely shaped the
interpretation and approach to the study” (Creswell, 2013, p. 251). Moreover, I clearly
described the methods and procedures I employed for collecting and analyzing the data
(see Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 310).
Methodology
This section deals with the issue of from whom and how data are collected and
how data will be analyzed. The primary intent of this case study qualitative research is
not to generalize the information or findings to another population but to explain the
specifics of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2013, p. 157). This consideration should also be
consistent with choosing a small sample size and applying purposeful sampling strategy
for collecting the data. Having said that, applying the purposeful sampling strategy
should be the right way to help me use the concrete and small sample size and number of
units within the major single case for illustrating, exploring, and understanding the target
unique phenomenon in depth (Patton, 2009, p. 230).
The case or phenomenon represents an extreme and revelatory case. A revelatory
single case means revealing and focusing on a phenomenon that is hitherto unknown or
not studied because it has been inaccessible to social scientists’ inquiry in the past (Yin,
2014, p. 52). This revelatory instrumental single case study involves the analysis of
multiple units embedded within the larger case that is the diaspora. Mainly, the case is
revelatory in nature, and that should give another rationale for selecting an embedded
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single case rather than multiple-case design (Yin, p. 52). The primary, larger unit is the
diaspora as a whole (the case). One small-embedded unit (the central unit of the study)
will be one group of Egyptians, the AEA group in Washington, DC. This small unit
includes members and leaders or founders, and it is the major unit of the case. I employ
this unit to explore the primary case, the diaspora itself. My primary individual
interviewees will come from AEA.
Throughout personal experience and close navigation, I identified a preliminary
group of Egyptians that could be considered representative of the Egyptian diaspora in
Washington, DC. I focus the AEA and its leaders as a representative sample for the
Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. In other words, the scope is the Egyptian diaspora
in DC, and AEA is the primary unit of analyses I use as an instrumental case to study the
Egyptian diaspora as a whole. AEA is a non-profit organization 501-C3 established in
2005 under U.S. Laws. The announced mission is promoting true democracy, and
sustainable development and social justice in Egypt and empowers Egyptian Americans
in their new communities. The general political orientation of the organization is against
the Egyptian government policies as well as the Muslim Brotherhoods, however, it has
good relationships with the Egyptian embassy. There is no persistent harmony among the
members and between them and the elected president and board of directors. AEA has no
particular physical place for its members' meetings and transparent information regarding
its financial resources; therefore, the observation instrument would not be applied.
Personal conflicts reflect on the group work and decisions, but AEA performed
very well in Washington, DC during the 2011 revolution. Therefore, AEA members were
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my primary interviews participants. I also chose this group because its leaders and
members have different political backgrounds and political and religious orientations that
could enrich the collected data. Finally, the smallest units will be an intermediary unit
that includes Egyptian activists from outside the AEA, and the leaders or followers of a
mosque. At each level of analysis, it was likely that slightly different data collection
techniques and resources were used.
The case was selected to illustrate the study issue or topic, and it must be
described in thick detail (Creswell, 2013, p. 102). Defining the phenomenon, case, and
embedded units of analysis should include defining the case boundaries that includes the
case nature, place, time, and members. It is important to choose a case with some real-life
characteristics that can be described and identified and are not very abstract (Yin, 2009,
p. 32). For this reason, and as I asserted at the outset of this chapter, I tailored questions
addressing particular issues of daily political engagement, such as facilitating the
Egyptian immigration and related policy and politics, and Israel-Arab conflict in the light
of its relation with Egyptian identity.
Those issues also included the present political development in Egypt in relation
to the new regime’s manner of governing, as well as the relationships between Egypt and
the United States pursuant to the 2011 and 2013 revolutions or coups and their effects.
These issues and related questions reflect the forms of political participation and lobbying
activity of the Egyptian American diaspora in the U.S. political system. These forms are
the focus of the study and its questions in terms of examining how the diaspora lobbies
occasionally for Egypt in the United States.
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It was necessary to include explanations for why I chose these particular issues
(the political participation forms and issues) and the related questions. It was also
necessary to explain to the scholarly readers how the interviewee’s responses are valid
indicators of a more or less strong sense of diasporic ethnic group cohesiveness,
proliferation, and the need for political participation among Egyptian Americans. For
example, the question of why the diaspora size is small and how the immigration policy
is a reason for that status can be an important political issue to the diaspora members. Of
course, they like to come to the United States and invite their family easily.
My major principle that dominates designing the study and choosing the proper
method and its elements for conducting this qualitative study refers “improved
understanding of complex human issues is more important than generalizability of
results” (Marshal, 1996, p. 524). That is because my design is a single case study, which
aimed to elucidate what is specific of that unique, extreme case (see Creswell, 2013, p.
157). This principal should justify choosing the sampling strategies, sample size, and
specific participants who can answer particular simple questions of this very detailed
research (Marshal, 1996, p. 523). Therefore, I will detail the criteria on which
participants’ selection is based; identify data collection instruments and sources; and the
procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection
Participant Selection Logic
Considering the qualitative nature of the study, this case study is based on a broad
range of data resources. Hence, collecting data ranged from gathering some documents of
government and organizations to interviewing some political activists and lobbyists, and
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community organizational leaders, mainly, from AEA. Therefore, this process should
included and serve to instruct others who could be interested in the study topic, fulfilled
the desired saturation and the desired credibility, and gave a full image of the diaspora
situation.
Based on my choice of applying qualitative method of inquiry, my purposive
sampling strategy focused deliberately on a small number of knowledgeable participants.
Those potential participants should have rich information about the case because the
intent is to obtain extensive detail about the case and each unit of it and to elucidate the
particular of them (Creswell, 2013, p. 157; Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123). The
participants. They should be able to likely contribute significantly to enriching a deeper
understanding of my topic, research questions, and phenomenon posed by this study.
Finding proper participants and make sure that they meet the selection criteria that
I have listed for that purpose will depend on several considerations. One of the
considerations is the sampling strategy, which is the basis of my logic. That strategy
determines and includes what case I should study in the first place and then the criteria on
which participant selection is based to study that case. According to Creswell (2013), “In
choosing which case to study, an array of possibilities for purposeful sampling is
available” (p. 100). Therefore, I employed a mix of strategies that combines the snowball
or chain sampling and the extreme or deviant case sampling.
The rationale for choosing the later strategy was because it had the same logic and
purpose of case study approach. Also, it offers a rationale for choosing the single case
study rather than a multiple case study design (Yin, 2014, pp. 51-52). According to
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Patton (2002), extreme cases can be information-rich cases. The reason is that by being
unusual, the extreme cases can show what is unusual or special and is typical (p. 234). In
addition, the Egyptian diaspora case shows notable failures or insufficiency so that it was
worth being studied and it can offer useful lessons about the extraordinary conditions of
the case.
According to Patton (2002), “Extreme or deviant cases may be so unusual as to
distort the manifestation of the phenomenon of interests” (p. 234). My readers could be
wondering what are these extreme cases I have in mind and why could be unusual. The
meaning here is not “extreme” or “deviant” individuals. I did not intend, in other words,
to interview someone who is also completely politically inattentive and uninterested to
find out why. I did not also mean by extreme or deviant cases something such as a
military coup, militant Islamists, or illegal organization activities. Instead, the general
unstable situation of the Egyptian national situation, erratic behavior of the diaspora case
and the small but modest growing up size of the diaspora, and the unsuccessful
performance of the diaspora compared to other similar diasporas, all imply the deviant of
the case according to my estimation and observation.
I had had practical experience with the political movements and organizations,
and observation on the media. Based on this fact and my readings, I believe that the
extreme trait of the study case also implies the outstanding successes and notable failures
of the Egyptian political activists and organizations in the local political sphere of Egypt.
Also, this trait implies the Egyptian diaspora’s limited proliferation and swinging
political engagement in the host countries before and after the Egyptian revolution.

143
On the other hand, I asked the initial participants about other likely candidates
who could be information-rich key informants or who could know who knows what cases
are information rich (Patton, 2002, p. 243). Hence, I want to emphasize highly attentive
Egyptian-Americans. Then, I asked them about issues which I predict they may have an
inclination to try to influence the U.S. government. The issues are such as mixing religion
with politics, U.S. immigration policies, and democracy of the Egyptian governance. Of
course, their answers were related and affected by their subjective views regarding the
2011 and 2013 revolutions/coups that are the overarching event of these issues and
questions.
As a likely result, the number of participants is not totally known at least in the
present. However, the snowball sampling process would stop when it comes to a few key
names of useful participants and when good informants or no new information are
forthcoming from new sampled units; thus, saturation is the foremost criterion (Patton,
2002, p. 246). Possibly, that how many I interview will depend in part on the identity
polarizations, if they exist, among Egyptian Americans. Coptic Christian Egyptian
Americans in Washington, DC may have significantly different views about President El
Sisi’s Egyptian administration than do strongly Muslim Egyptian Americans and secular
but Muslim identity Egyptian Americans. Moreover, because of the small size of the
diaspora in Washington, DC and the hardship of locating and contacting the members, I
expected that the available number of cooperative and informative interviewees would
have been limited.
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Besides, the criteria on which and how many participants should be selected
include also religious affiliations, professional background, social level in Egypt and
America, location, social connections, availability for meeting, and access to
organizations documents and sites and business meetings. The candidates should be
Egyptian who resided in Washington, DC before 2011, and somehow participated in the
Egyptian political events such as presidential election campaigns. They could be also
members of nonprofits or public agencies.
“In proposing an extreme group sample, as in all purposeful sampling designs,
the researcher has an obligation to present the rationale and expected benefits of this
strategy” (Patton, 2002, p. 234). Purposeful sampling criteria should consider that the
selected participants should have to constitute a purposely diverse and presentational
sample (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 123). So that, the sample included the relatively
active members who have had experienced the extreme changes in the diaspora role and
nature before and after the Egyptian revolution. Therefore, the interview instrument
focused on interviewing those people who were relatively active in the Egyptian diaspora
organization(s) at the Egyptian revolution time. I am also interested in interviewing
members who were relatively inactive but became active in the civil society and Egyptian
diaspora organization(s) during and after and because of that event.
With describing the relationship between saturation and sample size, saturation is
one of the major determinations of the sample size as I have just mentioned before
regarding the snowball sampling strategy. The case study approach considers collecting
data from interviewing appropriate candidates for participation with other data coming
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from observations or other collected data sets. In this recent stage of the study, I did not
have a full idea of what all difficulties I could face in the sampling process. According to
Marshall (1996), “the number of required [participants] usually becomes evident as the
study progresses, like new categories, themes or explanations stop emerging from the
data (data saturation)” (p. 523).
However, the sample size and how much it could be small should depend on
several essential considerations. Those considerations are such as my decisions regarding
the units of analysis, the available time and resources, access issues, availability and
cooperation of participants, and the rationale for the study. I also considered my purpose
of seeking particular sorts of participants, the amount of information the participants have
and can provide, and of course, what I was looking for to understand and the depth of that
understanding (Patton, 2002, pp. 228-229, 244-245). I considered my single case itself
being the study sample, as well as the number of individuals within my case to interview.
As it is a typical qualitative study, the sample size of this case study was small.
Instrumentation
The data collection instruments and evidences that I wanted to use had included
field diaries or journals; historical, organizational, or legal documents, and interview
protocols and open-ended interviews including several data types such as individuals and
organizational founders and members. I have a list of questions that I should send my
participants. I explained and justified these questions concerning the data that I hoped to
gather using them and concerning generating valid data.
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However, the interview was my primary instrument. Creswell (2013) identified
the interview method as a “dialogue that is conducted one-way, provides information for
the researcher, is based on the researcher's agenda, leads to the researcher's
interpretations, and contains “counter control” elements by the interviewee [if the
interviewee] withholds information” (p. 173). This popular instrument has high fidelity
and little structure (Rudestam & Newton, 2007, p. 130). It included phone calls, face-toface meetings and, e-mails. For this basic purpose, I collected a few legal documents
about the AEA group, and initial exchanged e-mails between the group members
including myself. Those e-mails included issues such as what is going on in Egypt,
debates on the organizations' leadership legitimacy, bylaws, holidays, or invitations for
annual meetings or organizational election. They were also different from the other type
of e-mails that I planed to send with attached interview questions that I mentioned
previously. As an ethical matter, I have informed these people that I was gathering data
for my dissertation, which may change their e-mail behavior.
However, my planned primary instrument of collecting data was the face-to-face
open-ended interviews. It was preceded by collecting documents, researching through the
organizations' websites, and collecting archival data. Getting responses by e-mail was
difficult while conducting Face-to-face interviews were better, even necessary, in order to
get the information I need. Hence, sending my questionnaires via e-mails was the last
resort when I could not meet any of the participants in person.
I used a protocol for the interviews when I needed to do that (Creswell, 2009, p.
175). Another basic step in conducting the qualitative instruments is to set up a clear
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protocol or several different protocols showing important procedural components such as
the questions and interviewees-interviewer consent. I designed the interview protocol
using a combination of sample interview protocols of Janesick dated in 2011 and
Creswell dated in 2013. The protocol included eight central descriptive questions. It was
useful for the consistency of the interviews and could vary based on the interviewees’
types (see Laureate Education, 2013, p. 24).
Regarding the observation instrument, it could raise an ethical concern. I should
not be so involved in the organization or community’s activities because I could lose a
sense of my required level of objectivity as a professional researcher (Laureate
Education, 2013). Pitfalls are also potential that might lead to biased role and outcomes
that using the participant-observation instrument might push me gradually to assume a
specific position within the observed organization or become such a supporter. Being a
participant-observer also could turn me busy involving in the observed setting which that
might make me forget about my original mission that is observing and taking notes (Yin,
2014, p. 117). Therefore, applying the interview instrument was my choice to collect the
data. The interview instrument should provide a good alternative when I cannot directly
observe the internal setting, people, and the environment of the organizations, and when
the observation cannot answer a particular research question. The interview provided me
with full control over the questioning process and the inputs and outputs (see Creswell,
2009, p. 179).
Nevertheless, the nature of my study leads to apply both ways because I addressed
the historical background of the studied group as well as its everyday matters such as the
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engagement issues. According to Yin (2003), the observation and interview methods
have the chance to address contemporary sources; however, the interview has the
advantage of treating past or history in a better way than observation can do (pp. 92, 98).
Hence, I did not use the observation option because there would be no actual reason or
benefit to my study. During the data collection process, I involved and focused on
interviewing people about their experiences and perspectives
The selected source of the instrument for collecting the data is a researcherproduced. The basis for this instrument development is the literature source that is the
Jang’s questionnaires. Jang’s work inspired the style and organization of my study
interview questions. In Chapters 1 and 2, I explained the rationales for choosing Jang’s
study and theory that should justify the validity for this source to be the basis for
selecting the specific researcher-developed instrument.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
According to Rudestam and Newton (2015), a good qualitative case study should
include and apply more than one data collection method and obtain different perspectives
(p. 56). This rule should give me the flexibility of choosing several methods or
instruments depending on their appropriateness and usefulness for the study purpose,
research questions, tradition and design, participants’ circumstances, and potential field
issues. To achieve credibility of the procedures and findings, I sought different types of
participants who have average level of political knowledge or interest such as
participating in the national elections. They also might hold different if not contrasting,
subjective perspectives on the reality.
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I attended several meetings of the AEA group that can be in the current
organization leader’s residence. I also came to some community meetings that were held
in the public community centers. Before conducting any instrument, I have tried to make
that everything would be clear and easy. Therefore, I used and take advantage on the
community center meetings. As Millar & Ahmed, (2013, p. 11) advised the researchers, I
should make the topic and the study interview questions known to individuals through
using the place’ facilities and distributing fliers to ensure that the study participants did
not feel coerced to involve in the interviews
I did not expect anyone else to collect data for me. I know that could make
potential bias; however, I asked or hire multiple analysts such as experts to assess the
quality of my data collection and analysis. Besides my dissertation committee, the
outcome of the assessment of the external analysts I would not consider as a formal or
final opinion. Those analysts can also be some of my participants and qualified
colleagues to review my collected data findings and analysis (Patton, 2002, p. 560).
When I meet in the participants’ possible places, the starting point was observing
the individuals and settings that give me a better idea of who are the best informative
participants for the following anticipated interviews. Those meetings used to occur
occasionally, not periodically; therefore, I did not wait until those people gather. Beside
attending the community meeting, I contacted them via emails, phone calls, and in person
to arrange online or face-to-face meetings. I conducted interviews in either English or
Arabic or both ways depending on the participants' preferences and language proficiency
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level. The interviews conducted in a language other than English were transcribed and
translated into English prior to analysis (Jang, 2014, p. 637).
Some participants asked not to be audiotaped because of personal or political
reasons. I considered emails as a way of documenting, recording, and archiving the data
that I collected by this method. I also considered using Skype to have online interviews.
Potential interviewees might feel insecure about putting in writing in an e-mail response
to questions; responses that they fear may end up being read by other people. I had to
soothe fears that I would be recording what they are saying or even taking notes. I had to
convince them that their identities would be anonymous.
I conducted the interviews including two ways, standardized paper-and-pencil for
my own personal notes and observations, and a tape recorder or other advanced
technological equipment. I used two modes of recording such as a labeled microphone
and iPad recorder making two copies of the interview material. My intention was to avoid
any hidden technical problem that can result in losing the recorded text. In a later time, I
transcribed the collected comments and answers of participants into written text, and then
I ran content analysis and coding for themes of this written text using NVivo software. I
detailed this triple process in following section.
The outputs of the participants would be answers and comments. In using the
interviews instruments, I was not anonymous to many participants. This is also because
of my previous personal relationships with many of them. According to Millar and
Ahmed (2013), due to the partial lack of anonymity of the researcher to some
participants, a number of them had the chance to contact and provide comments
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concerning some areas of confusion and difficulty of understanding the questions. Those
likely comments were discussed in the discussion chapter of this study.
There were other similar anticipated barriers. Recruitment process has been
resulted in too few participants or no answers at all because of participants’ personal
reasons, circumstances, inconsistency, or time. This expected behavior itself was
important to be analyzed. It explained why some diasporas are not active or engaging
enough. I roughly estimated five participants that I needed. As a plan B, I contacted the
same participants again, and sought and added other new entrants. Therefore, before I
contacted the candidates, I looked for public access to information about the AEA and its
members such as press releases and website statements about who they are, what they do,
their size and area of operation, etc. Also, applying the snowball strategy for purposeful
sampling was another procedure of this contingency plan. I directed the interviews'
questions to other several members in AEA and nonmembers instead of those whom I
have contacted before. I did not expect responses from all participants or because they
could simply have no rich information to provide for my case.
Data Analysis Plan
My approach to data analysis was an embedded analysis of a specific issue or
aspect of the case to understand it by employing multiple units within the single
instrumental case or system bounded in a specific place, time, and setting (Creswell,
2009, p. 200, 2013, p. 100). The unit of analysis will not be the whole case (the whole
diaspora or its entire community) itself because I will not consider studying and
analyzing everything of this community such as its history, concerns, or educational
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development (Creswell, 2013, pp. 98-100; Stake, 1995, p. 84).
Instead of employing a holistic analysis, no matter how much data I could collect,
my analysis focused on a critical incident stage, or aspect that is the political
development and involvement of that community. The focused critical incident, stage, or
aspect also included, for example, the nature of the foreign policy and relationships of
Egypt or the Egyptian regime with the American government. This determination is the
basis of my purposeful sampling method (Patton, 2002, p. 447) that I explained
previously.
As Creswell (2009, 2013) explained, the analysis process went through three
generic procedures. Describing and reducing the codes into themes by categorizing the
data into two cycles and condensing the codes followed preparing and organizing my
data for the analysis. The last procedure was about interpreting the larger meaning of the
emerged coded data and representing them in a narrative discussion or visually in graphic
chart (i.e. comparison tables, charts, and figures). Those are the major steps; however, I
detailed more specific steps or elements in the following sections.
Several factors stipulated choosing my analysis strategies. The employed
strategies included coding categories, theming, concept analysis, or connecting strategy
(Maxwell, 2013, p. 105). The factors included my study’s nature, my research design
choice (qualitative case study tradition), the focus of the questions and alignment
between those questions and data analysis strategies, and types of data (Stake, 1995, p.
77). My methods did not produce the data I needed to answer my research questions;
therefore, I have not had to change either the questions or methods including the analysis
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method (see Maxwell, 2013, p. 116). The alignment between the questions and data
analysis strategies was a considerable factor that has let me produce a functional analysis
for the study. Therefore, my analysis strategies and the whole method and design were all
be compatible with the listed research questions and able to collect data I needed to
answer those particular questions.
Having said that, my analysis strategy and process did not fracture the data chunk.
I did not apply the option of the “categorical aggregation strategy” only and I used other
option, “connecting analysis strategy” option that I toke from Maxwell’s (2013) and
Maxwell and Miller’s (2008) method of analysis. The purpose of this option was to
understand my collected data in their particular time and context to find possible patterns
and themes and to be fit for the questions (Maxwell, 2013, p. 112; Patton, 2002, p. 453).
The reason for applying this strategy for coding the collected data is that my research
questions focus on "the way events in a specific context are connected" (Maxwell, 2013,
p. 115) and how one thing such as the diaspora contextual factors work. As I said before,
my approach to data analysis was an embedded analysis of a specific issue or aspect of
the case to understand it by employing multiple units within the single instrumental case
or system bounded in a specific place, time, and setting.
As examples of those events and factors and contexts that I explained in Chapter
2, the factor of the relationship between diaspora and host country environment that can
affect the diaspora' role, and the impact of the U.S. religious institutions; Muslim and
Christian, on the Egyptian diaspora’s perceptions and attitudes. These variables should be
analyzed by looking at the effective relationship “that connect statements and events
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within a context into a coherent whole” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 115) I assume that this
analysis strategy concurs Yin’s (2003) empirical definition of case study method. This
method “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially
when the boundaries between [them] are not clearly evident [or the] contextual conditions
are highly pertinent to [my] phenomenon of study” (p. 13).
Case study approach adds other unique procedures. Therefore, my chosen
qualitative approach, the case study, and its purpose should made my analysis different
from other types of analysis and general analysis phases. I blended the case study
analysis particular procedures and the general analysis steps that include organizing and
preparing data for conducting analysis, analyzing for themes, and then reporting them
(see Creswell, 2009, p. 184).
Applying the case study approach for inquiry should involve two major
components of analysis: describing the settings and individuals in thick details, and then
generating and identifying themes (five to eight themes). As I will explain in the third
step of the analysis processes, I would extend the coding process scope by building
additional layers of more sophisticated analysis meaning that I use those initial themes
for more advanced analysis and connect them to the case. Adding more analysis for new
themes might add another function to the coding process functions (see Creswell, 2009,
p. 189; 2013, p. 200). I will explain in details in the following steps that brief of the
analysis process.
The describing phase. This step plays a central role in the case study and means
that I should describe what I hear and see (Creswell, 2013, p. 184). An excellent case
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study should have detailed descriptions of the case components (Yin, 2003, p. 46). The
description should include the case relatively small number of participants and their
behavior, specific incidents, and units as well as their context that gives them meaning to
illuminate the focus of the inquiry. That essential description should be followed by
analysis of the data for themes or issues and using the initially produced themes for more
complicated analysis (Creswell, 2009, p. 184, 189; 2013, p. 98-101, 199; Newton, 2015,
pp. 132-133; Patton, 2002, p. 450).
Rich concrete and detailed description of the case within the context of a specific
setting is the bedrock of qualitative analysis and reporting, and it should be the start of
the qualitative study (see Creswell, 2013, p. 184). It should let the readers understand and
feel deeply the phenomenon studied and, drive his own interpretation about the meanings,
and make the generalization to other settings that are off the interest to the reader (see
Newton, p. 133; Patton, pp. 437-438). Detailed descriptions ensure external validity or
transferability of the likely coming results and findings of the analyzed collected data
beyond the immediate case (Creswell, 2009, p. 200)
This section of the case and analysis addressed questions of the “who, what,
when, where, and why” of the topic under study. As a fundamental step of case study
approach, this essential description helped explain and answer the research questions that
focus on the mode events in a particular context were connected (Maxwell, 2013, p. 115).
The questions are such as, what external factors affect the diaspora role and how could
they hinder the diaspora organizations. I explained and described the role of the diaspora
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and its organization in issues such as lobbying the U.S. federal government, or
maintaining the cohesion of the diaspora community.
During this description process, I frequently read and reviewed my collected data
that I have gathered from several sources. Also, I collected field notes that I obtained
through working in the research location and studying the case parts. Besides ensuring
the validity of the study’s procedures and results, my other goal is to explore any
emergent patterns and themes. Achieving this objective and process has led to the next
step of the analysis.
Interpreting data into codes, categories, and themes. This section should
include the steps of (a) the emergence of the findings phase (patterns and themes or
issues), (b) the open coding phase that leads to the final step, and (c) the potentially
learned lessons. The analysis, reporting, and interpretation of the collected data are about
making sense and reaching the new meanings of the received data (Patton, 2002, p. 438;
Stake, 1995, p. 71). Therefore, I could apply the two major options of strategy, the
categories aggregation (coding analysis) or the connecting strategy or holistic approach
(i.e. narrative analysis). In the first option, I could aggregate the data into some categories
or themes and then collapse them into a specific number of themes by using categorical
aggregation. With applying the connection strategy option, I analyze the narrative
structure and contextual relationships among the data as a whole (Maxwell & Miller,
2013, pp. 465-467).
In different words, as Creswell (2013) put it, “the case study researcher looks at a
single instance and draws meaning from it without looking at the multiple instances. It is

157
a process of pulling the data apart and putting them back together in more meaningful
ways” (p. 199). Creswell calls Maxwell’s connection strategy option of data analysis as a
“direct interpretation form.” As I mentioned briefly, generating and finding emergent
themes was my purpose of the coding process. Those themes should indicate and lead to
my study findings, as that was shown in the Results Chapter. Finally, I looked for
developing generalizations about the case to obtain general lessons learned from the case
(Creswell, 2013, pp. 99, 190, 200; Stake, 1995, p.74).
Coding is an inductive process that has two cycles of open coding where I am
open for the potential findings in the form of themes or patterns that might emerge
inductively from the data. In the open coding process, the researcher should involve in
reading the collected data and developing the codes based on what and which data seem
most important (Maxwell. 2013, p. 107). It is important to emphasize that although open
coding is the typical way for the categorizing strategy (option 1) in qualitative research
analysis (Maxwell. 2013, p. 106), I primarily used the connecting strategy (option 2).
The categorizing strategy is more common and it is focusing on relationships of
similarities and differences that can be used to sort the fragments of data into categories
regardless of the data context. It is also independent of the time and place hoping that
issues relevant important meanings will emerge (Creswell, 2013, p. 199; Maxwell, 2013,
pp. 112-113). Instead of that common strategy, the connecting strategy is different
considering contiguity relationships that connect events or textual material such as
statements of the participants’ interviews or field notes within the actual context into a
coherent whole producing new meanings (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 112-113). To connect
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those materials to find patterns, it was necessary to begin to categorize the responses, so
these two approaches, the categorizing strategy and connecting strategy, were both used.
The connecting strategy was the primer method for analyzing this study data but I
did not ignore the categorical coding strategy that focuses on the similarities and
differences to define, group, and compare the categories of data, and I might need to mix
both strategies (Maxwell & Miller, 2013, pp. 471-472). According to Maxwell (2013), I
should flexibly modify the strategy to fit the potential data, to answer specific questions
that fit each strategy, and to address potential validity issues. Without integrating and
developing the categorization of these situations, it could be not possible to use purely
connecting analysis. That is because it can be insufficient to understand some situations
and participants’ perspectives or to answer some particular questions when I use one
strategy only (pp. 105, 113).
Therefore, I looked for similarities and differences as a base of grouping the data
(coding). At the same time, I looked for contiguity among data based on their actual
context (contextualizing) looking for unexpected meanings and relationships between
things, parts of the text, categories, concepts, antecedents, and consequences of the
interview transcript and all other data types (Maxwell, 2013, pp. 106, 113). As an
example of mixing both strategies, “contiguity relationships may also be identified
among abstract concepts and categories, as a subsequent step to a categorizing analysis of
the data” (Maxwell, p. 106). Moreover, using connecting strategy cannot be easy because
there are not enough resources in the literature addressing this type of analysis.
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Conducting more analysis. Coding process should go through another more
elaborate and systematic layer of coding. This step involved more thinking, reflecting,
and triangulating of the early emergent and coded themes seeking for new, deeper, and
better meanings of the themes (Stake, 1995, p. 78). Triangulation is a process that aims to
show and secure the validity of the themes and findings via soliciting data from different
data sources or converging several sources of perspectives from participants as a way for
cross-checking, illustrating, and justifying the themes (Creswell, 2009, p. 191; Rudestam
& Newton, 2007, p. 134). In different words, I allowed the themes and then codes to
emerge from gathered information or perspectives of participants interviewed (NVivo
coding) and then, analyze and compare them across the produced themes of the case.
I used NVivo software for the open coding process that I am familiar with this
software compared to other software and websites. Although this program did not fulfill
all jobs for me, it helped organize, retrieve, store, and analyze my different kinds of data
such as interviews' responses and my daily field notes (Creswell, 2013, p. 204). However,
according to Miles et al., (2014), the user of any software would not automatically get his
data analyzed. The user has to stay the dominant instrument in the qualitative research.
The software just allows selective monitor display of data and assigned codes in various
configurations (p. 50).
Issues of Trustworthiness
This section addresses four criteria and strategies that I applied to validate the
accuracy of the study’s ultimate findings and discuss their transferability, and illuminate
the reliability of the procedures and methods (Creswell, 2009, pp. 200-201). Not all
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strategies of trustworthiness or validity will be applied to all the four criteria; however,
some strategies such as triangulation were applied to all of them. The validation is a
process that includes employing several strategies aim to assess and establish authenticity
or trustworthiness and document accuracy for the study (Creswell, 2013, pp. 246, 250).
As generally and typically single case study offers a weak valid basis for
generalizability (Yin, 2003, p. 37), no generalization from one case to another is the
primary goal of this qualitative study because the context differs from one case to another
(Creswell, 2013, p. 99). As I mentioned in the analysis strategies and phases section
regarding the required thick description of the case components and units, it was a
fundamental condition to allow for generalizability or transferability of the study results
to other settings and situations or focus and maybe participants (Newton, 2015, p. 133).
That is because this early process gives a robust theoretical framework for comparison
that other researchers or readers need it to conduct different cases. Detailed descriptions
should help provide generalization; however, generalization is still important but not
primary to this case study and it remains “the task of the reader rather than the author of
qualitative studies” (Newton, 2015, p. 133).
However, using a systematic methodology and clear set of methods to collect and
generate data should assure that my study results would be interpretable and just able to
be generalized to another cases and populations. For example, I will consistently use the
items in interviews protocol to assure the trustworthiness of the study findings (Walden
University, 2014, p. 1). I made sure that there is alignment between designed questions
and all other parts of the study especially the analytical strategy as I mentioned in the
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section of the nature of the study in Chapter 1 and analysis section in Chapter 2.
Therefore, I was able to substantiate that I could track the conclusions or findings
backwards through the chain of evidence that I have collected to my approach, design,
protocols, and research questions. The data should be able to be traced back to the
primary source (Laureate Education, 2013, p. 24). The trustworthiness “of evaluation
resides primarily within the data and is addressed by some questions such as, “Are data
able to be traced back to a primary source?” “Are they verifiable?” “Are the conclusions
reached logical, sensible, plausible?”
Credibility. Because of the qualitative nature of the study, my anticipated
participants should vary concerning many considerations such as participants’ gender,
language preference, educational level, political affiliation or perspective, and
proficiency. According to Jang (2014), the study's credibility should increase as result of
of providing different and, vantage point of views (p. 636). Therefore, I worked on
constructing the creditability and dependability of the data collection process and
conclusions by ensuring that I derived the data from multiple sources such as different
individuals, interviews, and document analysis.
This process of applying this tactic that occurs in the data collection phase should
allow for developing the in-depth understanding and triangulation of the study data. For
an example of credibility issues, my background and personal presumptions could affect
data collection phase and my interpretation of the findings. One of my assumptions that I
should address and avoid is that organizations such as the State Department or mosques,
in general, are not welcoming to the outside inquirers and observers.
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There are several strategies such as triangulation. I used this strategy to address
my study method and design internal validity. Triangulation in general includes
collecting data from different types and sources, comparing multiple methods, checking
the consistency of multiple data sources, employing various investigators, or consulting
multiple theories to interpret a single data set (Patton, 2002, pp. 247, 555-556; Yin, 2003,
pp. 34-35, 97). Besides, other strategies will be about using external auditors and
providing a rich and thick description of the setting and perspectives.
The triangulation strategy could include four types that are the triangulation of
data, investigator, theory, and methods (Patton, 2002, p. 556; Yin, 1994, p. 92, 2003, pp.
98-99). The first type is triangulation of collecting evidence sources that could include
four ways such as bringing together and comparing two or more methods of collecting
data in my case study (Creswell, 2009, p. 199; Patton, 2002, p. 559). The goal is to
illuminate various aspects of the political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora
phenomenon. Conducting interviews with multiple resources and comparing them are an
important strategy for triangulation to support the validity of the findings (Creswell,
2009).
I was going to find differences in levels and intensity of political engagement and
kinds of that engagement. I explained these differences among Egyptian Americans. Is it,
for example, one of different levels of education or religious affiliations and views?
There are other variables may be important. Hence, I used my questions of multiple
interviews to capture these different variables and variations within the variable.
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The other types of triangulation strategies are with triangulation with multiple
analysts that could include review by inquiry participants, observers, audiences review,
peer examination, and expert audit review (Creswell, 2009, p. 200; Patton, 2002, pp. 560562). By applying the review by inquiry participants, I had my study’s participants,
whom I described, observed, or interviewed, to review, react, and confirm my
descriptions and analysis. I did not ask for this collaborative and participatory review and
reactions to my published study. My reason is avoiding any early misunderstanding,
ethical concerns or wasting time. In short, this strategy is about having those key
informants to review the draft case study report during the composition phase of research
(Yin, 2003, pp. 34, 36)
Triangulation with multiple analysts and observers provided a check on my bias
in collecting my data. Having a second opinion is better than having one researcher doing
all data collection. This review and feedback were obtained through verbal and written
evaluation, and I put the outcome in the final report. This second type of triangulation
strategy helped me notice and generate new ideas that I did not notice during the research
composition and phases of data collection process (Patton, 2002, p. 560). The ultimate
goal of using the both triangulation strategies was to confirm the findings and
interpretations, and guarantee that I designed and asked the right research questions
(Patton, 2002, p. 560).
Transferability. Transferability, generalizability, or external validity can be
defined by the ability of the study results to apply and extend to other people, cases,
settings, contexts, theories, or samples (Creswell, 2009, p. 190; Lincoln and Guba as
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cited in Patton, 2002, p. 584; Yin, 2003, p. 37). Besides, those terms also refer that the
likely findings are transferable between the participants and me (Creswell, 2013, p. 246).
The major limitation of transferability for this study is that the study is a single case.
Single cases method is a poor basis for generalization, and that feature is a major obstacle
in doing case studies (Yin, 2003, p. 37). Yin (2003) restricted the possibility of
generalization to the multiple case study approach as well as the analytical generalization
that is about generalizing “a particular set of results to some broader theory” (p. 37).
Having said that, generating a new or modified theory of the Egyptian diaspora
that can lead to a case in the first place is the same theory that can also help to identify
the other diaspora cases to which the results are generalizable. But, since this study is not
a deductive one, therefore, generalization to other cases of diaspora or universe is not one
of the study goals, however, it is theoretically, still possible. In his newest version of the
same book, Yin (2014), mentioned that a single case study could be a good basis for
significant generalizations if it included contrasting lessons or cases and was an
explanatory and not just descriptive or exploratory one (p. 7).
According to Yin (2003), the generalization or external validity is not an
automatic process or outcome (p. 37). Having said that, and based on my choice of
applying the single case study approach, I used specific tests and standards of evaluation
to ensure the quality of my study. According to Creswell (2013), when the researcher has
identifiable cases with clear boundaries and thick descriptions, a case study can be the
right approach for conducting a study (p. 100). Therefore, I described thoroughly what
methods and procedures I followed to collect and analyze my data (Miles et al., 2014, p.
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310). This procedure would be related and could lead to the possibility of following “the
actual sequence of how data were collected and displayed for specific conclusion
drawing” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 311).
Besides describing the data collection and analysis process, I defined and
described adequately and thickly my case and its subunits in this chapter, and that should
establish accuracy for the findings and convince the readers about them and potential
lessons and generalizability (Creswell, 2013, pp. 100, 264-265). I collected data from
different resources and forms. The wise selection of participants that includes sufficient
variation should support this typical nature of case study approach and its accuracy. One
source of data is, of course, not enough to achieve the in-depth understanding (Creswell,
2013, p. 98; Yin, 1994, p. 92). The goal is assuring the convergence of the findings and
ability to convince the readers of the findings. Achieving this level of transferability
should, hopefully, enable other researchers in the field to have a solid framework for
comparison between the study findings and other future studies (Merriam as cited in
Creswell, 2009, p. 200).
Dependability (the qualitative counterpart to reliability). It is the ability of
something to reproduce or give rise to another copy or new version of itself. According to
Rudestam and Newton (2007), this term refers to the “replicability of the study under
similar circumstances” (p. 132). Reliability could answer the question of whether an
auditor or another researcher would be able to review, understand directly my produced
codes and themes and procedures, and thus find similar results of my original study. This
tactic of testing reliability occurs in the data collection phase of research (Yin, 2003, pp.
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34, 38-39). To ensure quality control, I developed and documented a formal, presentable
database as a chain of evidence (see Yin, 2014, p. 105). Therefore, I was able to reach my
collected data or row evidence directly.
Establishing strategies for dependability includes issues such as documenting my
case study procedures and most of the study steps, and setting up and using the detailed
case study protocol and developing database (Yin, as cited in Creswell, 2009, p. 190;
Yin, 2003, p. 34). This strategy of reflexivity means the using of field journals to capture
ideas, connections, methodological notes, etc. related to the understanding of the
phenomenon. Reliability strategies would also include checking transcripts “to make sure
that they do not contain obvious mistakes made during transcription” (Creswell, 2013, p.
190). I would also apply “systematically recording and transcribing data” (Rudestam &
Newton, 2015, p. 132).
Finally, crosschecking codes by another researchers who could be one of my
colleagues is another strategy. Other way of a common procedure of increasing the target
reliability of observational evidence is to involve more than one observer (see Yin, 2003,
p. 93). I triangulated several data resources and ask participants for their feedback about
my collected data and analysis themes to ensure the validity of findings (Creswell, 2009,
p. 191).
Confirmability. Confirmability purpose is establishing the value of the collected
data (Creswell, 2013, p. 246) through several strategies. I was reflexive or self-disclosing
about my position that I should be the maker and product and learner of the study text
and findings (Creswell, 2013, pp. 257, 265). Credibility issues, my background, and
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personal presumptions could affect the data collection phase and my interpretation of the
findings. Therefore, confirmability refers to “the ability to ensure that the data collected
was reflective of the attitudes and opinions of the participants rather than the researcher
[and] was addressed through the use of multiple data sets” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, as
cited in Branchcomb, p. 71). Confirmability also certifies that the data reported in the
case can be pursued all the way back to original data sources (e.g., field notes,
documents, records, logs, etc.)
The strategy of triangulated reflexive inquiry should affect and inform my study
findings. For example, in the self-reflexivity, I was aware of answering questions such as
how did my background and experiences shape my perspectives and data collection and
analysis? What should I do with the findings? How do participants know and perceive the
topic? How do my readers and audiences make sense of what I produced and gave them?
What is the potential feedback they could send me back regarding my study findings?
Moreover, I used the service of an external qualitative auditing to review my
methods and all steps and phases of the research process (Creswell, 2009, p. 200;
Creswell, 2013, p. 246). In short, based on this reflexivity, self-awareness, and my
political and social responsibility for social change, I did not write this study just for
myself or build it on my presumptions. I was aware of presenting my study findings in an
understandable way for the peer review and researchers.
Ethical Procedures and Considerations
The application for collecting the data was made and approved through the
Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB; IRB Approval # 03-04-19-

168
0371164). There was no need for additional protections because I did not expect to have
special types of participants such as prisoners, children, or mentally disabled individuals.
I continually examined the design of my study so that the risk can be justified by the
benefits of the study. I did not expect any possible harm to my participants while I
expected and offered several personal, political and organizational benefits for them.
Those anticipated benefits did not include any financial benefits. The Egyptian
community members in Washington, DC are well educated enough to have a decent
financial level.
Regarding the ethical consideration of proficiency, respect and, justice, I did not
exclude anyone from participating in the study or collect my data based on my solo
personal opinion or presumptions. To ensure the confirmability of the data collection
phase and the value of the study findings, I addressed some of my presumptions that
could pose some ethical issues. For example, I do not trust the loyalty level of the
extreme Islamic groups and individuals. I do not accept or believe in their ideas or
appreciate their negative adverse deeds towards both countries. My personal view on
those opposite groups is that this sector of diaspora has its own agenda that is not
necessary to be a national one.
However, not all scholars and readers believe in these views regarding Islamic
political groups and of course, a critical listener can offer an alternative interpretation of
the facts and assumptions of my case. The exemplary case study should anticipate and
consider those alternatives and challenges because the study should not be a one-sided
case. Therefore, I collected all relevant evidence that supports or challenge my single
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point of view selectiveness. Empirically, I examined the evidence from different
perspectives and try to support the basis on which other anticipated challenging
alternative assumptions and rival propositions about those groups and other issues could
be rejected based on my study’s well collected and examined findings, otherwise my
assumptions could remain such biases (Yin, 2003, pp. 163-164).
Despite these presumptions and stand of mine, exploring the perspectives and
political engagement of those groups in the host countries are paramount to obtain a full
image of the studied case. Assumingly, those groups could be more active than others and
have stronger and more positive relationships with the U.S. government. Thus, the right
question is whether those groups are advancing the U.S. interests such as the war against
terrorism or not. This is not to accuse specific groups but it is just to shed light on the
controversial and potential role of some religious, political diasporic groups in the United
States, and this is not also an attempt to say that the U.S. policy is influenced by those
groups to be turned against the Egyptian state. Ambrosio (2002) argued, “The diasporas
that connect to something involving international terrorism (either as victim, perpetrator,
or even bystander) will have significantly less room to promote an “independent” foreign
policy” (p. 211). Nevertheless, I considered the views and participation of all participants
regardless of my presumptions to assure the validity of the different types of the study
findings.
I managed my potential bias as I have just mentioned in the previous section,
apply and comply all IRB requirements, and secure permission for accessing to private,
official, or business facilities and individuals’ residencies. Besides, I tried to maintain the
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integrity and confidentiality of the obtained documents such as archival and official data
and artifacts. During the interviews, I tried not to ask any leading question that could
affect the authenticity of the participation and its subjective outcomes and conformability
of the findings or results.
In some occasions, other ethical concerns related to data collection or intervention
activities could arise. These concerns could include participants’ refusing participation or
early withdrawal from the study, and any unpredictable adverse events. Also, I expected
that some participants would not be on time just because they can be busy, careless, or
culturally have no respect for their and others time and obligations. Addressing this kind
of concerns, I sought to "extend the discussion by incorporating new elements, or
replicate [the] study in new situations or with new participants" (Creswell, 2009, p. 25).
To avoid any ethical concerns in early time, I composed and submitted an
informed consent. In general, voluntarism, competence, comprehension, and full
information, are basic components of any informed consent (Frankfort-Nachmias &
Nachmias, 2008, p. 85). Ethical concerns and risks could occur at any time before,
during, and, after the study. Hence, I was aware that my interviewees and all other
participants would not be at maximum risk at any level or stage of the interviews and the
whole study (see Creswell, 2013, p. 264).
Because I interviewed participants in person, then the contact information for
them would need to be known to me. My participants’ participation would be
confidential, but not anonymous. Therefore, I composed and sent the consent form to my
participants before starting the interviews and any other method of collecting the data.
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This form simply allowed me to begin the interview and also stop the process or prevent
it. The content of my consent include the study's topic, purpose, interviews questions,
zero-potential cost and potential risks and benefits, time and place of the interviews,
privacy right and anonymously, and my personal contact and affiliation (Creswell, 2009,
p. 89). I also tolled my participants about their right of joining and withdrawing from the
process at any time they feel that, and whether I would be publishing the interviews and
study. Finally, I made sure to provide them a copy of the signed consent form in advance
Summary
My ideal choice for the research tradition was qualitative that directed my study
and its parts in a specific way and shape. Particularly, it influenced the methods I would
use to collect and analyze data. My chosen tradition is based on the social constructivism
worldview that typically hold true for qualitative more than quantitative and rely on the
participants’ rich views and open questions (Creswell, 2009, p. 8). I chose to apply this
tradition and case study approach because they also fit my study problem, research
questions, and purpose. They are fit because I have clearly identifiable case with specific
boundaries and I seek to provide an in-depth understanding of my case.
I purposefully devoted my exploratory study to a single case and limited size of
units in a particular geographic area and time. The purpose of this approach is not to test
a theory or influential relationship between variables. Hence, generalizability of results
and theory is not the primary goal, but it is just possible. Instead, the focus is on a
specific, single organization or unique bounded system
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Focusing on a single specific, bounded system is not also the purpose or nature of
the other four qualitative approaches such as the narrative approach, and that is why I did
not apply them to my study. My major purpose and criteria of deciding on choosing the
samples (or units), sample size, and purposeful sampling strategy is reaching to the
desired in-depth understanding and findings that were based on the research questions
and the nature of those questions (Marshal, 1996. p. 523). Hence, this criterion should
concern selecting and finding information-rich case and units or samples for study
(Patton, 2002, pp. 229-230). I did “study a more open range of experiences for a smaller
number of people (seeking depth)” (Patton, 2002, p. 244). To collect my data from this
number of people, I applied specific methods. My primary method is interview-based
(i.e., face-to-face and telephone).
The quality or trustworthiness issues point to ensuring that the data and evidence
are valid and free from biases on the part of the researcher, and thus the findings and the
data are an accurate portrayal of the situation. Validity is one of the strengths of
qualitative research and it includes a group of strategies to be followed to ensure that the
study findings are vibrant and realistic, and the study interpretations are presented
neutrally (Creswell, 2009, p. 191). Neutrality means collecting all relevant evidence that
support or challenge my point of views avoiding any orientation of selectiveness that
could harm the validity of evidence (Yin, 2003, pp. 163-164).
Since I applied single case study, my potential findings could be criticized as not
trustworthy enough, hence triangulating several collection data types or evidence sources
could recover this limitation of the single instrumental case study (Creswell, 2009, p.
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191). As I will show in the Results Chapter, the ultimate goal is not generalizing the
findings, but it is exploring, developing, describing, and interpreting a particular
instrumental single case to address a particular issue or phenomenon within given time
and place.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore,
describe, and share information regarding how the Egyptian diaspora and its different
members and subgroups narrate their political engagement regarding the Egyptian
interests in Washington, DC before, during, and after the 2011 revolutions and 2013
revolution or coup d’état. Therefore, I recruited first-generation, Egyptian American
immigrants living in Washington DC, most of whom are scholars and community leaders,
to provide their perspectives on their political participation inclinations and activities and
the factors that affect them. The participants also provided their perceptions of how their
opinions have been reshaped by their acculturation experiences in the United States. The
following two research questions guided my study, focusing on the key, joined internal
and external factors that shape, enable, and inhibit that engagement regarding particular,
contemporary political Egyptian issues:
Research Question 1: How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the
joint effect of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution on
organizational and political concerns, relationship between the governments, U.S.
environmental elements, and relationship between that diaspora and host) of
political engagement and the characteristics (i.e., small size, negative perception
on politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization,
development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC
society?
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Research Question 2: How did the Egyptian community in Washington, DC act
and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian concerns, such
as the Egyptian presidential election and revolution?
In this chapter, I present the settings and demographics of the recruited
participants, including a thick description of the group. Then, I discuss components of the
data collection process, such as the settings for the interviews and the interview
participants. I detail the analysis process with developed codes and themes. The chapter
also includes a description of evidence of the trustworthiness of the data. I then provide
the findings by research question, detailing the answers provided by the participants for
the interview questions asked during the interviews to provide rich, thick data taking a
narrative form. Finally, I present the findings of the study based on themes and
summarize the chapter taking into account any consistencies or inconsistencies I have
discovered before transitioning to Chapter 5.
Settings
At the time of the study, the participants and their experience had not been
influenced by personal or organizational situations. I conducted all the interviews as
planned; therefore, I believe that my interpretation of the results has not been influenced
by any unexpected conditions. My data collection design was planned to target Egyptian
diaspora members residing in Washington, DC. The primary unit of the study analysis
was the case of the members and leaders of the AEA group who did not systematically
meet in a specific professional place. Therefore, I interviewed participants in private or
public settings away from any workplace or professional authority. Regarding the time
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setting, I scheduled the interviews based on who was recruited and immediately available
for an interview. Therefore, the setting times were related to the participants’ work and
personal schedule. The political circumstances and interests of Egypt also made the
participants change and delay the interviews several times.
Demographics
Because I employed a case study design, I need to provide a thicker description
for the case major and subunits, AEA group and its members, and other active individuals
and mosque followers who are not affiliated with AEA. Most of 16 participants in this
study were current or former members of AEA. The participants comprised 14 welleducated, professional, Muslim men; one orthodox Christian woman; and one Muslim
woman. One participant was an active member in the Muslim Brotherhood. The age
range of the recruited and interviewed members was 50–75 years old. Most of the
participants lived in the Washington, DC metropolitan area and some others lived in the
surrounding suburbs.
Consistent with my filed notes and close observation, all of the participants were
politically active directly before, during, and shortly after the 2011 revolution. Many of
them came to Washington, DC more than 25 years ago and became U.S. citizens. They
were retired or still worked as freelancers, such as doctors or taxi drivers, or worked in
official or private U.S. or international foundations, such as the White House, Voice of
America broadcast, universities, news media, and hospitals. Some of them came on an
immigration visa for political issues during President Sadat’s era, and others came for
working or education purposes during Mubarak’s time. None of them mentioned a clergy
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figure whom they could love, follow, or admire. I noticed that all of the participants
except two might not go to Friday prayers or Ramadan events in mosques.
For different reasons, all participants agreed on not going back to Egypt or at least
splitting their residency between both countries. They explained emotionally that this
general trend is related to the home state political culture and circumstances. However,
many of the participants asserted that they might go back home for a while but not to
stay. The diaspora members widely believe political conditions are inadequate in Egypt
because they are afraid. Some of them also consider living or working responsibilities in
Washington, DC and their children’s schools as a rationale for staying in the United
States without any intention of returning to Egypt. A few of them expressed no reason for
that trend at all.
In 2005, the AEA was founded in Virginia as a group of Egyptian American
scholars to work on bridging gaps in understanding between Egyptians and Americans.
Similarly, to the rest of diaspora active members, AEA acts as a watchdog on the
Egyptian governments’ activities and agenda in and out of Egypt in the Washington, DC
political realm. AEA cares about different hot topics at different times. For example, in
2016, AEA issued statements regarding the dispute with the Saudi government on the
border islands between Egypt and Saudia. In 2019, AEA considered the top Egyptian
political topic, which was the presidential election and the related controversial
constitution amendment.
The political orientation of this diaspora, and exclusively the AEA group, focuses
on working for freedom of speech, better living conditions, and better governance style in
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Egypt. Additionally, they work, at least theoretically, to support the middle and poor
social classes that have been oppressed because of the unorganized political and
economic policies and the spreading corruption in all government offices after the
military coup in 1952. According to personal talks with several former leaders of AEA,
this situation became severe in Elsisi time, and this is the current motivation of the active
members of the diaspora.
According to the collected e-mail exchanges of the group and my notes, several
members and leaders of AEA asserted that their group used to have internal conflicts
regarding several issues, such as the leadership style, elections, and the political stance
the group should take as a whole. The former leader of AEA is a secular professional. He
was a founding member (2005–2009), spokesman (2009–2012), and president (2012-–
2017). According to that leader, in 2017, AEA had low amount of activity because of the
current Islamist director who was elected by default. AEA cares about giving a chance to
all political orientations to be presented; however, most of the members claimed that he
was not qualified. Another AEA member believed that the youth Islamists are an obstacle
and that their membership reflects on the group activists as well as its typical political
orientation that used to be secular and open-minded.
A majority of my study participants did not believe that Egyptians, consisting of
the diaspora, have Arab identification. They expressed their notion that Egyptians are
Egyptian only, but they also desired to have desirable relationships with Arab human
beings in the United States. Some participants also mentioned that the most of Egyptian
Christians hate the description of being Arabs. AEA individuals are an ideal of this
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patriotic notion. Despite being proud to be Egyptian and nothing else, they are willing to
assimilate into the U.S. network and way of life. Residing in the United States and being
away from Egypt for a long time caused modifications in their original Egyptian values.
Several participants stated that they, similarly to many of the diaspora members,
have been in a box culturally and politically. They also agreed that the most sizeable
exchange that happened to them, given that they came to the United States, was that they
are out of that home box. They became capable of seeing matters from a one of a kind
angle; for instance, giving overall freedom to children to choose their life companions
regardless of their religions. I also noticed that some of the participants have become
grandfathers to grandchildren who maintain U.S. names. Another instance is that
Egyptian Americans pay attention to their credit history, which is an extraordinary norm
that could be essential for residing in the United States.
Data Collection
I conducted one-time, in-depth interviews that took place from March 2019
through May 26, 2019 in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. I designed one group of
27 open-ended questions that each of the 16 participants answered. Each interviewee’s
answers provided me with new information and enabled me to do periodic reviews to
enhance my questions before I sent them to the next interviewee. Data included my
handwritten, filed notices and confidential audio recordings of the interviews using my
iPad. None of the participants refused to be audiotaped. My field note captured the
environment of the interviews, the participant’s personality, explanatory notes, and my
overall impressions of the experience with the participant. These two joint methods of
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data collection ensured that my findings were precise and captured the associated
meanings of both verbal statements and nonverbal communication presented by the
participants.
Sixteen out of 20 possible participants residing in Washington, DC were
successfully recruited for this study. I was looking for seven-nine members from the
AEA group and another four to five nonmember participants. I contacted more than this
total number to be able to avoid any last-minute surprises. Two potential participants
declined the interview after they had initially agreed to participate. They said they would
not have time. In general, all recruits were slow with their positive or negative reactions.
Despite this slowness in response, I completed my data collection and obtained enough
informative participants to meet saturation. I did not encounter any variations in data
collection from the plan presented in Chapter 3.
When I recruited the members for the interview, I drove from New York City to
Virginia to attend an Egyptian community event on March 2019. More than 33 Egyptian
members attended this event. Most of the members came from Maryland, and
Washington, DC. I distributed invitational letters to potential individuals whom I thought
that they might be fit to my recruitment criteria and able to volunteer for the study. I
interviewed participants individually in a place of their choice inside the center; however,
three other interviewees preferred to meet in their private residences.
Each interview lasted an average of 90 minutes. This time included time to
establish rapport, review the purpose of my study and the consent form, and to answer
possible questions before and after the actual interview. I recorded each interview
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entirely by two recording devices after asking and receiving the permission of the
interviewees. I stored the recordings to my home computer with two backup copies. I
transcribed each saved interview one by one without asking for following up questions or
having any outside help.
Data Analysis
My approach I used to generate the codes and themes for identifying the meaning
of the data included two joint strategies. The first strategy is the categorizing strategy that
is about coding. The row data segments should be labeled, sorted, and then grouped by
categories to create a similarity-based ordering of data (Maxwell & Miller, 2008, pp. 465,
469). This process is seeking similarities and differences between data segments within
the interview questions and their respective responses.
I also applied the connecting analysis strategy that is, in contrast to the first one,
does not fracture the data chunk. The purpose of this strategy was to understand my
categorized data in their particular time and context to find possible patterns and themes
and to have them fit for the questions chosen type (Maxwell, 2013, p. 112; Patton, 2002,
p. 453). My research questions focused on the way events in a specific context are
connected and how one thing, such as the diaspora external factors work with other
things in the phenomenon studied.
Because I chose to apply case study approach and connecting strategy for the
analysis, I provided a thick description of the case, the Egyptian diaspora, the case major
unit, AEA group, and subunits such as the active individuals and other groups, a mosque
and its followers, and all other available aspects, concepts, or facts about the case. These
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components of the findings chapter should give the coded data meanings to illuminating
the focus of the inquiry, add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, and enhance
the insight into the target single case and its representing larger, holistic aspects (Yin,
2003, p. 46). Therefore, analyzing the examined codes by reducing them for eight themes
or issues, two of which had additional subthemes, will follow this description phase. I
confirmed the themes and subthemes against each other and the data and then began
defining the final themes. In the following section, I report the process used to move
inductively from small coded units to larger representations, including categories,
themes, and subthemes.
Coded Units to Larger Representations
Therefore, I described the specific codes, categories, and then the themes that
emerged from the data using quotations of participants interview as needed to emphasize
their importance and relevancy. Moreover, I describe discrepant and infrequent issues,
and disconfirming data if they exist and how they were factored into the analysis. For
easier reference, examples of the preliminary codes are presented in Table 3. I also used
those codes to produce possible pattern codes to summarize the interview data by putting
the information into categories. I was able to see more codes and a set of themes emerged
as I left it open so that new ones would appear. As a result, more codes were discovered
and examined.
For data analysis, I used Saldana’s (2014) coding manual for this qualitative study
as was explained in Chapter 3. I performed two cycles of coding that included 6 coding
methods such as descriptive, NVivo and emotions, values, hypothesis, causation,
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attribute…coding and pattern codes to determine emerging themes after I conducted
interviews. Also, I used simultaneous coding when the data’s content suggested multiple
meanings (e.g., descriptive and attribution codes; Saldana, 2014, p. 81).
I coded after I conducted each interview and rechecked interpretations of the
meaning with participants by using their e-mail addresses and meeting some of them to
ensure the validity of the coding process as well as its possible results. I identified and
organized related codes produced by participants on each open-ended interview question.
Table 1 provides an example of coding process and some specific codes.
Table 1
Example of Coding Process and Specific Codes
Raw data
“They are politically passive, …by and largely
preoccupied with making a living and improving their
living conditions and achieving their personal
immigration goals. Maybe living responsibilities have
priority over political responsibilities.”

Simultaneous code
[Descriptive and attribution]
Other factors involved with
living issues

“…our solo culture, you know, made us have no
Cultural aspects affect
intention for collective work…,” “…it is in our
political engagement
blood…we are Pharaoh,” “Egyptian success stories in the
U.S. are individual,” “It is one man-show culture,
everyone wants to be the boss”
“Most successful diaspora institution in political
Mosques’ political
mobilization is mosques and churches. Therefore, they
role might be harmful
care about the relationship between Egypt and USA
governments more than other activists,” “There should be
no role for mosques and churches in promoting political
interest,” “…their roles in mobilizing Egyptians
politically is poisonous”
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Then, by employing the connecting analysis strategy, the participants that stated
the same words or opinion or related statements were grouped and reduced into related
themes. Finally, I summarized all of the theses gathered information in narrative nature
seeking to preserve the context and story of the political engagement of the Egyptian
diaspora. Table 2 shows all themes and their applicable subthemes.
Table 2
Final Themes and Subthemes
Theme 1

Subtheme 1

Subtheme 2

Subtheme 3

Cultural
attributions for
diaspora
political
engagement

Typical
passive of
the diaspora
is attributed
to its
national solo
culture

Temporary
factors that
illuminated
the passive
culture effect
for some time

Pharaonic
culture leads
to
unorganized
and
uncooperativ
e diaspora

Theme 2

No adequate
help for new
immigrants

Insufficient
organizationa
l unity and
problematic
leadership

Low level of
loyalty:
Theme 3

The effect of
domestic
Egyptian
concerns on
diaspora in DC.
Theme 4
Contrastive
relation
Diaspora’s
between the
relationships
home-hose
states
relationships
and
diaspora’s

The low
effect of the
relationship
between
diaspora and
Washington,
DC decision
maker on the

Subtheme
4

Subthem
e5

The effect
of small
size on
diaspora’s
political
engagemen
t

Mistrust
culture
between
diaspora
and
Egyptian
officials
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influence

diaspora’ role

The
revolutions
reveal the
inconsistenc
y of the
diaspora
political
behavior

Political role
of Mosques
and churches
in
Washington,
DC.

Theme 5
Individuals and
Groups Involve
in politically
and
organizationall
y
Theme 6
Egyptian
causes the
individuals
involve in
trying to
persuade the
U.S.
government
Theme 7
Different
lobbying types
to promote
Egypt’s
interests
Theme 8
Evaluating the
political
performance.

Finally, while offering the results, I discuss the discrepant troubles or
nonconforming data as applicable in which members’ opinions differed from the majority
sentiments. By means of inclusive of specific perspectives, I ensured an actual reporting
of individuals’ sentiments. That was without capacity bias influencing the presentation of
the outcomes.
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Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
I used several ways to establish the credibility of my research results of the
study—in other words, by making sure that my research findings are consistent with
reality. With applying qualitative case study, achieving the reality means that the results
reflected what the participants intended to convey. I used persistent efforts to build
essential trust with interviewees to obtain informative, detailed responses as I took
enough time to establish rapport by making myself friendly, but empathetic. I applied
triangulation of sources and triangulation with multiple analysts and observers that all
should provide a check on my bias in collecting my data. Having a second opinion is
better than having one researcher doing all data collection. This review and feedback was
through verbal and written evaluation, and I put the outcome in the final report. This
second type of triangulation strategy helped me notice and generate new ideas that I did
not notice during the research composition and phases od data collection process (see
Patton, 2002, p. 560). The ultimate goal of using these two types of both triangulation
strategies is to confirm the findings and interpretations, and guarantee that I designed and
asked the right research questions.
Transferability
The second tenet of trustworthiness is transferability, wherein a qualitative
researcher seeks to determine if the findings are generalizable across other individuals or
settings. By attaining saturation, I gathered a comprehensive view of the perceptions
within the case of interest, subsequently generating a deeper understanding of the case of
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interest. Because developing a descriptive study could lead to the finding transferability, I
defined and described thickly my case and its subunits in this chapter. In addition, I
described the data collection and analysis process. Therefore, I collected data from
different resources and forms. The wise selection of participants that included sufficient
variation and comprehensive view of the perceptions should subsequently generate a
deeper understanding of the case of interest. While I cannot ensure generalizability of
findings to other populations in social settings or cultural contexts, I utilized a thick
description to ensure raw data excerpts supported the thematic findings. This strategy
provides outside researchers with additional information about the phenomenon and
context of the findings allowing them to decide if the findings would transfer to other
populations.
Dependability
Dependability should answer the question of whether an auditor or researcher
would be able to review, understand my produced codes and themes and procedures
directly, and thus find similar results of the original study. This tactic of testing reliability
occurs in the data collection phase of research (Yin, 2003, pp. 34, 38-39). To ensure
quality control, I developed and documented a formal, presentable database as a chain of
evidence (Yin, 2014, p. 105). I utilized other strategies, such as feedback acquisition,
debriefing, and peer-review, to test the quality of the results. I triangulated several data
resources and asked participants for their feedback about my collected data and themes to
ensure the validity of findings (Creswell, 2009, p. 191).
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Confirmability
The fourth tenet of trustworthiness, confirmability ensures I realize I was not
subjective totally, so biases were bracketed in my field notes and journal and were
carefully considered during data analysis and reporting of the results. The strategy of
triangulated reflexive inquiry should affect and inform my study findings. For example,
in the self-reflexivity, I should be aware of issues, such as how did my background and
experiences shape my perspectives and data collection and analysis, and what will I do
with the findings. I should consider the way the participants know and perceive the topic.
I should be able to retain the voices of participants in the analysis process by included
direct quotes and excerpts to inform each theme. The potential feedback they could send
me back regarding my study findings also should be my concern.
Results
Eight resulting themes emerged from the data analysis—(a) Cultural attributions
for diaspora political engagement, (b) low level of loyalty, (c) effect of Egyptian
domestic concerns on diaspora’s engagement, (d) diaspora relationships, (f) individuals
and groups involve politically and organizationally, (g) Egyptian causes the diaspora
individuals involve in, (h) different lobbying types, and, (i) evaluating the political
performance. Themes Number 1, 2, 4, and 8 have subthemes as that was shown in Table
2. Participants’ responses and noticed natural reactions informed the emergence and
development of the themes, which I supported them with the most important quotations
from the data to illustrate the possible results and assure their validity. I organized the
results by themes, not by the interview questions. The themes numbered from 1- 4 are
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related to the Research Question 1, and they are classified under the category factorial
background of the political engagement. I sorted the rest of the themes under category
style and evaluation based on the Research Question 2. I provided the answers to the
research and interviews questions in the summary.
Theme 1: Cultural Attributions for Diaspora Political Engagement
This theme and its five subthemes presented the obvious effect of the diaspora’s
cultural characteristics on the Egyptian diaspora’s development and political engagement.
All participants expressed their belief that the original Egyptian dominant culture is the
most persuasive rationale behind the typical passive characteristic of institutionalization,
and organizational development thus resulting in low degree of political engagement of
their diaspora. That authentic national culture is the collective attribution category that
includes other cultural characteristics such as the lack of organizational purpose and
unity, affecting Egyptians inside and outside Egypt.
That overarching theme is associated with the current problem of the lack of
political activity of Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. However, the difference
between the participants’ general beliefs appears regarding the reasons for that typical
cultural characteristic of being passive and where these reasons take place. The following
statements, themes, subthemes detailed this attribution and the related noticed
differences. The relationships between this theme and its five subthemes are shown in
Figure 2.

190
Subtheme 1:
Typical passive
engagement

Subtheme 2: Diaspora
typically acts as
temporrary waves

Subtheme 5: Mistrust

Subtheme 4: Small size

Subtheme 3: Unorganized and
uncooperative diaspora.

Theme 1: Cultural attributions for diaspora low political engagement
Figure 2. Links between Theme 1 and its five subthemes.
Subtheme 1: Typical passive engagement of the diaspora is attributed to its
national solo culture. This subtheme indicates that Egyptian political culture of the
diaspora individuals could be classified into two major sections; internal that is related to
their growing, dwelling, and coming from a home country, Egypt, and external that is
related to their living in a host state, the United States. Two participants denied this
feature. DD thought, “We are not relay passive. We are learning.” In contrast, MM
concluded this opinion by saying, “We are not active at home, therefore we are passive
abroad, and no matter how can be the atmosphere helpful in this capital city.” In details,
MK described how Egyptians abroad are culturally passive based on national Egyptian
attributions. He stated, “Yes, because of our Egyptian prevailing patriotic culture led to a
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long history of disappointment and despair as related to the possibility of real political
change.” AW opined, “We did not use to participate in united organized efforts.” He
further summarized his opinion saying, “When it comes to politics, it is a individualistic
home culture.” AH expressed a similar sentiment when he explained, “Yes, we are
passive most of the time in Washington, DC, but you can not blame us. Egyptians worry
about getting back Egypt because that could make safety problem not just for us but also
for families who live there. So, we keep shut up here!”
Several participants overwhelmingly reported that also there is no fast interact
with Egyptian events because of the conventional traditional political education and the
priority of living safely. AG detailed this type of education and culture. He said, “Yes,
because we came from authoritarian or dictatorship countries where people used to have
no voice to share. Egyptian generations after the military coup and socialism wave were
educated to consider the president as the nation father whom they should obey because he
knows better and protects his kids.”
Talking about living and assimilating with host country culture, participants
agreed on several attributions. DD thought that Egyptians could better upwardly
assimilate into the American society. They try to take the best of the dominant American
culture but also remain attached to their own unique cultural practices. DD did not go
forward to detail that practices and how they could affect the diaspora integration into the
new political climate.
AG believed that the problem of the low level of political engagement was not the
Washington, DC system. He said, “I see that recent immigrants who still do not
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understand intricacies of the new society of their immigration and settlement are the real
problem. I wonder why other diasporas were able to take advantage of Washington, DC
prevalent mood and raise their voice to be heard!” SG explained, “Perhaps we have no
enough experience.” AG revealed, “They are politically passive, I mean Egyptians here,
also by and largely preoccupied with making a living and improving their living
conditions and achieving their personal immigration goals. Maybe living responsibilities
have priority over political responsibilities.” SH believed, “Egyptians dwelling in
Washington, DC longer than others are assimilated with the system however, they do not
use it very well for their causes.”
Subtheme 2: The diaspora acts typically as temporary reacting waves. In
Interview Question 22, I requested participants to explain for; based totally on their belief
on their passive political lifestyle, why and how long did the 2011 revolution feature as a
factor for advantageous modifications of their role? Did they return to be passive again
after the revolution? Why that occurred?
When I asked DD does the diaspora act and react politically as a wave's shape and
not as a straight line, he said, “Yes, to some extent.” MH illustrated an essential factor
while he said, “We do no longer participate in politics in the United States due to the fact,
absolutely, we do not participate in Egypt, and vice versa.” Therefore, participant SH
attested that the surprising 2011 revolution was like a wake-up call for that diaspora in
particular. The community in Washington, DC became aware of the need for being
active, united, and organized.
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AG asserted, “Yes yes... the so-called revolution of 2011 was a dream cut short. It
did inspire some serious members of the community and provided hope for positive
change.” Along the same lines of revolution short positive effect, XY said, “Short-lived
hope soon crashed on. Maybe because it was not prepared or organized well.” SH gave a
different explanation by saying that disappointment was because of the reality that since
1952, Egypt became a military-security state that was able, unfortunately, to absorbing
the revolution impact.” MK and other participants emotionally agreed that the 2011
revolution did not last long because of the feeling of defeat by Muslim Brotherhood and
military throw many of Egyptians back.
SH concluded that at that time, Egyptians created a new term that is the deep state
referring to all old powers that seemed to have vanished, but they came back again to the
scene to revenge on the revolutionary parties and resumed the former security state of
Mubarak. As a result, Egyptians, including the diaspora members, returned to their old
passive culture. XY articulated that the diaspora was not far from all of those events and
what happened to revolutionaries; it happened precisely to us here. He said, “We became
careless, busy, or divided again as the day before January 25, 2011.” These sentiments
and emerged themes revealed that passive characteristic, and they showed that there were
external factors that might functionally join that national culture leading to the diaspora
failing inside and outside.
Subtheme 3: Pharaonic culture leads to unorganized and uncooperative
diaspora. Along with the cultural attribution of being politically passive, several
participants added more reasons that should clarify that the diaspora is not
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organizationally united and cooperative. Participants also explained why the diaspora did
not stay active after the revolution. Ten participants believed that establishing active
organizations and having internal cooperation is not a high priority for some of the
diaspora members.
Participant AW said, “As I told you, our solo culture, you know, made us have no
intention for collective work, no respect to roles. So, everyone wants to be the boss who
has his own agenda.” SH added, “The leaders usually have personal business that has
nothing to do with the group or organization mission-no trust in our leadership so that
there is no single leader we should work under him only. So, there is no unification for
now.” MM rephrased that saying and said, “We do not adopt and push for maintaining a
primary or clear, single, known agenda for the organization.” AW provided an emotional
example. He said, “The last leader of AEA went to Aljazeera channel talking about
Elsisi. We might share his opposition opinion on Elsisi but he was speaking there for
personal purpose, maybe money. We did not permit him to represent AEA.” AW
mentioned other reasons for the insufficient organizational unity.” He said, “We are all
busy with daily life; we do not hate each other. We do not love each other too.”
Subtheme 4: The effect of small size on diaspora’s political engagement. This
theme explored the impact of the Egyptian immigrants’ immigration decision, and the
United States immigration policy on the diaspora size, and whether the diaspora invests
in it to improve its influence. All participants agreed on the impact of those two elements
on the size; however, three participants came up with an unexpected observation that
might present discrepancy in the results. They explained: we are not really a small size!
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We should take advantage of our size and maximize it. Simply, our official number is
unknown. SH said, “No adequate information about the percentage of Egyptians in
Washington, DC and the United States in general because we do not register our names in
the embassy because we do not trust the official agencies.”
The small size of the community could be attributed to other cultural reasons. AG
mentioned, “Traditionally, Egyptians throughout their history have been more bound to
Egypt soil and roots because they are an agricultural country. They do not immigrate
largely in contrast to other nations. SH added to this explanation and said, “The problem
of knowing the exact size of the community is not just about the residents in DC because
that size is not stable.” According to TF, “For those Egyptians living in America or the
DC area in particular, the frequency of their travel back to Egypt is an indication of their
reluctance to be away from the motherland for any extended period. Therefore, the size is
unknown, unstable, and small.”
AG added, “Do not forget geography. Washington is far away, and they would
prefer to travel to Europe or the Arabian Gulf countries for closeness.” Similarly, TF
conveyed “Larger numbers of Egyptians head to other Arab countries to work where the
culture and language are more familiar. These places are closer to home and family.”
When I asked about that trend, participant MK explained, “Egyptian immigration is a
relatively recent trend in Egypt, started in the late sixties with accelerating pace until
now, unlike Lebanese, for instance, which launched their immigration in the late 19th
century.” TF admitted: Most Egyptians in America would rather have it both ways. They
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want to get the green and citizenship but they also want to be able to split their residence
between the United States and Egypt.
There is another causation explains the diaspora small size phenomena and belief
system that might affect its human actions or not. U.S. Embassy’s immigration policy,
including visa restrictions, is a factor. MK revealed, “Also Americans make it very
difficult for Egyptians to obtain the status. Cairo embassy always has a negative and
aggressive attitude towards youths.” AW added a different side of the situation. He said,
“Let us say that some of us were able to have any kind of visa, the problem is still us! Not
everyone can afford expensive living in America while, as I told you before, those lucky
newcomers get no help from residencies. Participant XY claimed that “Ethiopian
community has more people, and they support each other.”
MK explained further, “Unlike the Lebanese and Syrians who ventured out to
other countries, the Egyptian people have historically been less inclined to immigrate.”
DD explained, “Egyptians are immobile due to the Nile culture that promotes settlement
and stability.” A former leader of AEA, participant MK said, “The level of the Egyptian
diaspora organization is below average in contrast with the successful Jewish diaspora
despite that both are relatively small.” SH concluded, “The small size was not the only
factor because diasporas are not equal in investing in their size, and thus, it does not
matter if they are small or big.” XY asserted the same idea and added, “This is what the
Egyptian community is in Washington, DC and it should use that relatively small size.”
Subtheme 5: Mistrust between diaspora and Egyptian officials. The previous
theme mentioned that the mistrust between the Egyptian embassy and diaspora members

197
had pushed both of them away from building mutual organizational efforts between each
other. This situation can be an example of the theme of negative perception and mistrust
in Egyptian politicians and government in large. When I asked MK about this hypothesis,
he responded firmly, “Yes, to a considerable extent.”
According to multiple participants and my field notes, low level of political
participation of Egyptian diaspora could be attributed to that typical characteristic of
Egyptians. Egyptian politics and government as well as Egyptian organizations and
leaders and their performance in Washington, DC refrain the Egyptian diaspora from
political engagement such as establishing or joining the diaspora. SH implied a cultural
attribution; he said, “Our community leaders, if any, mix personal issues with
organizations’ agenda and activities-It is the culture of people who came in the near past.
I think that distrust should harm our efforts of organizing ourselves.” AW indicated other
several reasons. He said, “Blame Egyptians in general; we don’t respect roles because we
have the usual dough or maybe many of us are such ignorant.” XY explained, “Before the
revolution, we used to avoid the embassy or consulate because we have a deep mistrust in
the Egyptian government agencies.” An embassy official told me, “That attitude hinders
the embassy’s role and cooperation with the community. You can see that during the
visiting army recruiting committee.”
AW deeply explained this observation: “Regardless of our actual number or what
you call it a size, they [diaspora members] simply do not want to talk with each other and
the embassy.” XY explained, “They consider family is more important and have mistrust
in their government; we do not want to provide the embassy with our real addresses
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because that should harm families who still live in Egypt.” SH added, “I think the
embassy spies us here. All dictatorship states are like that, not just Egypt.” In contrast to
that general stream of participants, One Muslim female participant was such as an
exception. She proudly said,” Yes. But Elsisi is an honest example that we trust.”
Theme 2: Low Level of Loyalty
Subtheme 1: No adequate help for new immigrants. Those professional
individuals who have connections in the political and social realm of Washington DC
should be able to support their new peers; however, MK determined this capability as
“Great level of loyalty but weak practice.” MM had the same observation: “No fast or
continues help for newcomers. However, we send money and try to help with the local
problems in Egypt for just good reason.” AW said, “Because they are busy with personal
life concerns, they might have no time or even interest in frequent meetings and
cooperating with others.” This finding might give an example of the lack of cooperation
and a minimum level of loyalty to the home country that all should produce weak
development and influence of the diaspora.
That is in general, however, as some participants reminded me that there was a
little exception on that negative image. AW asserted, "Christian Egyptians still; Church
helps only Copts sometimes.” SH explained that particular good picture could be such a
reaction. I mean Copts want to be different, or maybe they react as a weak minority that
wants to gather to be reliable. XY gave the same opinion but added another dimension,
“This minority invest positively in their small size similarly to Jewish and Ethiopian
diasporas reacting to what they think is discrimination or isolation against them inside
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Egypt.” However, FF told me, “Mr. XYZ, who is Christian man ordered his children to
avoid talking in Arabic with their new Muslim-Egyptian next door and any Egyptian! We
do not know his rationale. Bizarre!” Two diaspora members provided some detailed and
unique answers when they mentioned the comparison between the Egyptian and Chinese
diasporas. They believed that China invests in the diaspora as a political tool, and the
Chinese diaspora supports the new immigrants in systematic and planned ways. Some
answers merit exploration in the interpretation and implications sections of Chapter 5.
Subtheme 2: Insufficient organizational unity and problematic leadership. As
I mentioned before, insufficient support for new immigrants is an example of the lack of
cooperation and organization but that is just one aspect of insufficient organizational
unity. When it comes to comparing Jewish, Ethiopian, and Egyptian diasporas regarding
their cooperation and organization style, AG said, “The comparison is not valid. The
Jews came here as a persecuted minority from Europe. They were more motivated to
invest in their small group and excel.” SH added, “Jewish people had no other choice
other than success. They had had a teamwork spirit. In contrast, that is not the case of the
Egyptian minority. Egyptian success stories in America are such individual.”
TF conveyed, “In tribal and family settings, Egyptians followed directions got
from the patriarchal leaders. Rarely did they follow organized initiatives.” MK provided a
more profound explanation when said, “First generations came carrying their baggage.
They do not have the teamwork spirit, they lack deep-seated democratic concepts, and
they are trapped within the box they grew up in. All is about culture, here and there.”
Participant SH mentioned the need for national professional and credible leadership
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inside and outside Egypt working with the members for one national cause under the
united organization.
Several participants assured this meaning repeatedly: It is a one-man-show
culture; everyone wants to be the boss and working for his or her agenda. They reminded
me of the several clashes that occurred in front of the White House during the revolution.
A group of demonstrators pushed other people away from the spot just because the latter
wanted to demonstrate showing a different claim regarding the revolution. MM said, “Sir,
it is in our blood precisely as the typical role of any leader inside Egypt itself; we are
Pharaoh.” Meanwhile, participant MK attributed the competition and lack of gathering
organization of the diaspora members to “ they are severely divided into political “tribes”
covering a wide range no sense of and against Egyptian nationality, so people resort to
their political tribes instead; thus, they lose the national framework and goal.”
For another example, one of the participants, AW assured, “We need an outside
leader who can cooperate with inside-people. I asked our community to announce me as a
presidential candidate against MB, the military ruling council-SCAF- in 2011, and Elsisi
in 2014 during both revolutions. No one listened to me!” Many participants said
something similar to participant GH, who was a member of AEA. He said, “All
organizations are fragile and fake. Our organizations are such empty frames and full of
internal personal conflict.” Therefore, SH gave an example saying, “A congressman of a
district in Virginia told me if you guys tell us what u all want, we will come to be with
you.” When I asked DD whether the small size of the community could be a positive
characteristic that the Egyptian diaspora might invest in it, he said, “Yes if they get
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organized.” SH assured that potential bad feature could turn to be good if the diaspora
understand our other positive elements.
Theme 3: The Effect of Egyptian Domestic Concerns on Diaspora in DC.
I asked my participants to explain how could the tension of political concerns in
Egypt cause sharp divisions among the diaspora. The participants’ responses and
reactions were unexpected and very different from each other. Their responses focused
on the political and religious fragmentation in the country and among the diaspora
members. Regarding this concern, one or two participants denied any division among
Egyptians inside Egypt. A female participant who used to have positive reactions and
show support to the current rule in Egypt, stated, “Its a temporary man-made crisis.”
Another group of the participants thought that there was political powers
polarization inside the country before the revolution and became severer during and after
it; however, that situation had no reflection on the diaspora members. That is because
Egyptians do not know each other in host countries! I noticed that they brought their
culture aspects to the host country, but they did not say whether they brought their home's
conflicts to the host state or not.
Third groups of participants thought that Egyptians came to Washington, DC
carrying their original beliefs. TF said, “They have the same thoughts anywhere.” AG
articulated: Most Egyptians retain a mindset even after an extended stay in their new
society. Therefore, diaspora members are rare to be affected by U.S. culture except for
persons who born here.” MK provided two illustrating examples. He said, “This mindset
is clear in the Egyptians religious orthodoxy as opposed to reform, and it is also clear in
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their views of the Jews and the Israeli-Arab conflict. The outcome of this input is that all
such factors plus people preoccupation with socioeconomic conditions affect their
willingness to immerse in the American melting pot.” SH mentioned “the Arab-Israeli
conflict is still in our heart and mind; however, we are not in the 1960s now. I mean it is
not the priority on our agenda, and it does not reflect negatively on our diaspora.”
Theme 4: Diaspora’s Relationships
Subtheme 1: Contrastive relation between the home-hose states relationships
and diaspora’s of influence. This theme describes the relation between the better
relationship between the present Egyptian and American governments and the diaspora
role and its chance of performing. Participant SH believed that relation is a contrastive
relation. He said, “The working relationship between both governments should lead to the
unfortunate situation of some diasporas, especially the Egyptian one.” Another
participant specified that connection. MH said, “The current relationship hurts some
active groups.” MK reminded me when said, “generally, most acting and successful
diaspora institution in political mobilization are mosques and churches. Therefore, I think
they are the most active component of that diaspora who should be worried.”
AG explained further, “Very few Egyptians care about the nature of the TrumpSisi relationship and how it affects them. They care and afraid because that Elsisi and
Trump have chemistry. That should give more protection to Elsisi and Israel.” I was
surprised by this claimed similarity between Israel and Elsisi or Egypt and did not hear
the same from other participants. TF reiterated participant AG’s sentiment and clarified,
“That new official relationship between both governments affects the active portion of
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our diaspora…you know! Like the Muslim Brotherhood are weaker now. They cannot
talk with Trump’s administration as before 2017.” He added a separate statement: Those
fear Trump may succeed in designating their group as a terrorist organization. I predict
that Trump will be reelected.
On the side of Copts, the effect was not harmful as it is for some Muslim groups.
MN advised me to not to worry about Copts; they are happy, but still, there are negative
results in the future on Egyptians in Egypt and the United States in general. AW
summarized this theme: Egyptians, including many of the diaspora members, are not
happy for that chemistry; all depends on who you are. I mean…whom you belong to at a
particular time and place. The participant who has affiliation with the Muslim
Brotherhood stated, “Of course, because it [the present governments relationship]
justifies oppression and violation of our human rights.”
Subtheme 2: The low effect of the relationship between diaspora and
Washington, DC decision maker on the diaspora role. Unexpectedly, seven
participants only who believed that lack of the relationship between the diaspora and the
United States decision makers had a role to play when it comes to improving the
establishment and activities of the diaspora. Participant SH elaborated this unexpected
finding. He stated, “This communication between us and Washington, DC people does
not affect diaspora engagement, not because America does not welcome or consider
diaspora, it does, but because of the diaspora itself does not establish relationships with
Washington people on a systematic base; thus no effect of that relationship and diaspora.
One of those seven individuals was the Muslim Brotherhood representative in this study;
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DD stated, “Some do [have relationships] in different degrees, and it can help the
diaspora promote the American values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
inside Egypt.”
In contrast, AH said, “No effect because they [diaspora members] do not really
interact except few educated individuals, but unfortunately, we don’t take advantage of
the chance to work.” Moreover, DT denied the relationships themselves. He said, “no
relationship or somewhat. Because they [diaspora members] have no specific stand or
clear collective agenda, so Washington, DC does not know whom to talk to or support.”
Participant SH agreed to TD’s inclusion and said “we left the playground to Islamists and
maybe Copts since Obama’s time. President Donald Trump’s time is our chance.”
As GS explicated this situation by saying, “Egyptians live in Washington, DC are
few, and who wanted to approach Washington, DC decision makers are fewer.” MM
uncovered, “that is because they choose to live in the suburbs to be close to larger
common shopping areas. How they could build any relationship with the Washington,
DC center?” When I exposed this example to the next participant, participant SH assured
that it could not be an excuse! How about who lives in Washington, DC itself? He
thought that could be not enough attribution. The reasons should be more profound than
the living choice and more general. He referred that their social and economic life
responsibilities keep active and none active members away from immersing in American
political life of Washington, DC AW added, “no specific political activity. No lobby or
weight to be considered by the decision makers."
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The following themes 5-8 are based on the answers to the second and last research
question regarding the engagement style and aspects.”
Theme 5: Individuals and Groups Involve Politically and Organizationally
Several participants believed that engaging in political activities and working for
Egypt’s interests in Washington, DC would depend on the individuals. DT said,
“Religious individuals and institutes are most active if called by their clergy. I am not
sure whether first or new generations are more productive; however, newer generations
are much involving in American life, of course, including political aspects. In details,
AW said, “as I told you before, Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized and active
component; therefore, they demonstrate in different events. However, they are not like
before two or four years ago. Immigrants are also active.”
Other participants focused on the difference between generations instead of
groups or individuals. AG said, “First generation Egyptians come carrying their baggage.
Culturally, they lack deep-seated democratic concepts.” So that, as MM added, “the
potential impact on U.S. policy comes from the second and third generations, but they are
too recent and small to political activism” Participant GS warned me saying, “new
generations, if they participated in political realm, they are about American policies more
than Egyptian, no wonder my friend!” SM is a school founder and principal and very
active. She emotionally complained, “Unfortunately, there are very few of us, and that
makes it a hefty load. I am so tired of being the only woman in gathering or
demonstrations or political meetings!”
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Theme 6: Egyptian Causes the Individuals Involve in Trying to Persuade the U.S.
Government.
The participants did not say much in this matter, and their comments were about
three issues: -(a) facilitating the emigration process, (b) the presidential elections, and (c)
Egypt-America political relationships. None of the participants mentioned any foreign
policy issue, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. AG and DD believed that U.S.Egyptian relations and good Egyptian governance are two top issues of interest. MM
reiterated participant AG’s sentiment. He said, “Both of these issues are important to the
country stability, and we should support it.” But he also assured that human rights for all
Egyptians including Copts are the priority. Another one mentioned to the Muslim
brotherhood situation with this matter; TF said, “The good governance and establishing
democracy in Egypt, in particular, is of interest to supporters of that group living in
Washington, DC.” In contrast to TF’s view, DD talked differently about his group,
Muslim Brotherhood. He said, “Christians lobby work hard for their sectarian agenda but
many Muslims lobby struggle to see the American values practiced in Egypt.”
Theme 7: Different Lobbying Types to Promote Egypt’s Interests
Related to the previous one, this theme shows examples of issues and activities of
the Egyptian activists. A very active participant conceded that there is a small lobbying
effort by the Egyptian community; however, lobbying is not only on maintaining
democracy and wise governance or against the Egyptian regime. GH said, “Our lobbying
agenda includes such as an economic and business promotion group.” AG told me not to
forget that there was an Egyptian government-supporting lobby during the era of
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Mubarak. He added that “Most of the lobbying effort is government inspired or funded
and it aims at supporting the regime in power at any moment.” MM added, “most of
those lobbying efforts is laughable such as the case during a visit to Washington by the
Egyptian president. The embassy rented a mobile screen advertising his achievements.
Muslim Brotherhood has their lobby too.” Participant SH reminded me: in 2014 when
Elsisi came for the first time, the president supporters and opposers had demonstrated and
begun as only two groups in streets, and American local police separated them. We were
monitoring who had the biggest number of demonstrators.
Regarding the Islamic groups’ lobbying activities, DD said, “The lobby of the
Brotherhood was very active during Obama’s time and cooperating with other Islamic
organizations. DT agreed with this opinion and illustrated further, “Muslim Brotherhood
runs the headquarter of CAIR [a Muslim charity organization] in Washington, DC. They
cooperate with democrat politicians in DC. The politicians in DC know that CAIR
members are active in DC.” MH believed that this Islamic organization for charity have
been sending donations to the Muslim Brotherhood and other terrorist Islamic groups in
the Middle East regularly. SH added: Now, Trump announced them a terrorist
organization. I do not know what they do now; however, they still act individually. MH
said, “Hopefully we will have an Egyptian AIPAC. There are UAE and Saudi lobbies,
but they are official.” SW, a female participant with a positive attitude along the whole
interview, said, “Some does [lobbying]. We need more to assure that Egypt stays in peace
and strength.”
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Theme 8: Evaluating the Political Performance
This theme evaluated the actions of Egyptian diaspora in general based on the
participants’ answers and previous themes that were about assessing specific activities of
the diaspora. There were two subthemes to this general theme providing concrete
examples on the diaspora political engagement. Several participants assessed the current
performance of the Egyptian diaspora as low or nothing. Participant SH articulated, “It is
far below average…its bad…period.” However, SH believed, “Maybe we underestimate
our political power and participation.”
Some participants attributed this status to several negative reasons. AW said,
“They do not want to be active, and if they do, everyone wants to be the boss with no
objection.” SH though, “Leadership issues should harm the organization unity from the
top and that should hinder the collective community work. UV added, “As for lobbying,
Egyptian Americans are not active at all because they are used to be politically
irrelevant.” When I asked FF how about the future, she specified, “Changes may emerge
in third and fourth generations.”
Subtheme 1: The revolutions reveal the inconsistency of the diaspora political
behavior. During the 2011 revolution, obtaining new democratic nonmilitary governance
was the principal motive for Egyptians inside Egypt. Diaspora in DC had been backing
up the revolutionaries’ demand. SH proudly said, “Muslims, Christians, men and women,
and even kids had the same motivation and demand; we all were Egyptian only.” Another
participant, KS, revealed, “Right after the success of the revolution, many Egyptians who
lived in DC for long years, had decided to go back home.” HA said, “Why not? Mubarak
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and his spies had gone. It is safe now.” None of the participants provided me with the
actual reason for acting during the revolution in the first place. The participants did not
mention to their conflict with the previous regime or any disturbance or challenge to their
common interest. All of them spoke about general issues. For example, DD said, “They
love to see Egypt as free and just as America. The Arab Spring unified and made us more
conscious.” I found that could be a discrepancy between this finding and the conflict
theory. However, participants explained why they became politically passive again after
the revolution
What happened afterward was very different according to all participants. XY
regretfully said, “We all came back to the first square, same same!” That is because, as
AG said, “Most of Egyptians react and rarely take a significant initiative.” I asked a
different participant whether she agreed on that observation, she said, “Our backing up
for the revolution was such reaction.” Thirteen participants out of 16 expressed the same
collective belief that was expected, but SG, optimistically said, “Egyptians in
Washington, DC generally, are successful in many fields and slowly participating in
politics.” However, KF added, “In contrast to the 2011 revolution, the 2013 revolution
(or coup) retrieved polarization between Egyptians in Egypt. I think that had reflected on
us in Washington, DC.” KF assured that “the diaspora members’ reactive political
behavior was between passive and active but not very cooperative as before.”
Subtheme 2: Political role of mosques and churches in Washington, DC. It
was mentioned, conservative Muslim groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and
many Christian groups, are active more than other diaspora members. Most of the
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participants believed that the most successful diaspora institution in political mobilization
is the religious institutes and groups. So, they care about the relationship between Egypt
and the U.S. governments more than other activists.
There was no agreement among participants, including the secular participants, on
the nature of religious institutions’ political role. Most of them said that this role is
harmful to both countries; however, participants did not equate the mosques' role to the
church’s role. AW believed, “The effect of the sectors role depends on what is the
interests’ sort! And who you are. When the active church urges its Christian believers to
gather to welcome Elsisi in DC that gives him some necessary support; however, DC
knows that is fake.” SH added, “This role does not harm the state’s interests but might be
not what our diaspora wants.”
However, there is a paradox in the Coptic groups situation as TF implied. He said,
“They support the agenda of the Egyptian governments in Washington, DC, but they also
lobby claiming unfair governmental treatment. They used to have fair hearings in the
Capitol.” Therefore, as AE added, “The U.S. government widely suspects any role by the
church. Some in Congress; however, echo the Egyptian Church in expressing those
claimed grievances.” AE asserted that Trump’s administration has been raising those
grievances with the Egyptian government; but the church role in promoting Egyptian
interest remains limited for those grievances. AW saw this matter differently assuring
that the U.S. government watches the church, but it does not bother it as it does for
mosques. FF said, “They have a better situation here than their situation in Egypt.”
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No agreement between participants, including the secular participants, on the
religious institutions’ political role. Their opinions range from “no role” to “it is a bad
role.” Thus, the clergies should be stopped and limited to their original religious role.
MK’s opinion was extreme and did not make any difference between the mosque and the
Egyptian church. He said, “Mosques and churches are extraordinarily orthodox and antimodernity, therefore I find their roles in mobilizing Egyptians politically poisonous.” The
observations of AG supported my hypothesis that Mosques are suspect of hosting
radicals. He said, “They are infiltrated by FBI agents and informers. Both the Egyptian
and U.S. governments suspect them. Therefore their role remains minimal.“
In contrast, one or two participants only thought that mosques in Washington, DC
have no political role, but the church had an active part all the time supporting Elsisi’s
agenda. One participant only who called for the role of the mosques and churches; DD
added, “there is no dialogue between Christians and Muslims of Egyptian origin, and
there is a need to develop a national agenda that is good for all of us. I tried many times
but did not achieve positive results.”
As a result, several participants agreed that there should be an affirmative
separation between religion and the state. The former leader of AEA, MK asserted,
“There should be no role for mosques and churches in promoting political interest. Such
separation doesn’t exist, however, but the role played by these religious institutions is
limited anyway in America.” Therefore, as SH reminded me: President Sadat said during
the Muslim-Christian clash in 1981, that no religion in politics…no politics in religion.”
Consequently, he asserted to me that America-Trump should know and apply this golden
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role, which Obama and Carter did not consider, and we pay the price now. Listen, Imams
and Moncks should lead prayers only.”
Summary
The principal conclusion from the findings of this study is that the theme of home
culture explained the Egyptian diaspora typical passive political engagement. There are
several positive characteristics of the diaspora as well as positive elements in the host
country culture and system, such as living in the tolerant political climate of Washington,
DC close to the decision-makers. However, the diaspora members did not take enough
advantage on those elements because of the negative effect of the political home culture
characteristics. All participants agreed that the diaspora should continually and actively
contribute to the Egyptian interests in Washington, DC through socioeconomic and
political discourse, family relations, and networks; however, the practice is different.
Participants underlined several cultural characteristics in conjunction with external
factors that are hindering their political efforts.
The members, especially the older generation, preserved that domain culture and
its several aspects, despite their claim of long-living and total assimilation in the open
climate of Washington, DC. It seems that climate factor and high level of education and
carrier did not result in a high level of political engagement because of the opposite effect
of other factors. The cultural aspects are such as the busy personal life schedules,
insufficient help to new immigrants, lack of adequate organizational unity or cooperation,
competitive internal relationships, fear of Egyptian political and security authorities, and
lack of political ties with Washington, DC.
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All participants agreed that the external factor of the revolution was the greatest
motivation for acting for all Egyptians, including the diaspora in recent time. This finding
might confirm my hypothesis that the Egyptian diaspora acts when it has a compelling
and exceptional motivation such as the revolution. However, it remained unclear why and
how, if they are culturally passive, such a factor (i.e., revolution) changed their behavior
temporarily, or whether it was the change in the culture itself.
All participants provided enough information regarding their political concerns
and reasons for acting politically such as establishing a new democratic rule in Egypt or
economic support for Egyptians. However, none of them talked about their mechanism of
building and utilizing the desired lobby working on those concerns. For example,
participants did not mention reaching out to think tanks, or knocking on the door of
Washington, DC agencies.
The diaspora does not act as a whole. Engaging in political activities would
depend on individuals and specific groups. All participants agreed that Christians lobby
for their sectarian agenda and many Muslims lobby actively more than others.
Participants used the term individuals and similar terms frequently. For example,
participants stated, “Initiatives normally take the form of small demonstration…it
depends on the individual.” and “Egyptian diaspora members’ success stories are
individual.” There were fewer female participants than male participants. The female
participants spoke and participated less in my interviews. This note can be a small
indicator of the low level of their participation and interest in large.
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The Egyptian diaspora has difficulty maintaining and investing in political
relationships as well as obtaining their noncompetitive internal relationships.
Participants’ answers could imply that establishing active organizations and having
internal cooperative relationships serving one national agenda was not a high priority for
some of the diaspora members. Some participants admitted that there is national political
polarization that they had brought to their host country. However, none of their responses
were clear enough about the influence of that polarization, if any, on the diaspora
interrelationships and political activities in Washington, DC.
In Chapter 5, I will analyze and interpret the findings in the context of the
theoretical framework. I then will present the implications of the research study’s
findings for positive social change at the appropriate level and provided my study
recommendations for future researchers in the field. Finally, I will outline the limitations
of this research, followed by a conclusion that captures the essence of the study.
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Chapter 5 Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative single case study was to identify, explore,
describe, and share information regarding how the Egyptian diaspora and its different
members and subgroups narrate their political engagement regarding the Egyptian
interests in Washington, DC before, during, and after the 2011 revolutions and 2013
revolution or coup. In this chapter, I present my interpretation of the findings of this
study focusing on some key themes of the results, such as the effect of home culture on
the diaspora organizational development and political engagement and the style of its
involvement.
In this study, I discovered that the overall perception of the Egyptian diaspora
community on its contemporary engagement was negative. All participants asserted the
political engagement of the diaspora is affected negatively by the home culture side-byside with a few other factors related to the homeland and host country. Therefore, I
worked from the premise that exploring the present situation of Egyptian diaspora’s
political engagement is essential to establish a sustainable diaspora with healthy future
participation towards building an organized influential lobby in Washington, DC
The key findings also implied that Egyptian Americans participate in politics in
Washington, DC not because they are interested in politics in general or American
politics in particular but because they react to home politics. They do not engage in
Washington, DC political activity regarding U.S. or Egyptian political affairs because
they did not learn or use to participate in the Egyptian political realm inside Egypt.
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In the discussion of the results in this chapter, I further incorporate viewpoints
from the literature as presented in Chapter 2 that are related to the findings of this study.
Likewise, the theories of the passive political and social engagement of the Korean
diaspora, conflict theory of Truman, and the climate theory of Cigler and Loomis (2007)
were applied to the findings as appropriate. In the following sections, I discuss the
limitations, recommendations, and implications of the study. The chapter ends with a
conclusion.
Interpretation of the Findings
The findings of this research revealed a generally negative image of the Egyptian
diaspora and its contemporary political engagement. The diaspora engagement inclines
to be passive most of the time and to be active from time to time. Such perception was
particularly confirmed in the literature review of this study. The majority of Egyptian
expats abroad have been more focused on gaining an education and career to build their
economic fortunes (Ashour, 2010).
I used a theoretical framework that was based on Jang’s (2012, 2014) Korean
diaspora negative model to explore the adverse factors of the failing enterprise of
Egyptian Americans’ lack of political engagement. Some participants suggested that the
comparison with the successful Jewish diaspora might be not valid. Jang’s model
included factors that mainly addressed how and why the Korean-Americans were not
very engaging or influential except during intensive times. I applied some of those
factors from Jang’ (2012, 2014) theory, such as underestimation of the self’s political
engagement, lack of organization, and negative perception toward politics and
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organizational leadership. Besides Jang’s theory, my theoretical framework also included
other theories and diaspora models to address issues that Jang’s theory neglected.
The findings of this study approved several of my hypotheses from Chapter 1.
Positive characteristics and external factors are not always enough or capable of imposing
a positive change or keeping it in the diaspora reality; for instance, the excellent
education, employment and supportive political and social climate of the host
country. Cigler and Loomis’s (2007) climate theory indicated that a national, tolerant
environment should shape the expected proliferation of interest groups and organizations.
The general norm of many participants in this study was in line with this theory.
However, they also believed that the current generation did not understand the climate, so
they use the system of the host city. AG said, “The problem of the low level of political
engagement was not the Washington system.” One of the diaspora members’ significant
problems was the home culture of disorganization and lack of unity among the members
and groups. That culture has been hindering them from politically investing in the open
climate of Washington, DC.
The effect of host climate was not enough to help the diaspora members;
therefore, they became passive again when they lost the homeland motive to be active
politically. Several participants asserted that they were assimilated in U.S. society a long
time ago. However, the diaspora does not remain consistently engaged in the supportive
U.S. atmosphere despite that claim of assimilation, according to the participants. This
finding was further vindicated in the literature review of this study, as described by
Talani (2005) who stated that despite the members of many Egyptian diasporas deciding
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to become new citizens and assimilate into the Western host countries, they still have
difficulty being accepted and integrated into the political realm.
I sought to determine what factors made the diaspora members typically passive
and not influential most of the time, and I found that those factors are primarily cultural.
Ashour (2010) stated that the Egyptian diaspora is divided along political, ideological,
religious, and social class lines. Participant MK described the diaspora members resorting
to their political “tribes” and covering a wide range of small goals against Egyptian
nationality and losing the national framework.
The study findings also showed that the participants’ loyalty to Egypt is high but
is highest to the culture. All study participants reported that the lack of organizational
unification is a cultural characteristic. That culture includes several elements, such as
adopting sectorial agendas instead of recognized national purpose and organizational
leadership. Previous researchers, such as Cigler and Loomis (2007) and Oswiecimski
(2014), linked passive engagement to the lack of unified political organizations. MüllerFunk (2016) found that sharing common situations and believing and working for the
same causes among the members are essential elements for the diaspora’s proliferation
and development.
In general, a diaspora needs to found organizations or lobbies holding a clear
agenda and reasonable goals to be influential in the political process (Mearsheimer &
Walt, 2006). However, the results of this study revealed that the situation of the
contemporary Egyptian diaspora in general and AEA in particular is static and has clear
polarization. Fourteen participants out of the 16 admitted that the members have ongoing
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disputes on essential matters, such as leadership, the organization’s agenda, and political
orientation.
Many researchers also asserted the effect of losing an announced, clear
organizational purpose and goals among the Egyptian diaspora members and groups, in
particular, and Arab Americans in general. Smith (2000) and Ambrosio (2002)
contended that organizational unity might enable the diaspora to convince decisionmakers to support its political agenda. Therefore, the diaspora might have a chance to
shape the foreign policy of the United States (Smith, 2014). These sentiments are backed
up by a participant’s report. A congressman advised this participant to encourage the
Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC to announce a single agenda if the diaspora needs
consideration from Congress. When divisions occur within the diaspora and it loses its
united voice, it will be harder to gain or keep support outside it for its political cause
(Uslaner, 2007).
All participants asserted that building mutual relationships within the political
structure of Washington, DC in terms of enhancing the diaspora role in both countries
should be beneficial to the diaspora, Egypt, and the United States. Regarding the effect of
the different types and levels of diaspora relationships, the response of participants
ranged from “I do not know,” “no relationship at all,” or “minimal relationship; therefore,
low effect should be expected.” All participants admitted the lack of trust between
diaspora members and Egyptian governments, including official agencies, as well as the
insufficient relationship between diaspora and Washington, DC decision makers. They
also acknowledged that both levels of relationships are deteriorating at an alarming rate.
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Some participants specified results of those effective relationships, such as
imposing human rights statutes in Egypt. According to DeWind and Segura (2014), the
host land-diaspora relationship should help resolve some conflicts in the motherland.
Participant DD indicated that unfortunately, there is no dialogue between Christians and
Muslims of Egyptian origin, and there is a need to develop a national agenda that is good
for all.
The study findings determined that it is not true that the Egyptian diaspora never
has a political agenda that is based on organizational unity. It is also not true that all
sectors of the diaspora do not foster announced or unannounced agendas. The literature
explained and asserted the positive changes in the political positions and powers of some
diasporas after certain significant events, such as revolutions and Arab Spring. As all
participants asserted, their diaspora exceptionally, had a specific national motive based
on promising unification between all individuals and different groups during the
revolution.
Participants did not mention any home conflict caused by their diaspora
involvement. As indicated in Chapter 1, the Egyptian diaspora can be similar to Korean
diaspora regarding the sudden engagement behavior but not similar regarding the reason
of that engagement. According to Jang (2014), Koreans faced a domestic racial conflict
that had led to civic unrest in Los Angeles in 1992. That diaspora understood the need
for being active, united, and organized and, therefore, became aware of coalition
building. The study participants determined that the Arab Spring revolutions unified and
made them more conscious politically. Nevertheless, they gave different reasons for their
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enthusiastic reaction to the revolution; for example, DD mentioned that they love to see
Egypt as free and just as the United States. The conflict theory of Truman did not align
with the findings regarding the real reasons for the diaspora involvement in the
revolution activities.
Because of the diaspora’s passive home culture, such as typical insufficient
organizational unity and waves shape of engagement, it had not been able to keep the
revolution factor. All participants, including AEA members, also criticized and blamed
the political powers and circumstances in Egypt for the lack of sufficient organization
and political engagement. Jang (2014) mentioned the same observation regarding the
Korean diaspora but did not explain the reason for that waving shape of the diaspora
political and civic engagement.
The theoretical framework for this study held that the political engagement of
some diasporas, such as Korean diaspora, might take the waves shape. Some diaspora
turn from typically being passive to being active then passive again. The study findings
approved this major claim of this study regarding the Egyptian diaspora. This
phenomenon is an echo of the same behavior of the citizens inside the homeland. All
participants in this study agreed on that phenomenon, but they attributed it to different
reasons. MPI (2014, 2015) reports agreed with this finding. A significant portion of new
Egyptian organizations was established during the Arab Spring and Egyptian
revolutions. Many of those organizations had already grown inactive or disappeared after
the revolution. Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory clarified that although the domestic racial
conflict brought attention and awareness to the larger Korean population, Koreans have
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continued to be inactive. UV explained this phenomenon by attributing the constant
passive political engagement of Egyptian lobbying efforts to the fact the Egyptian people
used to be politically irrelevant.
Another aspect of the passive engagement and the absence of the culture of
organizational unity is the difference between the diaspora members, generations, and
groups regarding who could be active and the level of commitment. The difference
between involving people should lead to differences between their levels and types of
their organizational purposes. Diaspora members can also be different regarding their
lobbying efforts and national goals.
In details, all participants agreed that the first generation is politically passive.
They also decided on the future political role of the second and third generations in the
political realm of Washington, DC. This finding was in line with the theoretical study
framework that was based on Jang’s (2012, 2014) theory. The first generation of both
diasporas has this stand that is more intensive than the position of the later generations.
Therefore, the study participants believed that the second generation who understands
the politics and culture of both countries could hopefully function as a bridge to
represent their citizens and diaspora communities. They have hope in the political
involvement of the younger generations.
All participants agreed on the role of mistrust and negative perceptions factor that
exists, in particular, among the members of the first generation. That impact of that role
is not limited to the diaspora members’ intra-relationship, but it extends to the
relationship between the diaspora and Egyptian political system and agencies. This
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finding is consistent with previous concepts revealed in the literature. It is not just
negative perceptions but also mistrust between Egyptian citizens and their governments
that affect the citizens as well as diaspora members (Zohry & Debnath, 2010).
In line with those statements, Jang (2014) found that cynical perceptions and
distrust toward Korean associations and leadership, who belong to the first generation in
America is a common trend among Koreans in Washington, DC. It is a common thought
that those leaders and politicians only work for their won agenda and family businesses.
As the findings of my study indicated, the first generation of the Egyptian diaspora and
its leaders have the same situation; therefore, the members refrained from engaging
similarly to the Korean case.
The opinion of all participants confirms the prevailing view in the literature
review regarding the Coptic lobby in the United States. Rowe (2001), and Severo and
Zuolo (2012) emphasized that the lobby members are very active and more organized
compared to their Egyptian peers. However, the dispersed Islamic organizations and
mosques should also be considered in the same category according to the findings.
Mosques have been found to directly and purposefully influence political engagement
and perceptions of Arab Muslims (Jang, 2014).
The opinion of most of the participants that the political role of religious
institutions and groups is harmful to both countries matches Sheffer’s (2006) assertion.
This role and nature of some diasporas and groups can be detrimental on the political
level causing conflicts and terrorism in the home and host lands. This sentiment seems as
opposite to DeWind and Segura‘s (2014) recommendation; the host land-diaspora
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relationship should help resolve the conflicts in the motherland. However, I believe that
both statements are compatible.
The general implications of participants’ responses indicated that the national
purpose of a diaspora would be for the benefit of the diaspora and the home country. In
contrast, one sector of the diaspora with a sectorial agenda is usually working against the
whole or at least working for selfish demands. As stated by many participants who all
are Muslims, the Christian community promotes support for their claim of civic and
religious discrimination and the Egyptian military regime. Most of my study participants
do not like or at least they do not agree with the Coptic claim and political orientation.
Same participants except one who belongs to Muslim Brotherhood repeatedly asserted
that the organization is the most organized and active component of the diaspora in
Washington, DC. This group works for their won agenda that could be beyond the
Egyptian national purpose.
Limitations of the Study
Even though I applied several procedures to enhance trustworthiness, such as
members checking and executing multiple data sources, some limitations emerged. One
limitation of my research occurred during the data collection process was that the level
of participants’ cooperation and interaction with the study was average. Even though all
participants were asked to be not in a rush for returning their responses, all except one
did not respond promptly at all, and some did not respond and ignored my frequent
contacts. Three candidates were hesitated to answer my questions during the interview.
Their concern was whether I conduct my research for the Egyptian government and
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Elsisi, or a U.S. or Egyptian university. They were afraid that I could transfer their
information and responses to the security agencies. I assume that some others had the
same thought, although they did not say. To overcome their suspicious of my motive, I
referred them to the consent form.
Moreover, two candidates from my study had withdrawn after they have agreed
on participation. This behavior may imply to their passive political participation
concurrent with a lack of cooperation with other Egyptians like me. Another potential
recruit who was an Islamist leader advised me to join in a demonstration was conducted
by an Islamic group against the Egyptian president and government in front the Capitol
Hill. He said that I would meet several people who can accept answering my questions
instead of interviewing him! The last potential recruit did not respond to my several emails or phone calls.
Despite knowing about the member-checking process and the study duration,
most participants took a long time to respond to my request of member checking and did
not offer any valuable feedback or corrections to the transcripts. Perhaps, participants
answered the questions to the fullest, or they merely browsed their responses. To
overcome the threat to quality due to my own potential personal bias as an Egyptian
American political activist, I tried to remain objective throughout the entire study while
establishing trustworthiness.
Recommendations
While reviewing the available literature on diasporas, I did not find any study on
the Egyptian diaspora in Washington, DC. Also, while collecting my study data, I found
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there are no Egyptian or U.S. academic surveys, and interviews focusing on the Egyptian
diaspora viewpoints. Researchers performing similar studies could use this diaspora
model to explore the barriers and opportunities of other new or small-size diasporas
situations. According to literature as well as Chapter 4 findings, I found that the political
performance of the Egyptian diaspora connects functionally to culture and social
background interpretation of the diaspora members. So, to gain a deeper understanding
of the political engagement of the diaspora, future scholars could focus on the same
diaspora and city in areas other than political area such as social and economic.
Therefore, future researchers will be able to build a new inductive composing for a
comprehensive model theory on the Egyptian diaspora.
The strength of this study is that it is the first; therefore, all the candidates who
accepted to participate were interested in the topic; therefore, they willingly answered
the research questions. This involvement indicated that my research was meaningful to
participants. Their interest might encourage any follow up study to focus on the same
diaspora and city or other areas in the United States. Hence, the knowledge obtained by
my study participants would expand. Future research would also provide additional
information and recommendations for the Egyptian diaspora as well as decision-makers
of the home and host countries to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of that
diaspora. Washington, DC should be a good starting point for policy-makers and future
researchers if they consider the political engagement of the diaspora.
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Implications
In this case study, I based the study implications on the analysis of the subjective
perceptions and daily real-life experiences of research participants. Though this study
has limitations, implications for positive social change on different levels emerged for
policymakers, immigration agencies, and the diaspora itself. Because this study is not a
practical one, the study purpose was not about providing information from or to leaders,
members, and beneficiaries about strategies for better work. Instead, the study only
brought attention to the present status of the Egyptian diaspora and its weaknesses. In
this way, the members can design better programs and strategies to empower their
community and promote its agenda. Particularly, this section should bring attention to
the need for improving better internal relationship the Egyptian diaspora as well as
cooperation between it and other diasporas, and the home and host lands.
An organized, active diaspora operating in Washington, DC can be an agent of
positive social change in both countries. I asked participants how could their groups or
the whole diaspora obtain any benefit from my study and questions. One of them stated,
“Highlighting the challenges and the opportunities is always an eye-opener. I hope it
leads to a serious dialogue among all Egyptians in America to create a democratic Egypt
where all human rights are protected.” However, the Egyptian diaspora sustainability,
development, and influence are hindered by many challenges beyond and under its
control as Chapter 4 findings presented.
Regarding the potential positive social change on the individual and social levels,
the knowledge gained from this study could guide changes in the practices of the
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diaspora, including the leaders of AEA. The foremost step towards a competent diaspora
and its strong lobby is building personal trust and organizational unity among the group
members and leaders (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). Those leaders must find ways to
remain sustainable by resolving their conflicts and avoiding their personal agendas to
reach the desired unity. This is not an easy task, but the diaspora should take advantage
of the supportive climate of Washington, DC to work on its individualistic cultures
where individuals strive for self-achievement only. I assume that the diaspora needs to
build trust with Egyptian citizen and new immigrants via economic contribution and
legal aids. Formalizing and intertwining that social role with political action might lead
and speed up social and political change in the homeland and the diaspora reality. The
Chinese diaspora can be an ideal that the Egyptian diaspora might follow.
The most active organizations and groups such as Muslim and Coptic
organizations should be directed towards one national purpose under a single leadership
of one diaspora. However, that is a tremendous goal needs a lot of personal,
organizational, and political work. Concerning the religious institutions' political role, I
would adopt the recommendation of Jang (2012) who considered the religious factor as a
critical element of organizational type and unity. Therefore, there is a need for studying
the effect of the civic and political role of religious-background institutions factor on the
diaspora communities in the host countries, including the United States, particularly, in
Washington, DC.
Jang (2014) and my participants emphasized the likelihood of political
involvement of the following generations. The second generation who understands the
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politics and culture of both countries could function as a bridge to represent their citizens
and diaspora communities. On the other hand, new generations might not have the
negative traits of the home culture such as negative perceptions mistrust in the homeland
politicians and diaspora organizations. Hence, there might be a hope in the political
involvement of the younger generations. Future studies might also focus on the empirical
implications of that role and why it could have a better chance than the chance of the
first generation of the diaspora.
On the organizational and political levels, the whole diaspora, not as groups or
individuals, needs to create a collaboration with other incipit diasporas. The diaspora
also needs to seek partnerships with the home and host governments regardless of the
nature of the existing relationships between the governments. Knowledge of the diaspora
efforts and challenges could establish opportunities for partnerships between the
governments and diaspora, thus promoting positive social change. Knowledge of goals
and plans rendered by the diaspora could add to existing data and assist in the decisionmaking processes of organizations and governments.
Also, the diaspora should be active, involving in the host country' affairs in the
first place; therefore, it would be accepted and heard in its host environment regarding
home concerns. Smith (2000) recommended that interests groups, in general, should
implement deep understanding and deal with the U.S. political system. Groups should
work to foster political relationships with the decision-makers, no matter whether the
system could be good or bad according to the groups view. As I mentioned in Chapter 2,
diasporas should not try to change the political system of America because it would be
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an unrealistic attempt. On the other hand, the favorable climate and policies of the host
state should consider diasporas as a definite source for national benefits rather than a
symbol of weakness for their original countries or threat against their host states.
The Egyptian diaspora should investigate, on all possible levels, the factors that
kept it passive again after being active during the revolution. The cultural attribution
might be not the only factors. The theory of Jang (2012, 2014) and conflict, and climate
theories did not offer enough updated explanation regarding the study target diaspora.
Hence, future studies need to seek theories and methods to explore other factors
explaining that shape of unstable political engagement of the Egyptian diaspora and other
similar diasporas. The diaspora leaders might need to share the results of this study with
their members. That could be as a mean of exploring ways to build their stability of
engagement and effective lobby with specific strategies that should enhance and truly
empower the diaspora. AEA would be ideal for the whole diaspora in this regard.
Conclusion
The problem of this study was that there is no existing studies or interests in
studying the Egyptian diaspora. Given this fact, the contribution of this qualitative study
is important to the discipline, diaspora, and related parties. The study is not an applied or
comprehensive study, but it forms a foundation for future studies on the same topic. The
impact of this qualitative case study is to help the diaspora members in Washington, DC
understand their current situation issues. The different views of the study participants
may help frame an initiative for some positive social changes in the reality of the whole
diaspora.

231
Some facts in the present diaspora predicament would not be changed in the short
term because they are beyond the diaspora control. Perhaps, political culture and small
size of the diaspora could take generational time to be enhanced. On the other hand, the
diaspora can improve other factors. Adopting one national motive can be the backbone
of the diaspora organizational unity. Chapter 4 findings showed that this factor could
lead to improving other factors and facts. Besides, the host land-diaspora close
relationships should provide opportunities for all, thus resulting in positive social change
on all levels and areas (DeWind & Segura, 2014). Residency in Washington, DC is a
privilege that is not available for other Egyptian communities and it should facilitate the
diaspora access to the decision-makers door. However, to reach positive change, any
diaspora should not involve in relationships as individuals or groups. Individual and
sectorial relationships and interests could lead to negative changes, especially related to
the homeland's interests (Sheffer, 2006) and that is like the present situation.
Given all of these facts, some individuals of the younger generation might be
interested in sharing and addressing the findings of this study. There is a need to
encourage the younger generation to become more engaged, not only in the host country
but also homeland (See Jang, 2012). The Passive culture of the current generation should
not affect the coming generations whom born and live in the United States. The ultimate
goal is to maintain the organizational unity by avoiding any potential emergence of new
religious or sectorial groups and agendas among the new generations. AEA needs to
accumulate more efforts in this regard to strengthen the collective political weight and
presence of the Egyptian diaspora at the broader community for the future.
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Appendix: Interview Questions
The diaspora term in this questioner is defined as a socio-political entity that maintains
connections with Egypt and other Egyptian groups beyond the border and mobilizes for
causes. For the purpose of this interview, be aware that the term diaspora, would mean
community
A. Describe your Background (Nationality, education, religion, age, profession)
[Optional]
1. Why and when did you come to the United States, and DC in particular?
2. Do you think about going back to or staying in Egypt? Why or why not?
B. Identify your political identify
3. What community or political group do you belong to [If applicable]?
4 What did lead you to change or not change your original identity since you came to
America?
5 Who do you admire among the greatest Egyptians of the past and present?
6 Do you attend any church service or go to any mosque? If so, how often?
Research Quistion1. How do members of the Egyptian diaspora describe the
connection of the external factors (i.e., the influence of the revolution, organizational
and political concerns, relationship between the governments, American
environment elements, relationship between that diaspora and host country) of
political engagement, and the internal factors (i.e., small size, negative perception on
politicians, loyalty, and organizational unity) with the institutionalization and
development, and political engagement of that diaspora in Washington, DC society?
C. The level of assimilation and self-identity of the Egyptian community within the
American society?
7. Do children learn Arabic because the parents push it, send them to Egypt, and so on?
8. Does second generation become Americans and soon forget how to speak Arabic?
9. What is the level and type of the loyalty the diaspora keeps and shows to Egypt (e.g.
financial contribution, showing self-identity, lobbying, and helping newly arrivals in
solving their legal concerns)?
10. Do Egyptians, including you, believe that they are Arab? What can be a rationale?
11. How that belief could reflect on the Egyptian Americans identity, and Egyptian
political interests?
D. The Egyptian community characteristics and elements
12. Why could you think that the Egyptian and Arab diasporas are typically passive in
terms of political activities?
13. What has kept the Egyptian diaspora unorganized and not cooperative politically?
14. Despite the huge population in Egypt, why Egyptian diaspora's size is smaller than
others? Can be individuals’ immigration personal decision and pattern, or U.S.
immigration policy [e.g. green card] a reason?
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15 Could the small size be a positive characteristic and thus; the Egyptian diaspora
should invest in it similarly to the small Jewish Diaspora? Why and how? (Explanation:
Jewish diaspora as an example; the more it is small, the more it is more focusing and
stronger)
16 How could mistrust and negative perception of Egyptian politics and government in
Egypt and organizations leaders in DC refrain the diaspora from political engagement?
17 Based on those characteristics, how could you evaluate the performance of diaspora?
E. External factors you think discourage or motivate the diaspora political
engagement
18 How could the Egyptian diaspora possible concerns [e.g. personal, political and
religious fractions among the diaspora members; and Israelis-Palestinians conflict] affect
its political activities and engagement?
19 Does the better relationship between the present Egyptian and American governments
affect the diaspora negatively? How?
20 How could political American environment elements, i.e. local politics and politicians,
foreign policies, and official or public attitude do or do not effect diaspora establishment,
engagement, and activities?
21 What do you think about the factor of the relationship between your diaspora and
decision maker in the host country or city, Washington, DC that can affect the diaspora
position or role?
Research Question 2. How does the Egyptian community in Washington,
D.C., act and engage in the political process regarding the national Egyptian
concerns such as the presidential revolution and elections?
F. The political engagement style of the Egyptian Diaspora in Washington, DC.
23 Who involves in the Egyptian concerns more than others [first or new generation, men
or women, religious or secular persons, or immigrants or citizens...]?
24 What Egyptian issues [i.e. 1-facilitating the emigration process, the presidential
elections and constitution, and Egypt-America relationships] make the diaspora (AEA in
particular, if applicable) attempting to influence the U.S. government?
G. The Egyptian diaspora’s perspective on its political roles and engagement
activities in Washington, DC society concerning Egypt issues?
25 How do you, as a member of AEA or not, perceive the way Egyptians have been
active in the American political sphere and activities [e.g. voting, financing the political
campaigns, contacting American official entities, becoming politicians themselves, or
demonstrating]?
26 How much the community members lobby to promote Egypt’s interests?
27. Should Washington, DC area mosques, and Coptic institutions play any political role?
Is it harmful to the Egyptian state? How could the American government and host
environment see that role?

